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Throughout	  the	  1960s,	  Guatemala’s	  radical	  left	  became	  consumed	  in	  an	  internal	  debate	  
concerning	  the	  revolutionary	  strategy	  they	  believed	  should	  be	  followed	  to	  generate	  
radical	  socio-­‐political	  and	  economic	  changes	  in	  Guatemala.	  Confronting	  the	  societal	  
anxieties	  that	  accompanied	  advances	  in	  modernity,	  such	  as	  growing	  wealth	  inequality,	  
new	  forms	  of	  social	  poverty,	  and	  the	  marginalization	  of	  the	  fragments	  in	  Guatemalan	  
society	  (primarily,	  peasants	  and	  workers),	  Guatemala’s	  radical	  left	  encountered	  a	  
fundamental	  quandary	  in	  the	  development	  of	  its	  revolutionary	  methodology.	  Should	  
they	  work	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  electoral	  democracy	  to	  realize	  radical	  reforms	  or,	  as	  a	  
militant	  faction	  of	  the	  radical	  left	  increasingly	  proposed,	  would	  radical	  changes	  require	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1	  
Introduction	  to	  the	  thesis	  
This	  thesis	  explores	  the	  strategic	  divergences	  that	  polarized	  Guatemala’s	  radical	  left1	  in	  
the	  1960s.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  constructing	  and	  developing	  their	  revolutionary	  
strategies,	  the	  radical	  left	  debated,	  above	  all	  else,	  the	  merit	  of	  electoral	  democracy	  as	  a	  
capable	  venue	  for	  initiating	  revolutionary	  changes.	  Throughout	  the	  1960s,	  some	  in	  the	  
radical	  left	  negotiated	  a	  methodological2	  shift	  from	  democratic	  reformism	  to	  armed	  
insurrection,	  producing	  a	  methodological	  rupture	  that	  challenged	  the	  radical	  left’s	  
pursuits	  of	  political	  and	  revolutionary	  unity.	  The	  diverse	  set	  of	  perspectives	  regarding	  
this	  strategic	  dilemma,	  reveal	  the	  dynamic	  and	  non-­‐static	  mosaic	  of	  Guatemala’s	  radical	  
left	  throughout	  the	  decade.	  	  
	   The	  radical	  left	  focused	  their	  tactical	  deliberations	  on	  the	  forms	  of	  revolutionary	  
struggle;	  centrally,	  they	  debated	  the	  merits	  of	  electoral	  reformism	  as	  a	  revolutionary	  
tool.	  Some	  in	  Guatemala’s	  radical	  left	  argued	  that	  multiple	  forms	  of	  struggle,	  including	  
electoral	  reformism	  and	  popular-­‐front	  building,	  should	  be	  simultaneously	  navigated	  to	  
extend	  the	  revolutionary	  struggle	  to	  the	  more	  moderate	  segments	  of	  Guatemalan	  
society	  in	  order	  to	  broaden	  their	  bases	  of	  support.	  However,	  the	  emergence	  of	  leftist	  
militant	  groups	  in	  the	  early	  1960s	  challenged	  this	  oppositional	  approach	  of	  democratic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I define “radical left” by political radicalness, as judged relatively and temporally according to 
the political conditions of particular places and times. In Guatemala, I define the radical left in 
relation to their political policy positions, which typically questioned the relationship between 
land and capital. Generally, Guatemala’s radical left in the 1950s and ‘60s advocated for 
significant agrarian reform, workers’ rights to organize into unions and other trade 
organizations, an end to socio-economic and political dominance of the landowning elite, and a 
halt to foreign ownership of natural resources and interventionism.  
2	  Throughout this thesis, I use the term “methodological,” to mean the strategy and tactic that the 
radical left argued should be followed to achieve radical reforms. While the PGT and the FAR 
shared a common vision for a “nueva Guatemala,” they disagreed on the methodology that should 
be implemented to realize it.  	  
	  	  
2	  
reformism	  and	  its	  prioritization	  of	  legal	  modes	  of	  resistance	  over	  political	  violence.	  The	  
Rebel	  Armed	  Forces	  (FAR),	  Guatemala’s	  most	  significant	  left-­‐wing	  guerrilla	  faction	  in	  the	  
1960s,	  offered	  what	  they	  perceived	  to	  be	  a	  counter-­‐hegemonic	  vision	  for	  a	  new	  
oppositional	  project,	  fragmenting	  away	  from	  the	  Communist	  Party,	  known	  as	  the	  
Guatemalan	  Worker’s	  Party	  (PGT).	  The	  FAR	  guerrillas	  denounced	  electoral	  democracy	  as	  
a	  farce,	  arguing	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  PGT,	  that	  the	  road	  to	  revolutionary	  change	  would	  not	  
pass	  through	  a	  ballot	  box.	  	  
	   The	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  united	  around	  what	  they	  perceived	  to	  be	  the	  breach	  of	  
Guatemala’s	  national	  sovereignty	  by	  foreign	  imperialism	  and	  U.S.	  interventionism.	  They	  
resented	  the	  mass	  eviction	  of	  campesinos,	  or	  Guatemalan	  peasants,	  many	  of	  whom	  
were	  forced	  off	  their	  subsistence	  farmland	  to	  open	  up	  lands	  for	  commercial	  farming;	  
they	  objected	  to	  the	  government	  corruption	  that	  administered	  the	  purchase	  of	  such	  
national	  lands.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  envisioned	  a	  “nueva	  Guatemala,”	  which	  
would	  be	  ruled	  by	  a	  worker-­‐peasant	  alliance;	  their	  immediate	  demands	  were	  clear:	  land	  
reform,	  protection	  of	  worker’s	  rights,	  and	  a	  society	  that	  protected	  dignity	  and	  justice	  for	  
all	  Guatemalans.3	  	  	  
	   While	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  claimed	  to	  share	  both	  a	  common	  enemy	  and	  a	  
Marxist-­‐Leninist4	  political	  line,	  they	  diverged	  on	  the	  revolutionary	  strategy	  they	  believed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In Edgar Marroquín’s biography, Turcios Lima: Este sí era Comandante (Guatemala: Imprenta 
Vasquez, 1998), 32, 69, notes that FAR guerrilla leader Luis Augusto Turcios Lima referenced the 
revolutionary struggle as a struggle for a “Nueva Guatemala.” Turcios Lima offered a counter-
hegemonic conception of a Guatemalan society that rejected capitalism and the corresponding 
socio-economic strains it placed upon the fragments of Guatemalan society (campesinos, workers, 
indigenous peoples, and women).  
4 According to Alfred B. Evans, in his work Soviet Marxism-Leninism: The Decline of an Ideology 
(Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1993), Marxism-Leninism refers to a political ideology 
	  	  
3	  
could	  produce	  radical	  changes;	  namely,	  they	  disagreed	  on	  the	  primacy	  of	  electoral	  
reformism	  versus	  armed	  tactics.	  Throughout	  the	  decade,	  the	  PGT	  party	  persistently	  
looked	  for	  electoral	  openings,	  arguing	  that	  democratic	  reformism	  in	  tandem	  with	  
sufficient	  popular	  will,	  could	  legally	  generate	  radical	  changes.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  FAR	  
discarded	  electoral	  democracy	  as	  a	  corrupted	  bourgeois	  tool,	  diametrically	  opposed	  and	  
inherently	  incompatible	  with	  revolutionary	  change.	  	  	  	  
	   By	  the	  mid	  1960s,	  the	  FAR	  increasingly	  vocalized	  their	  frustration	  with	  their	  
subordinate	  political	  and	  leadership	  positions	  on	  the	  PGT’s	  Central	  Committee,	  the	  
party’s	  political	  leadership	  apparatus.	  Further	  straining	  their	  alliance,	  the	  PGT	  only	  
reluctantly	  committed	  resources	  to	  the	  FAR	  guerilla	  campaigns,	  instead	  focusing	  on	  
legal	  alternatives	  of	  resistance	  such	  as	  political	  participation	  and	  electoral	  reformism.	  
According	  to	  FAR	  guerrilla	  leader	  Pablo	  Monsanto,	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  radical	  left	  to	  
effectively	  coordinate	  their	  revolutionary	  campaigns	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  “organize	  the	  
mobilization	  of	  the	  masses,”	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  coherent	  “political	  organization.”5	  The	  
central	  methodological	  issue,	  then,	  that	  challenged	  revolutionary	  unity,	  was	  how	  to	  
effectively	  integrate	  a	  traditional	  Communist	  political	  party	  (the	  PGT)	  with	  a	  guerrilla	  
movement	  (the	  FAR).	  The	  problem	  with	  orthodox	  Marxism,	  FAR	  guerrilla	  leader	  César	  
Montes	  explained,	  is	  that	  “there	  was	  no	  mention	  of	  guerrillas.”6	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that prioritizes the leadership of a revolutionary vanguard, or those who have developed class-
consciousness through the realization of the dialectic of class struggle. This revolutionary 
vanguard directs and leads the “dictatorship of the proletariat” during the transition to socialism.  
5 Marta Harnecker, “Pueblos en Armas,” Serie Luchas Populares Latinoamericanas (1983): 29. 
6 Julio César Macías, Epitáfio para César Montes: relatos de la guerra Revolucionaria en Centroamérica 
(San Salvador: Editorial Guayampopo, 1997), 99.	  
	  	  
4	  
	   While	  the	  FAR	  accused	  the	  PGT	  of	  abandoning	  the	  armed	  struggle,	  the	  PGT	  
publically	  accepted	  FAR’s	  armed	  strategy	  as	  one	  methodological	  form,	  but	  the	  PGT	  
leadership	  argued	  that	  multiple	  forms	  of	  struggle	  should	  be	  implemented	  
simultaneously.	  The	  PGT	  were	  reluctant	  to	  close	  the	  door	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  electoral	  
openings,	  hoping	  eventual	  negotiations	  could	  shift	  the	  armed	  struggle	  towards	  that	  of	  a	  
democratic	  struggle.	  The	  PGT	  viewed	  armed	  tactics	  only	  as	  a	  potential	  catalyst;	  they	  
accepted	  a	  “brief”	  insurrection	  in	  order	  to	  force	  the	  government	  to	  compromise	  on	  an	  
electoral	  level,	  but	  they	  were	  not	  prepared	  for	  a	  “prolonged”	  war,	  as	  advocated	  by	  the	  
FAR.	  	  
	   When	  presidential	  elections	  were	  scheduled	  for	  March	  1966,	  the	  methodological	  
disagreements	  that	  were	  dividing	  the	  radical	  left	  reached	  a	  thunderous	  pitch.	  Despite	  
the	  FAR’s	  firm	  anti-­‐participatory	  stance,	  the	  PGT	  decided	  to	  support	  Julio	  César	  Méndez	  
Montenegro,	  a	  progressive	  candidate	  who	  promised	  to	  enact	  reforms.	  When	  Méndez	  
Montenegro	  won	  the	  election,	  the	  PGT	  were	  cautiously	  optimistic	  that	  they	  had	  made	  
the	  right	  choice	  in	  participating	  in	  the	  elections.	  However,	  despite	  the	  “democratic”	  
election	  of	  Méndez	  Montenegro,	  the	  Guatemalan	  military	  remained	  the	  ultimate	  
authority	  in	  the	  nation,	  effectively	  preventing	  the	  Méndez	  Montenegro	  administration	  
from	  passing	  any	  tangible	  reforms.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  military	  unleashed	  a	  brutal	  counter-­‐
insurgency	  campaign	  that	  accelerated	  social	  and	  political	  violence,	  leaving	  the	  radical	  
left	  in	  a	  state	  of	  disarray.	  From	  1966-­‐1970,	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  continued	  to	  debate	  the	  
decision	  they	  had	  made	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  elections	  of	  1966.	  The	  FAR	  pointed	  to	  the	  
endemic	  levels	  of	  violence	  that	  gripped	  Guatemala	  following	  the	  election	  as	  evidence	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for	  the	  fundamental	  shortcomings	  of	  electoral	  democracy	  in	  Guatemala.	  Many	  in	  the	  
PGT,	  in	  contrast,	  retained	  a	  more	  sympathetic	  view	  of	  the	  Méndez	  Montenegro	  
administration,	  arguing	  its	  failures	  were	  more	  a	  factor	  of	  insufficient	  popular	  will,	  a	  lack	  
of	  democratic	  resolve	  that	  could	  potentially	  force	  the	  military	  to	  accept	  Méndez	  
Montenegro’s	  reforms.	  The	  PGT	  remained	  defiant	  that	  electoral	  reformism	  should	  
remain	  a	  central	  component	  of	  the	  party’s	  revolutionary	  praxis	  of	  the	  future;	  many	  in	  
the	  PGT	  believed	  that	  if	  they	  were	  successful	  in	  expanding	  their	  bases	  of	  support,	  and	  
could	  rally	  enough	  political	  momentum,	  then	  they	  could	  force	  the	  military	  to	  concede	  
their	  demands.	  	  
	   By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1960s,	  the	  PGT	  maintained	  that	  the	  ongoing	  struggles	  plaguing	  
Guatemala’s	  revolutionary	  movement	  was	  not	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  focus	  on	  the	  armed	  
struggle,	  as	  the	  FAR	  increasingly	  maintained,	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  failure	  to	  generate	  enough	  
political	  will	  to	  gain	  adequate	  democratic	  position.	  They	  blamed	  the	  FAR’s	  violent	  
revolutionary	  strategy	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  support	  from	  the	  more	  moderate	  members	  of	  the	  
radical	  left;	  namely,	  urban	  workers,	  students,	  and	  the	  middle	  class,	  who	  were	  alienated	  
and	  isolated	  from	  the	  struggle.	  To	  the	  PGT,	  the	  revolutionary	  struggle	  was	  like	  a	  chess	  
match;	  it	  would	  require	  a	  thoughtful	  and	  well-­‐rounded	  execution	  of	  revolutionary	  
strategy,	  a	  strategy	  that	  utilized	  all	  the	  pieces	  on	  the	  board	  in	  complementary	  
capacities.	  	  	  	  	  
Historiography	  	  
There	  have	  been	  few	  scholarly	  works	  that	  specifically	  aim	  at	  unraveling	  the	  
methodological	  complexities	  and	  strategic	  divergences	  within	  Guatemala’s	  radical	  left	  in	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the	  1960s.	  The	  strategic	  debate	  between	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR,	  concerning	  the	  primacy	  
of	  electoral	  reformism	  over	  armed	  tactics,	  is	  generally	  glossed	  over	  without	  sufficient	  
critical	  analysis.	  My	  primary	  research	  suggests	  that	  competing	  notions	  of	  revolutionary	  
strategies	  were	  the	  most	  ferociously	  debated	  and	  internally	  divisive	  issues	  that	  
challenged	  the	  radical	  left’s	  ability	  to	  secure	  revolutionary	  unity	  throughout	  the	  1960s.	  
This	  tactical	  schism	  consumed	  the	  writings	  of	  both	  movements,	  with	  voluminous	  
correspondence	  penned	  back	  and	  forth,	  arguing	  in	  favor	  of	  their	  particular	  ideological	  
and	  methodological	  visions.	  This	  thesis	  attempts	  to	  address	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  historiography	  
and	  to	  complicate	  the	  historical	  understanding	  of	  Guatemala’s	  radical	  left	  in	  the	  1960s;	  
principally,	  this	  thesis	  provides	  a	  more	  nuanced	  analysis	  than	  what	  has	  been	  done	  in	  the	  
past,	  concerning	  the	  competing	  strategies	  of	  electoral	  reformism	  versus	  violent	  
revolution	  in	  Guatemala	  during	  the	  1960s.	  
	   There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  scholarly	  works	  that	  elucidate	  the	  historical	  conditions	  
that	  both	  informed	  and	  shaped	  the	  diverse	  set	  of	  perspectives	  held	  by	  the	  radical	  left	  in	  
the	  1960s.	  These	  scholarly	  histories	  illuminate	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  conditions	  that	  
radically	  altered	  land	  use	  patterns,	  primed	  the	  acceleration	  of	  popular	  mobilization,	  and	  
shaped	  political	  power	  dynamics,	  which	  were	  constantly	  evolving	  as	  Guatemala’s	  
political	  rule	  shifted	  hands	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  
historiography	  with	  the	  intent	  of	  providing	  a	  historical	  framework	  that	  facilitates	  a	  
deeper	  understanding	  of	  what	  informed	  the	  radical	  left’s	  methodological	  debates	  in	  the	  
1960s,	  while	  critically	  examining	  the	  sources	  for	  their	  bias	  and	  intent.	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Agrarian	  transformations	  	  
In	  his	  work	  Gift	  of	  the	  Devil,	  historian	  Jim	  Handy	  tracks	  the	  historical	  evolution	  of	  
agrarian	  systems	  and	  land	  ownership	  schemas	  in	  Guatemala,	  connecting	  a	  historical	  
legacy	  of	  colonial	  plunder	  in	  the	  sixteenth	  and	  seventeenth	  centuries,	  the	  introduction	  
of	  liberalism	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  and	  the	  growing	  influence	  of	  U.S.	  imperial	  
interests	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  to	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  plights	  of	  Guatemalan	  
campesinos	  by	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century.	  	  
	   Following	  the	  Spanish	  conquest	  of	  Guatemala	  in	  the	  early	  sixteenth	  century,	  a	  
minority	  of	  land-­‐owning	  elite	  profited	  from	  the	  export	  of	  agricultural	  goods,	  forging	  a	  
colonial	  heritage	  of	  agrarian	  inequity.	  In	  the	  1870s,	  Handy	  contends,	  a	  series	  of	  liberal	  
reforms	  accelerated	  even	  more	  land-­‐grabs	  to	  promote	  coffee	  production,	  and	  its	  export	  
infrastructure,	  resulting	  in	  further	  strain	  on	  many	  campesinos	  to	  maintain	  their	  plots	  for	  
subsistence	  farming.	  Handy	  explains	  the	  consequences	  that	  the	  liberal	  reforms	  had	  
upon	  many	  campesinos	  and	  their	  communities:	  “The	  forced	  labour,	  the	  debt	  contracts,	  
the	  forced	  sale	  of	  village	  common	  land	  and	  the	  confiscation	  of	  tierras	  baldias	  [common	  
land	  without	  legal	  title]	  had	  the	  desired	  effect…they	  broke	  down	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  
highland	  villages,	  impoverished	  peasant	  agriculture	  and	  drove	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  
peasants	  to	  labour	  on	  the	  developing	  coffee	  fincas	  [large	  farm	  estates].”7	  By	  the	  early	  
twentieth	  century,	  Guatemala’s	  Caribbean	  coast	  was	  sold	  off	  to	  U.S.	  corporations,	  eager	  
to	  exploit	  the	  profitable	  banana	  industry	  that	  had	  accelerated	  since	  the	  construction	  of	  
a	  railway	  facilitated	  its	  export	  in	  1904.	  The	  United	  Fruit	  Company	  (UFC)	  created	  a	  
banana	  empire	  whose	  “domain	  and	  power	  appeared	  limitless”	  by	  the	  1930s,	  owning	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Jim Handy, Gift of the Devil (Boston: South End Press, 1984), 69.  
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three	  million	  acres	  of	  land	  and	  boasting	  $242	  million	  in	  domestic	  assets.8	  Throughout	  his	  
analysis,	  Handy	  demonstrates	  his	  interpretation	  that	  Guatemala’s	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  
political	  landscape	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  was	  informed	  and	  shaped,	  principally,	  by	  
shifts	  in	  agrarian	  systems,	  land	  ownership,	  and	  land	  use.	  	  
The	  expansion	  of	  agro-­‐capitalism	  in	  Guatemala	  
Much	  of	  the	  historiography	  on	  this	  time	  period	  analyzes	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  
political	  changes	  in	  Guatemala	  in	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century	  from	  a	  Marxist	  perspective	  
of	  class	  relations.9	  They	  maintain	  that	  before	  the	  expansion	  of	  agro-­‐capitalism	  following	  
the	  Second	  World	  War,	  many	  Guatemalan	  campesinos	  maintained	  small	  plots	  of	  land	  
for	  subsistence	  farming.	  	  According	  to	  political	  scientist	  Jeffery	  Paige,	  within	  this	  
traditional	  servile	  system,	  campesinos	  effectively	  operated	  outside	  of	  the	  market	  
economy	  where	  their	  passivity	  was	  preserved	  through	  a	  system	  of	  paternalistic	  
exchange.	  This	  subservient	  relationship,	  forced	  upon	  indigenous	  and	  ladino10	  
campesinos	  since	  colonialism,	  was	  maintained	  and	  reinforced	  through	  the	  coercive	  
power	  of	  the	  state.	  Paige	  argues	  that	  traditional	  servile	  systems	  deterred	  the	  ability	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Handy, Gift of the Devil, 78-79.	  
9 See, for example, Jeffery Paige, Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the 
Underdeveloped World (New York: Free Press, 1978), Susanne Jonas, Guatemala (Berkeley: North 
American Congress on Latin American, 1974), Jim Handy, Revolution in the Countryside (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1994), Robert G. Williams, Export Agriculture and the Crisis 
in Central America (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1986), Richard Adams, 
Crucifixion by Power (Austin: The University of Texas Printing Division, 1970) and John A. Booth, 
Understanding Central America (Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1989). 
10 The term “ladino” is traditionally associated with Latin Americans of mixed racial heritage, a 
blending of white and indigenous bloodlines. However, in his work Más Que un Indio (Santa Fe: 
School of American Research Press, 2006), Charles R. Hale problematizes the historic labeling of 
the term “ladino“ as its usage tends to ignore internal difference while promoting misguided 
homogeneity of a widely varying social class and/or racial identity. 
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rural	  peoples	  to	  achieve	  political	  organization	  as	  a	  result	  of	  geographic	  and	  structural	  
isolation.	  	  
	   By	  the	  1950s,	  technological	  innovations	  in	  agricultural	  production	  prompted	  the	  
cultivation	  of	  previously	  unusable	  lands,	  greatly	  modifying	  existing	  socio-­‐economic	  
structures.	  Many	  campesinos	  migrated	  out	  of	  isolated	  rural	  areas	  in	  search	  for	  wage-­‐
labour	  employment.	  In	  doing	  so,	  Paige	  maintains,	  campesinos	  entered	  into	  physical	  
spaces	  in	  closer	  proximity	  to	  one	  another,	  generating	  new	  opportunities	  for	  labour	  
organization	  and	  mobilization.	  Augmented	  population	  density	  and	  increased	  spaces	  for	  
exchange	  produced	  the	  conditions	  for	  popular	  organization	  to	  accelerate.11	  	  
	   To	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  shift	  from	  subsistence	  farming	  to	  wage-­‐labour	  
facilitated	  popular	  mobilization,	  political	  scientist	  Susanne	  Jonas	  discusses	  an	  interview	  
she	  conducted	  in	  1966	  with	  a	  migrant	  wage-­‐laborer	  working	  at	  a	  finca	  in	  the	  El	  Quetzal,	  
San	  Marcos	  Department	  of	  Guatemala.	  The	  worker	  reflected	  on	  how	  working	  wage-­‐
labour	  awakened	  him	  to	  injustice,	  enabling	  him	  to	  form	  new	  bonds	  of	  solidarity.	  He	  
recounted,	  “It	  was	  when	  I	  first	  went	  to	  work	  on	  the	  coast	  that	  I	  began	  to	  think	  about	  my	  
rights…I	  began	  to	  counsel	  other	  workers.	  One,	  two,	  three…until	  I	  gathered	  a	  group	  of	  all	  
the	  workers…Don’t	  you	  want	  to	  fight	  for	  your	  rights	  with	  me?”12	  Jonas,	  like	  Paige,	  
explains	  the	  acceleration	  of	  popular	  organization	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  ‘60s	  as	  a	  function	  of	  
the	  changing	  socio-­‐economic	  conditions	  of	  many	  campesinos	  who	  transitioned	  from	  
subsistence	  farmers	  to	  wage-­‐labourers.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Paige, Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World, 
42-44. 




	   In	  his	  work	  Export	  Agriculture	  and	  the	  Crisis	  in	  Central	  America,	  economist	  
Robert	  G.	  Williams	  examines	  the	  emergence	  of	  cotton	  and	  beef	  as	  major	  agro-­‐exports	  in	  
Guatemala	  during	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century.	  To	  Williams,	  such	  case	  studies	  
demonstrated	  how	  advances	  in	  agro-­‐capitalism	  encouraged	  the	  transition	  from	  
subsistence	  farming	  to	  wage-­‐labour.	  Guatemala’s	  ideal	  soil	  fertility,	  mild	  climate,	  and	  
cheap	  labour	  made	  cotton	  cultivation	  very	  desirable	  to	  foreign	  capitalists.	  Many	  plots	  of	  
previously	  subsistence	  farmland	  were	  converted	  into	  viable	  cotton	  fields,	  resulting	  in	  
mass	  eviction	  and	  landlessness	  of	  campesinos.	  By	  the	  early	  1960s,	  commercial	  cotton	  
cultivation	  created	  a	  new	  class	  of	  wage-­‐laborers,	  who	  traveled	  from	  their	  villages	  to	  
work	  often	  for	  minimal	  food,	  inferior	  lodging,	  and	  poor	  sanitation.13	  	  
	   Before	  the	  cattle	  boom	  hit	  Guatemala	  in	  the	  late	  1950s,	  cattle	  production	  was	  
generally	  small-­‐scale	  and	  did	  not	  require	  huge	  tracts	  of	  land.	  However,	  a	  surge	  in	  beef	  
demand	  in	  the	  U.S.	  catapulted	  the	  Guatemalan	  cattle	  market	  onto	  a	  globalized	  scale,14	  
draining	  beef	  from	  the	  local	  market.15	  Williams	  contends	  the	  “beef	  boom	  was	  greedier	  
for	  land	  than	  any	  of	  the	  export	  booms	  that	  preceded	  it.”16	  Unlike	  the	  coffee	  boom	  of	  the	  
late	  nineteenth	  century,	  limited	  by	  ecological	  constraints	  for	  rich	  fertile	  soil	  in	  
specialized	  elevations	  and	  climates,	  cattle	  could	  be	  grazed	  anywhere	  with	  grass.	  The	  
construction	  of	  fencing	  cut	  off	  baldios,	  or	  untitled	  lands,	  which	  were	  converted	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Williams, Export Agriculture and the Crisis in Central America, 59-65.  
14 It is interesting to note the cattle boom shifted land conversion from the Pacific coast to 
Northeastern Guatemala, specifically to the Izabal and Zacapa Departments, which would later 
become guerrilla strongholds. The guerrillas capitalized on campesino mobilization in these areas 
of extreme land inequity.  
15 Robert G. Williams notes in Export Agriculture and the crisis in Central America, 108, that in 1950, 
nearly all beef was consumed domestically. By 1970, nearly 75% went for export.   
16 Williams, Export Agriculture and the Crisis in Central America, 113.	  
	  	  
11	  
campesino	  commons	  to	  restricted	  private	  lands.	  Thus,	  the	  land	  that	  campesinos	  
managed	  to	  retain	  through	  other	  agro-­‐export	  booms,	  lands	  unsuitable	  for	  the	  
cultivation	  of	  coffee,	  cotton,	  or	  bananas,	  were	  now	  systematically	  exploited	  for	  cattle	  
grazing.	  Not	  only	  were	  campesino	  communities	  increasingly	  denied	  access	  to	  land,	  
campesinos	  also	  found	  it	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  find	  steady	  employment,	  as	  cattle	  
grazing	  did	  not	  require	  the	  same	  labour	  as	  previous	  commodities.	  Williams	  emphasizes	  
that	  the	  rapid	  socio-­‐economic	  shifts	  that	  accompanied	  attempts	  at	  agricultural	  
modernization,	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  class-­‐conflict	  over	  access	  to	  land.	  Williams	  suggests	  that	  
the	  rapidly	  modified	  socio-­‐economic	  conditions	  that	  resulted	  from	  the	  expansion	  of	  
agro-­‐capitalism	  in	  Guatemala,	  generated	  new	  levels	  of	  civil	  incompatibility	  and	  social	  
turmoil.17	  
	   Other	  scholarship	  on	  the	  topic,	  notably Carlos	  Guzman-­‐Bockler	  and	  Jean-­‐Loup	  
Herbert’s	  Guatemala:	  una	  interpretación	  histórico-­‐social,	  describes	  the	  generous	  
government	  financing	  given	  to	  major	  commercial	  enterprises,	  which	  encouraged	  the	  
expansion	  of	  agro-­‐capitalism	  in	  Guatemala.	  Generally,	  the	  introduction	  of	  free	  market	  
capitalism	  did	  not	  inherently	  favor	  the	  landed	  oligarchy,	  resulting	  from	  centuries	  of	  
stifled	  competition	  and	  monopolization.	  Therefore,	  the	  landed	  oligarchy	  depended	  on	  
the	  state	  for	  protection	  in	  the	  form	  of	  restrictions	  on	  land	  ownership	  and	  distribution.	  
Historian	  Angela	  B.	  Anthony	  describes	  the	  disparity	  in	  agrarian	  equity	  in	  Guatemala	  by	  
the	  mid	  1960s,	  noting	  that	  by	  1964,	  90%	  of	  all	  agricultural	  credit	  was	  given	  to	  
commercial	  firms.	  Contrastingly,	  Guatemalans	  categorized	  as	  “indigenous,”	  who	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Williams, Export Agriculture and the Crisis in Central America, 117.  
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accounted	  for	  70%	  of	  population,	  received	  only	  4%	  of	  the	  credit.18	  The	  resulting	  agrarian	  
inequity	  was	  evident	  by	  the	  1964	  Guatemalan	  Census	  findings,	  calculating	  that	  97.6%	  of	  
“small”	  farmers	  possessed	  37%	  of	  land,	  while	  the	  largest	  finca,	  owners,	  collectively	  
accounting	  for	  only	  2.4%	  of	  the	  total,	  possessed	  62.6%	  of	  cultivable	  land.19	  
	   In	  his	  work	  Crucifixion	  by	  Power,	  sociologist	  Richard	  Adams	  asserts	  that	  the	  agro-­‐
export	  boom	  also	  influenced	  urban	  areas;	  many	  campesinos	  immigrated	  into	  cities	  to	  
search	  for	  employment.	  Between	  1950-­‐1964,	  the	  number	  of	  Guatemalan	  cities	  with	  a	  
population	  over	  10,000	  nearly	  tripled.	  During	  the	  same	  time	  period,	  unemployment	  
rose	  from	  56	  to	  70%	  of	  the	  urban	  population.20	  Therefore,	  according	  to	  Adams,	  urban	  
areas	  also	  experienced	  prime	  conditions	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  increasingly	  radicalized	  
popular	  movements.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  relative	  immobility	  of	  lower	  social	  classes	  to	  
improve	  their	  general	  living	  conditions,	  a	  growing	  tension	  fragmented	  Guatemala’s	  
societal	  fabric.	  For	  some,	  the	  inequity	  of	  land	  ownership	  fueled	  a	  smoldering	  sentiment	  
that	  existing	  schemas	  of	  land	  and	  natural	  resource	  ownership	  required	  serious	  reform.	  
Adams	  argues	  that	  “changing	  bases	  of	  internal	  power,”	  in	  combination	  with	  changes	  in	  
migration	  patterns,	  generated	  a	  class	  conflict	  between	  “upper	  sector	  interest	  groups”	  
and	  “campesino	  organizations.”21	  In	  his	  work	  Understanding	  Central	  America,	  political	  
scientist	  John	  A.	  Booth	  echoes	  Adam’s	  assessment	  that	  by	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century	  
class-­‐conflict	  in	  Guatemala	  was	  rapidly	  developing,	  suggesting,	  “rapid	  changes	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Carlos Guzman-Bockler and Jean-Loup Herbert, Guatemala: una interpretación histórico-social 
(Mexico: siglo veintiuno 1972), 75. 
19 Angela B. Anthony, “The Minority that is a Majority: Guatemala’s Indians” Guatemala (1974): 
29.  
20 Adams, Crucifixion by Power, 134. 
21 Adams, Crucifixion by Power, 229.  
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economic	  and	  political	  conditions,”	  such	  as	  income	  inequality,	  unemployment,	  new	  
forms	  of	  social	  poverty,	  and	  popular	  mobilization,	  were	  the	  central	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  
the	  formation	  of	  revolutionary	  struggles	  in	  Central	  America	  in	  the	  1960s.22	  	  
The	  October	  Revolution	  and	  the	  “Ten	  Years	  of	  Spring”	  
To	  contextualize	  how	  the	  Guatemalan	  state	  negotiated	  the	  changing	  socio-­‐economic	  
landscape	  that	  transformed	  Guatemala	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  ‘60s,	  many	  of	  the	  general	  
histories	  on	  Guatemala	  highlight	  the	  politically	  progressive	  period	  between	  1944-­‐
1954.23	  After	  fourteen	  “years	  of	  terror,”24	  President	  Jorge	  Ubico	  resigned	  from	  office	  
July	  1,	  1944	  amidst	  violent	  student	  protests.	  A	  military	  junta,	  led	  by	  General	  Frederico	  
Ponce	  Vaídes,	  held	  power	  briefly	  until	  Ponce	  Vaídes	  was	  deposed	  on	  October	  20,	  1944	  
and	  presidential	  elections	  were	  scheduled,	  initiating	  a	  ten-­‐year	  politically	  progressive	  
period	  in	  Guatemala	  known	  as	  the	  October	  Revolution	  and	  the	  “Ten	  Years	  of	  Spring.”25	  	  
	   Juan	  José	  Arévalo,	  a	  reformist	  teacher	  in	  self-­‐imposed	  exile,	  returned	  to	  
Guatemala	  and	  was	  elected	  president	  on	  a	  platform	  of	  making	  “foreign	  enterprises…	  
subject	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  nation.”26	  Facing	  overwhelming	  opposition	  from	  an	  
entrenched	  oligarchy	  of	  landowners,	  foreign	  imperialist	  interests,	  the	  Catholic	  Church,	  
and	  the	  increasingly	  powerful	  military,	  Arévalo	  was	  unable	  to	  achieve	  any	  major	  reforms	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Booth, Understanding Central America.  
23 See, for example, Jim Handy’s, Gift of the Devil and Revolution in the Countryside, Greg Grandin, 
The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2004), Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-
1954 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) and Stephen Schlesinger, Bitter Fruit: The Story 
of the American Coup in Guatemala (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
24 Jim Handy notes in Gift of the Devil, 98, that Jorge Ubico was president of Guatemala from 1931 
to 1944. His administration was known for its strong relations with the U.S., generous 
concessions to U.S. foreign investment firms, and its commitment to stifle political opposition. In 
1934, he passed the Vagrancy Law, which required landless peasants to work 150 days per year.  
25 Handy, Gift of the Devil, 105-106. 
26 Handy, Gift of the Devil, 104. 	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that	  addressed	  agrarian	  inequity.27	  However,	  when	  Colonel	  Jacobo	  Árbenz	  Guzmán	  was	  
elected	  president	  in	  March	  1951,	  it	  was	  evident	  that	  Arévalo’s	  October	  Revolution	  
would	  endure.	  Árbenz	  established	  freedom	  of	  press,	  poured	  money	  into	  education	  (15%	  
of	  total	  budget),	  and	  legalized	  lower-­‐sector	  organization	  with	  new	  labour	  laws	  that	  
removed	  traditional	  protections	  for	  the	  Guatemalan	  oligarchy.28	  	  
	   With	  support	  of	  the	  Guatemalan	  Worker’s	  Party	  (PGT),	  and	  validation	  from	  a	  U.S.	  
authored	  International	  Bank	  of	  Reconstruction	  and	  Development	  (IBRD)29	  report,	  
President	  Árbenz	  concluded	  that	  the	  principal	  solution	  to	  Guatemala’s	  economic	  
problems	  was	  agrarian	  reform.	  Árbenz	  confronted	  foreign	  capitalist	  monopolies30	  by	  
positioning	  the	  state	  as	  a	  competitor.	  He	  challenged	  the	  transport	  monopoly	  held	  by	  the	  
United	  Fruit	  Company	  (and	  its	  subsidiaries)	  by	  constructing	  a	  new	  rival	  highway	  to	  the	  
Atlantic	  port	  of	  Santo	  Tómas.	  Most	  significantly,	  he	  promoted	  and	  legislated	  the	  
Agrarian	  Reform	  Law	  of	  1952,	  which	  called	  for	  the	  expropriation	  of	  1.7	  million	  acres	  of	  
non-­‐cultivated	  land	  from	  the	  32	  largest	  estates	  in	  the	  country.	  Famously,	  Decree	  900	  
called	  for	  the	  allocation	  of	  lands	  to	  100,000	  landless	  campesinos,	  while	  addressing	  the	  
colonial	  heritage	  of	  debt	  bondage	  by	  opening	  up	  lines	  for	  government	  credit.	  In	  all,	  only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Handy, Gift of the Devil, 109, 111. According to Handy, Arévalo withstood nearly thirty coup 
attempts during his administration.   
28Adams in Crucifixion by Power, 145, 477 and Susanne Jonas, “The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, 
Death Squads, and U.S. Power,” Latin American Perspectives 5, (1991): 63, emphasize that during 
the Árbenz administration unions thrived, boasting more than 100,000 members in 665 officially 
recognized union associations. Contrastingly, by 1962 only 16,000 members, or 1.2% of total 
workers, were unionized in only 100 recognized unions.  
29 Handy in Gift of the Devil, 115, explains how Árbenz instituted economic reforms influenced by 
an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) report, authored by 
University of Saskatchewan economist George Britnell, which called for the more efficient use of 
land and the diversification of crops along Guatemala’s lower Pacific coast.  
30 By “foreign capitalist monopolies,” I refer primarily to the “unholy trinity” of the United Fruit 




16.3%	  of	  qualifying	  land	  was	  actually	  expropriated.31	  According	  to	  Jim	  Handy,	  despite	  
frequent	  reference	  to	  Árbenz	  as	  a	  “communist”	  by	  the	  oppositional	  right,	  Árbenz	  
actually	  framed	  his	  case	  for	  agrarian	  reform	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  liberal	  capitalism,	  which	  
aimed	  to	  boost	  productivity	  by	  increasing	  the	  efficiency	  of	  land	  use.	  Handy	  interprets	  
Árbenz’s	  aims	  of	  agrarian	  reform	  as	  a	  mechanism	  of	  bringing	  democracy	  to	  the	  
countryside,	  while	  advancing	  nationalistic	  capitalism.32	  	  
	   According	  to	  Handy,	  “The	  Agrarian	  Reform	  Law	  inevitably	  caused	  tremendous	  
political	  upheaval.	  Peasant	  leagues	  and	  ‘revolutionary’	  political	  parties	  had	  been	  
forming	  in	  villages	  for	  years	  before	  the	  law	  was	  promulgated,	  but	  the	  decree	  
accelerated	  political	  organization	  while	  polarizing	  village	  communities.”	  Handy	  
continues	  by	  explaining	  how	  peasant	  leagues	  extended	  their	  socio-­‐political	  influence	  
dramatically	  after	  agrarian	  reform	  was	  passed,	  working	  in	  rural	  Guatemala	  to	  recruit	  
campesinos	  into	  labour	  organizations	  and	  strengthen	  local	  unions.	  “It	  attracted	  the	  most	  
radical	  and	  the	  most	  dedicated	  of	  Guatemala’s	  reformers,”	  Handy	  contends,	  asserting,	  
“Many	  of	  these	  were	  communists	  or	  had	  links	  to	  the	  communist	  Guatemalan	  Workers’	  
Party	  (PGT).”33	  In	  Handy’s	  work	  Revolution	  in	  the	  Countryside,	  Greg	  Grandin’s	  The	  Last	  
Colonial	  Massacre,	  and	  Marjorie	  and	  Thomas	  Melville’s	  The	  Politics	  of	  Land	  Ownership,	  
there	  is	  notable	  attention	  given	  to	  the	  contribution	  of	  the	  Guatemalan	  Worker’s	  Party	  
(PGT)	  to	  drafting,	  passing,	  and	  implementing	  agrarian	  reform	  in	  the	  early	  1950s.	  The	  
PGT	  rallied	  the	  popular	  masses	  in	  support	  of	  the	  October	  Revolution	  and	  advocated,	  at	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Schlesinger, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, 53-58. 
32 Handy, Gift of the Devil, 127. 
33 Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, 130-132.  
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times	  openly	  and	  sometimes	  clandestinely,	  on	  behalf	  of	  progressive	  public	  policy	  
initiatives	  introduced	  throughout	  the	  Ten	  Years	  of	  Spring.	  Handy	  and	  Grandin	  highlight	  
the	  PGT’s	  historical	  contributions	  to	  the	  Ten	  Years	  of	  Spring	  more	  than	  most	  scholarship	  
on	  the	  topic.	  In	  the	  journalistic	  work34	  that	  discussed	  the	  emergence	  of	  Guatemalan	  
guerrilla	  groups,	  very	  little	  attention	  was	  allocated	  to	  the	  historical	  work	  done	  by	  the	  
PGT,	  regarding	  the	  party’s	  role	  in	  the	  passing	  of	  agrarian	  reform	  legislation,	  while	  
negating	  the	  supply	  and	  communication	  networks	  that	  the	  PGT	  helped	  construct	  in	  
campesino	  communities	  throughout	  the	  1950s.	  In	  contrast,	  Handy	  and	  Grandin	  offer	  
ample	  tribute	  to	  the	  work	  done	  by	  the	  PGT	  leadership	  during	  the	  Ten	  Years	  of	  Spring,	  
contending	  their	  contributions	  were	  invaluable	  to	  the	  success	  of	  later	  guerrilla	  
campaigns	  in	  the	  1960s.	  	  
	   In	  1954,	  President	  Árbenz	  was	  forced	  from	  office	  in	  a	  military	  coup,	  declaring	  
that	  Guatemala	  was	  being	  taken	  over	  by	  a	  “heterogeneous	  Fruit	  Company	  expeditionary	  
force,”	  effectively	  signaling	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Ten	  Years	  of	  Spring.35	  Much	  scholarship36	  on	  
the	  topic	  explains	  the	  coup	  as	  a	  function	  of	  U.S.	  Interventionism	  within	  a	  Cold	  War	  
lexicon.	  In	  this	  interpretation,	  pressure	  from	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department,	  acting	  to	  
protect	  their	  investment	  interests	  in	  Guatemala,	  became	  too	  significant	  by	  1954	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See, for example, Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America (Oxford: Verso, 1970), 
Eduardo Galeano Guatemala: Occupied Country (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), Adolfo 
Gilly, “The Guerrilla Movement in Guatemala,” Monthly Review (1965), and Régis Debray, The 
Revolution on Trial: A critique of arms (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1974).	  	  
35 Handy, Gift of the Devil, 146.  
36 See, for example, Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-
1954 and Schlesinger, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, and Richard 
Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1982). 
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Árbenz	  was	  forcibly	  ousted	  from	  office	  for	  his	  “communistic”	  attempts	  at	  social	  and	  
economic	  reform	  in	  a	  CIA-­‐backed	  coup.	  	  
	   	  However,	  Jim	  Handy	  argues	  that	  the	  CIA’s	  role	  in	  the	  Árbenz	  coup	  may	  be	  
overblown	  by	  the	  historiography	  on	  the	  topic,	  ignoring	  what	  he	  calls	  a	  “revolution	  in	  the	  
countryside”	  that	  had	  empowered	  campesinos	  and	  community	  associations	  to	  initiate	  
the	  process	  of	  land	  redistribution	  themselves.	  	  Handy	  argues,	  “much	  of	  the	  unrest	  that	  
exploded	  in	  rural	  Guatemala	  during	  the	  revolution	  was	  a	  function	  of	  the	  continuing	  
strength	  of	  community	  identification…many	  communities	  used	  the	  agrarian	  reform	  to	  
regain	  control	  of	  land	  that	  had	  been	  lost	  years	  earlier	  to	  large	  landowners…In	  many	  
instances,	  this	  also	  meant	  that	  Indians	  were	  reclaiming	  land	  from	  Ladinos.”37	  Therefore,	  
according	  to	  Handy,	  the	  coup	  that	  ousted	  Árbenz	  was	  more	  of	  a	  function	  of	  “internal	  
tension”	  than	  “external	  sources	  of	  pressure,”	  such	  as	  the	  CIA.38	  	  
The	  end	  of	  “spring”	  
After	  the	  Árbenz	  coup,	  hundreds	  of	  “leftists”	  were	  murdered,	  an	  estimated	  17,000	  
“radicals”	  were	  jailed,	  unions	  were	  abolished,	  and	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  was	  suspended.	  
Thousands	  of	  “leftist”	  politicians	  took	  asylum	  in	  foreign	  embassies	  or	  fled	  the	  country	  in	  
exile.39	  In	  October	  1954,	  Colonel	  Carlos	  Castillo	  Armas	  became	  president	  through	  a	  
referendum	  to	  legitimize	  his	  authoritative	  rule;	  it	  was	  a	  fraudulent	  election,	  according	  to	  
Susanne	  Jonas,	  in	  which	  Castillo	  Armas	  received	  “over	  99	  percent	  of	  the	  vote.”40	  Castillo	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, 139. 
38 Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, 169. 
39 Handy, Gift of the Devil, 151. 
40 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power, 59. 
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Armas	  reversed	  the	  Agrarian	  Reform	  Law	  of	  1952	  and	  returned	  the	  expropriated	  land	  to	  
its	  former	  owners.	  	  
	   The	  scholarship41	  on	  the	  topic	  generally	  agree	  that	  while	  Castillo	  Armas	  officially	  
took	  the	  presidency,	  the	  military	  increasingly	  consolidated	  power	  within	  their	  own	  
ranks,	  becoming	  the	  dominant	  political	  force.	  From	  1955-­‐1965,	  for	  example,	  Guatemala	  
increased	  defense	  expenditures	  more	  than	  any	  other	  nation	  in	  Latin	  America.42	  This	  
interpretation	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  consolidation	  of	  military	  power	  implied	  an	  
internally	  unified	  military	  apparatus;	  however,	  power	  struggles	  and	  internal	  dissent	  
ensued	  regularly,	  constantly	  restructuring	  the	  military’s	  power	  dynamics.	  In	  1957,	  for	  
example,	  Castillo	  Armas	  was	  assassinated	  as	  a	  result	  of	  an	  internal	  power	  struggle	  
within	  the	  military,	  and	  General	  Miguel	  Ydígoras	  Fuentes	  took	  power	  in	  1958,	  an	  
election	  in	  which	  his	  opponent	  was	  bribed	  $20,000	  by	  the	  CIA	  to	  concede.43	  	  
	   In	  contrast	  to	  the	  scholarship44	  on	  the	  topic	  done	  by	  economists,	  sociologists,	  
and	  political	  scientists,	  who	  generally	  correlate	  the	  rise	  of	  popular	  organization	  in	  
Guatemala	  to	  the	  shifting	  socio-­‐economic	  conditions	  produced	  by	  structural	  shifts	  to	  the	  
agrarian	  landscape,	  other	  scholarship	  has	  nuanced	  this	  interpretation.	  Jim	  Handy,	  for	  
example,	  argues	  ethnic	  difference,	  and	  the	  corresponding	  ethnic	  conflict	  that	  it	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produced,	  greatly	  influenced	  community	  formation	  in	  Guatemala,	  complicating	  the	  
politics	  of	  land	  rights	  and	  the	  power	  dynamics	  of	  agrarian	  reforms.45	  Handy	  complicates	  
our	  understanding	  of	  the	  traditional	  dialectic	  of	  “ladino	  versus	  indio,”	  arguing	  regional	  
and	  ethnic	  variations	  produced	  rivalries	  that	  spilled	  out	  onto	  various	  levels	  of	  societal	  
interaction,	  particularly	  it	  made	  enacting	  agrarian	  reform	  a	  complex	  and	  convoluted	  
process.	  	  	  
	   Greg	  Grandin	  also	  nuances	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  acceleration	  of	  popular	  
mobilization	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  ‘60s	  in	  Guatemala,	  arguing	  it	  was	  as	  much	  to	  do	  with	  a	  
changing	  political	  landscape	  as	  class-­‐conflict.	  While	  Grandin	  acknowledges	  the	  profound	  
impact	  of	  a	  “multigenerational	  land	  struggle,”	  on	  raising	  popular	  consciousness,	  he	  
complicates	  this	  traditional	  Marxist	  analysis	  of	  class-­‐relations,	  asserting	  that	  a	  sense	  of	  
“individuality”	  was	  beginning	  to	  define	  how	  campesinos	  perceived	  their	  socio-­‐economic	  
condition.	  46	  Grandin	  contends,	  “it	  was	  politics	  not	  capitalism	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  
individual	  in	  Latin	  America.”47	  Proposing	  a	  more	  nuanced	  perspective	  of	  modernity,	  
Grandin	  moves	  beyond	  previous	  explanations	  that	  the	  radicalization	  of	  Guatemalan	  
politics	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  “restore	  a	  shattered	  unity”	  in	  the	  “face	  of	  modernity’s	  
pluralisms.”	  In	  contrast,	  Grandin	  argues,	  “mass,	  collective,	  passionate,	  and	  populist	  
political	  mobilizations…were	  absolutely	  essential	  to	  bring	  forth	  individual,	  which	  in	  turn	  
was	  key	  in	  furthering	  the	  liberalization	  of	  Latin	  American	  society.”48	  Exercises	  of	  
electoral	  participation	  and	  union	  activity,	  primarily	  during	  the	  Ten	  Years	  of	  Spring,	  had	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awakened	  a	  political	  consciousness	  in	  campesinos,	  largely	  transmitted	  to	  them	  via	  
peasant	  leagues	  and	  community	  organizations.	  According	  to	  Grandin,	  their	  experiences	  
of	  electoral	  inclusion	  “began	  to	  embody	  the	  fusion	  of	  insurgent	  individuality	  and	  social	  
solidarity…the	  twin	  pillars	  of	  democracy,”	  and	  produced	  new	  forms	  of	  radical	  leftism.	  	  
	   Generally,	  the	  scholarship49	  on	  the	  topic	  all	  correlate	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  armed	  
revolutionary	  struggle	  in	  Guatemala	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  failed	  military	  mutiny	  on	  
November	  13,	  1960.	  The	  military	  rebels,	  many	  of	  whom	  later	  constructed	  the	  FAR	  
guerrilla	  movement	  in	  1962,	  joined	  with	  the	  PGT	  in	  1961,	  forming	  the	  nucleus	  of	  
Guatemala’s	  radical	  left.	  In	  1960,	  the	  PGT	  had	  passed	  a	  resolution	  embracing	  “all	  forms	  
of	  struggle,”	  hinting	  at	  widening	  their	  revolutionary	  strategy	  to	  include	  armed	  tactics,	  
but	  as	  Grandin	  notes	  there	  remained	  a	  “large	  gap	  between	  theory	  and	  practice”	  on	  this	  
issue.50	  Grandin	  maintains,	  “its	  [the	  PGT]	  ambivalent	  stance	  toward	  armed	  revolution	  
put	  the	  party	  at	  odds	  with	  many	  of	  its	  more	  militant,	  Cuba-­‐fired	  members,	  while	  its	  
constant	  attempts	  to	  respond	  to	  this	  or	  that	  political	  opening,	  or	  this	  or	  that	  potential	  
collaborator,	  led	  it	  to	  forsake	  what	  it	  had	  done	  best	  during	  the	  October	  Revolution.”51	  
The	  “central	  tension”	  within	  the	  PGT	  party	  in	  the	  early	  1960s,	  Guatemalan	  sociologist	  
Carlos	  Figueroa	  asserts,	  was	  the	  “awareness	  for	  the	  need	  of	  armed	  revolution”	  versus	  
“sensitivity	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  democratic	  openings.”52	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   Historian	  Michael	  D.	  Kirkpatrick	  explains	  that	  by	  the	  mid	  1960s,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
Cuba’s	  revolutionary	  influence,	  the	  FAR	  adopted	  a	  post-­‐colonial	  Marxist	  critique	  on	  their	  
revolutionary	  struggle.	  Kirkpatrick	  maintains	  the	  FAR	  called	  citizens	  to	  action,	  
connecting	  personal	  responsibility	  with	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  “Nueva	  Guatemala.”	  
Specifically,	  the	  FAR	  implemented	  rhetorical	  devices	  in	  their	  armed	  propaganda	  
education	  campaigns	  that	  attempted	  to	  connect	  the	  struggles	  of	  agrarian	  inequity,	  
imperialism,	  and	  poverty;	  in	  doing	  so,	  Kirkpatrick	  claims,	  the	  FAR	  were	  “synchronizing”	  
Guatemala’s	  “national	  narrative	  with	  an	  international	  genealogy	  of	  revolutionary	  
heroes.”53	  
	   Throughout	  the	  mid	  1960s,	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  entered	  into	  a	  polarizing	  debate	  
concerning	  the	  primacy	  of	  electoral	  reformism	  versus	  armed	  tactics.	  The	  presidential	  
election	  of	  1966	  brought	  this	  methodological	  schism	  into	  blistering	  view	  and	  tensions	  
mounted.	  According	  to	  Grandin,	  the	  military’s	  brutal	  counter-­‐insurgency	  offensive	  of	  
1966-­‐1967	  proved	  to	  many	  in	  the	  radical	  left	  that	  participating	  in	  the	  election	  of	  1966	  
was	  a	  tactical	  disaster,	  which	  demonstrated	  the	  “inability	  of	  substantive	  democracy”	  to	  
generate	  revolutionary	  change,	  and	  further	  radicalized	  Guatemala’s	  revolutionary	  
movements.54	  
Primary	  source	  base	  
This	  thesis	  relies	  on	  three	  central	  bases	  of	  primary	  research;	  first,	  the	  works	  of	  foreign	  
journalists	  Adolfo	  Gilly,	  Richard	  Gott,	  Eduardo	  Galeano,	  and	  Régis	  Debray,	  all	  of	  whom	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extensively	  covered	  the	  Guatemalan	  guerrillas	  in	  the	  1960s	  and,	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
developing	  personal	  relationships	  with	  the	  guerrillas,	  began	  to	  represent	  particular	  
ideological	  interests,	  while	  implicitly	  advancing	  certain	  political	  and	  ideological	  agendas;	  
secondly,	  this	  thesis	  utilizes	  the	  work	  published	  by	  a	  number	  of	  North	  American	  
journalists	  who	  covered	  the	  FAR	  guerrillas	  following	  the	  presidential	  election	  of	  1966,	  
publishing	  newspaper	  articles	  that	  propagated	  a	  romanticized	  conception	  of	  the	  
Guatemalan	  “guerrilla;”	  thirdly,	  this	  thesis	  depends	  upon	  the	  primary	  source	  research	  I	  
conducted	  at	  the	  Centro	  de	  Investicacciones	  Regiónales	  de	  Mesoamérica	  (CIRMA)	  in	  
Antigua,	  Guatemala.	  The	  CIRMA	  archives	  include	  FAR	  and	  PGT	  internal	  and	  public	  
documents,	  memoirs,	  manifestos,	  communications,	  and	  testimonials	  from	  1954-­‐1995.	  	  
Guerrilla	  journalists	  	  
Guatemala’s	  revolutionary	  struggle	  attracted	  the	  attention	  of	  foreign	  journalists	  who	  
traveled	  to	  Guatemala	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  reported	  on	  their	  guerrilla	  campaigns,	  often	  
actively	  engaged	  in	  the	  same	  historical	  events	  they	  were	  writing	  about.	  The	  manner	  in	  
which	  these	  sources	  communicate	  their	  version	  of	  historical	  events	  reveals	  a	  great	  deal	  
about	  how	  these	  active	  historical	  actors	  perceived	  the	  historical	  conditions	  that	  
surrounded	  them	  at	  particular	  times	  and	  place.	  	  
	   Richard	  Gott	  published	  Guerrilla	  Movements	  in	  Latin	  America	  in	  1970,	  one	  of	  the	  
first	  books	  to	  provide	  a	  comprehensive	  history	  of	  the	  FAR	  guerrillas	  in	  the	  1960s.	  In	  
1963,	  Gott	  worked	  as	  a	  freelance	  journalist	  for	  the	  British	  newspaper,	  The	  Guardian,	  in	  
Cuba.	  In	  Cuba,	  Gott	  became	  influenced	  by	  Cuba’s	  brand	  of	  revolutionary	  Marxism,	  
which	  challenged,	  in	  his	  perspective,	  the	  Communist	  Party’s	  hegemonic	  grip	  over	  the	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global	  left.	  His	  account	  of	  the	  Guatemalan	  guerrillas	  in	  the	  1960s	  reflected	  his	  affinity	  
for	  Cuban	  revolutionary	  strategy	  and	  guided	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  FAR.	  Gott	  was	  a	  cultural	  
worker	  who	  wrote	  in	  support	  of	  military	  confrontation,	  advocating	  for	  the	  primacy	  of	  
armed	  tactics	  over	  electoral	  reformism.	  As	  a	  result,	  Gott	  did	  not	  allocate	  nearly	  any	  
attention	  to	  the	  PGT	  party	  nor	  credit	  them	  for	  their	  role	  in	  the	  revolutionary	  struggle;	  
instead,	  Gott	  romanticized	  the	  FAR	  and	  MR-­‐13	  guerrilla	  movements.	  For	  example,	  Gott	  
described	  FAR	  leader	  Luis	  Augusto	  Turcios	  Lima	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  “Though	  he	  
suddenly	  found	  himself	  in	  a	  position	  of	  political	  leadership,	  Turcios	  was	  essentially	  a	  
soldier	  fighting	  for	  a	  new	  code	  of	  honour:	  If	  he	  has	  an	  alter	  ego,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  Lenin	  or	  
Mao	  or	  even	  Castro,	  whose	  works	  he	  has	  read	  and	  admires,	  but	  Augusto	  Sandino,	  the	  
Nicaraguan	  general	  who	  fought	  the	  U.S…”55	  Furthermore,	  Gott’s	  evidence	  extensively	  
relied	  on	  interviews	  conducted	  with	  Argentinian	  Trotskyist	  and	  MR-­‐13	  leader	  Adolfo	  
Gilly,	  who	  by	  his	  active	  participation	  in	  the	  MR-­‐13,	  was	  clearly	  not	  an	  objective	  source	  of	  
historical	  information. 
	   Eduardo	  Galeano,	  a	  Uruguayan	  journalist,	  writer,	  and	  poet	  published	  Guatemala:	  
Occupied	  Country	  in	  1967,	  providing	  his	  account	  of	  the	  Guatemalan	  revolutionary	  
struggle	  in	  the	  1960s.	  Galeano	  was	  part	  of	  a	  Cuban-­‐inspired	  cultural	  project,	  which	  
aimed	  to	  revise	  the	  historical	  narrative	  of	  Latin	  America	  through	  various	  literary	  outlets.	  
Galeano,	  like	  Gott,	  clearly	  favored	  a	  militant	  revolutionary	  struggle,	  downplaying	  the	  
utility	  of	  the	  PGT’s	  electoral	  reformism	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  FAR’s	  armed	  tactics.	  Galeano’s	  
tendency	  towards	  romanticizing	  the	  guerrillas,	  and	  favoring	  their	  tactics	  over	  the	  PGT,	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was	  illustrated	  when	  he	  wrote,	  “The	  guerrilleros	  do	  not	  think	  that	  history	  began	  with	  
them,	  on	  the	  day	  the	  first	  rebels	  chose	  to	  install	  themselves	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Sierra	  de	  
las	  Minas.	  It	  was	  the	  fallen	  flags	  of	  Arévalo	  and	  Árbenz	  that	  they	  raised	  and	  unfurled.	  
But	  this	  continuation	  of	  the	  interrupted	  anti-­‐imperialist	  process	  is	  not	  and	  could	  not	  be	  
a	  repetition.”56	  Galeano’s	  Guatemala:	  Occupied	  Country	  relied	  heavily	  on	  the	  interviews	  
conducted	  with	  the	  FAR	  guerrillas,	  especially	  FAR	  leaders	  Turcios	  Lima	  and	  César	  
Montes.	  In	  this	  thesis,	  Galeano’s	  rich	  and	  colorful	  commentary	  provides	  insight	  into	  the	  
perspective	  of	  one	  foreign	  leftist	  who	  was	  committed	  to	  propagating	  a	  revolutionary	  
strategy	  of	  armed	  conflict	  over	  electoral	  reformism.	  
	   Régis	  Debray,	  a	  French	  revolutionary	  theorist,	  was	  a	  professor	  at	  the	  University	  
of	  Havana	  in	  the	  mid	  to	  late	  1960s.	  His	  works’	  The	  Revolution	  on	  Trial	  and	  Revolution	  in	  
the	  Revolution?	  were	  written	  at	  the	  time	  of	  an	  intense	  power	  struggle	  for	  global	  leftist	  
leadership.	  Debray	  was	  essentially	  commissioned	  by	  the	  Cuban	  government	  to	  provide	  
evidence	  and	  write	  of	  the	  superiority	  of	  Cuban	  foquísmo,	  or	  a	  military	  strategy	  of	  
irregular	  warfare	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  popular	  insurrection,	  over	  the	  Communist	  Party’s	  
“peaceful”	  strategy	  of	  reformism.	  Debray	  theorized	  that	  popular	  support	  for	  the	  
revolutionary	  struggle	  would	  be	  developed	  through	  the	  course	  of	  an	  armed	  struggle.	  
According	  to	  foquísmo	  theory,	  a	  popular	  war	  could	  be	  initiated	  before	  all	  of	  the	  
“objective	  conditions”	  for	  revolution	  were	  satisfied	  if	  the	  struggle	  was	  led	  by	  a	  
dedicated	  and	  moral	  revolutionary	  vanguard.	  According	  to	  historian	  David	  A.	  Crain,	  
Debrays’	  works	  provided	  Cuban	  President	  Fidel	  Castro	  with	  the	  “evidence”	  he	  needed	  in	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his	  debate	  with	  the	  Communist	  Party	  over	  global	  revolutionary	  strategy.57	  Debray	  used	  
the	  Guatemalan	  experience	  as	  a	  case	  study	  to	  prove	  the	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  
superiority	  of	  the	  foco	  strategy	  over	  electoral	  reformism.	  
	   In	  his	  work,	  Revolution	  in	  the	  Revolution?,	  Debray	  argued	  that	  the	  subordination	  
of	  the	  FAR	  guerrillas,	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  political	  leadership,	  was	  an	  ongoing	  
methodological	  error	  that	  was	  damaging	  Guatemala’s	  revolutionary	  movement.	  For	  the	  
Guatemalan	  revolution	  to	  find	  success,	  Debray	  contended,	  FAR	  guerrilla	  leaders	  should	  
be	  elevated	  to	  prominent	  leadership	  positions	  on	  the	  PGT’s	  Central	  Committee.	  Debray	  
clarified	  why	  the	  PGT	  should	  delegate	  more	  political	  leadership	  to	  the	  FAR	  guerrillas,	  
arguing:	  
	   “the	  problem	  with	  intellectual	  guerrillas	  is	  the	  speed/adaptability…they	  	   	  
	   are	  less	  able	  to	  invent,	  improvise,	  make	  do	  with	  available	  resources…	  	   	  
	   thinking	  he	  already	  knows	  he	  will	  move	  more	  slowly,	  with	  less	  flexibility…	  	  
	   [this]	  promotes	  isolation	  from	  the	  masses…	  Mountain	  forces	  depend	  on	  city	  
	   leadership	  for	  logistical	  and	  military	  aid…	  it	  subordinates	  guerrilla	  forces	  to	  
	   petty	  urban	  politics…”58	  	  
	  
The	  guerrillas	  were	  the	  true	  vanguards	  of	  the	  revolution,	  Debray	  contended,	  
superseding	  the	  PGT’s	  hegemonic	  and	  outdated	  “old”	  party	  maneuvering.59	  Debray’s	  
works’	  reveal	  the	  perspective	  of	  someone	  actively	  involved	  in	  the	  task	  of	  convincing	  
guerrilla	  groups	  to	  abandon	  electoral	  participation	  in	  favor	  of	  extending	  military	  
operations.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 David A. Crain, “Guatemalan Revolutionaries and Havana’s Ideological Offensive of 1966-
1968,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 17 (1975): 193-194. 
58 Debray, Revolution in the Revolution?, 20-21, 68, 70. 
59 Crain, “Guatemalan Revolutionaries and Havana’s Ideological Offensive of 1966-1968,” Journal 
of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 193-194. 
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   Adolfo	  Gilly,	  an	  Argentinian	  Trotskyist60,	  reported	  on	  the	  Revolutionary	  
Movement	  of	  November	  13	  (MR-­‐13),	  a	  FAR	  guerrilla	  column	  that	  split	  from	  the	  FAR	  in	  
1964.	  Gilly	  joined	  MR-­‐13	  in	  their	  guerrilla	  campaigns	  through	  the	  mid	  1960s	  in	  
northeastern	  Guatemala,	  and	  wrote	  extensively	  on	  the	  MR-­‐13’s	  split	  with	  the	  PGT	  in	  
articles	  such	  as	  “The	  Guerrilla	  Movement	  in	  Guatemala,”	  published	  in	  the	  Monthly	  
Review.	  Gilly	  wrote	  from	  a	  pro-­‐Trotskyist	  perspective	  and	  framed	  his	  argument	  in	  
complete	  opposition	  to	  the	  PGT’s	  tendency	  of	  favoring	  electoral	  reformism	  over	  an	  
armed	  struggle.	  Gilly	  wrote	  with	  the	  intent	  of	  shedding	  a	  positive	  light	  on	  global	  
Trotskyism,	  trying	  to	  extend	  Trotskyism	  into	  Guatemala.	  His	  critique	  of	  the	  Communist	  
Party,	  which	  he	  presented	  as	  an	  objective	  analysis,	  was	  motivated	  by	  his	  political	  
affiliation	  with	  Trotskyism.	  For	  example	  he	  recounted	  an	  interview	  he	  conducted	  with	  a	  
campesino	  that	  recalled:	  
	  	   “In	  the	  time	  of	  don	  Jacobo	  [Árbenz],	  we	  all	  got	  together	  and	  asked	  for	  arms,	  but	  
	   they	  didn’t	  give	  us	  any,	  and	  that	  finished	  him.	  If	  the	  peasants	  had	  been	  armed,	  
	   no	  one	  could	  overthrow	  him…workers	  and	  peasants	  do	  not	  believe	  in	  elections,	  
	   they	  have	  no	  illusions…the	  electoral	  experience	  was	  thoroughly	  explored	  with	  
	   Árbenz	  and	  it	  failed…it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  have	  the	  land;	  it	  is	  also	  necessary	  to	  
	   have	  a	  	  government	  and	  the	  arms…to	  defend	  it.”61	  	  
	  
In	  this	  example,	  Gilly	  tried	  to	  rewrite	  the	  historical	  legacy	  of	  the	  Ten	  Years	  of	  Spring,	  
downplaying	  its	  contributions	  to	  the	  revolutionary	  movement	  and	  re-­‐interpreting	  its	  
legacy.	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support was pivotal for the broader success of localized revolutionary struggles.	  	  
61 Adolfo Gilly, “The Guerrilla Movement in Guatemala” Monthly Review 17 (1965): 9-12.  
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   The	  documents,	  which	  the	  aforementioned	  journalists	  have	  left	  behind,	  blur	  the	  
line	  between	  secondary	  and	  primary	  sources.	  Their	  writings	  can	  only	  relay	  their	  
subjective	  interpretations	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  struggle	  that	  they	  were	  actively	  involved	  
in.	  Despite	  that	  their	  works	  read	  like	  scholarly	  material,	  their	  political	  motivations	  and	  
ideological	  biases	  informed	  and	  shaped	  their	  historical	  analysis	  and	  were	  written	  to	  
achieve	  certain	  ends.	  Therefore,	  in	  this	  thesis,	  their	  work	  will	  be	  viewed	  only	  as	  primary	  
sources,	  as	  interpretations	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  struggle	  from	  people	  at	  a	  certain	  time	  
period,	  which	  were	  actively	  involved	  in	  the	  revolutionary	  process.	  When	  analyzing	  their	  
work,	  I	  weigh	  the	  evidence	  they	  offered	  with	  careful	  consideration	  of	  the	  political	  
motivations	  that	  guided	  their	  writings,	  constantly	  questioning	  their	  interpretations	  as	  
politically	  contrived.	  	  
North	  American	  journalists	  fall	  in	  love	  with	  the	  ‘guerrilla’	  
In	  the	  spring	  of	  1966,	  the	  FAR	  guerrillas	  invited	  a	  series	  of	  North	  American	  journalists	  
(notably,	  Norman	  Gall	  of	  The	  Toronto	  Daily	  Star,	  Georgie	  Anne	  Geyer	  of	  The	  Chicago	  
Daily	  News,	  Milan	  J.	  Kubic	  of	  Newsweek	  International,	  Ted	  Yates	  of	  NBC	  News	  Special,	  
and	  Alan	  Howard	  of	  The	  New	  York	  Times)	  to	  visit	  them	  in	  the	  mountains	  of	  northeastern	  
Guatemala	  as	  part	  of	  their	  public	  relations	  strategy.	  At	  this	  time,	  the	  FAR	  were	  largely	  
demobilized	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  PGT’s	  decision	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  presidential	  election	  of	  
1966.	  However,	  by	  the	  time	  the	  North	  American	  journalists	  arrived	  in	  Guatemala,	  it	  was	  
becoming	  increasingly	  clear	  that	  the	  new	  Méndez	  Montenegro	  administration	  was	  
powerless	  to	  pass	  any	  significant	  reforms.	  Therefore,	  these	  interviews	  provide	  crucial	  
insight	  into	  the	  guerrillas’	  perspectives	  on	  electoral	  democracy.	  The	  FAR’s	  commentary	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on	  Guatemala’s	  corrupted	  democracy	  was	  markedly	  cynical	  and	  they	  routinely	  
expressed	  their	  opposition	  to	  electoral	  participation	  in	  favor	  of	  carrying	  out	  a	  prolonged	  
armed	  struggle.	  
	   The	  central	  methodological	  challenge	  of	  these	  interviews	  resides	  in	  how	  
enamored	  the	  journalists	  were	  with	  the	  guerrillas;	  they	  romanticized	  guerrilla	  culture.	  
Clearly,	  the	  intent	  of	  these	  publications	  was	  to	  sell	  newspapers,	  and	  until	  the	  mid	  1960s,	  
their	  North	  American	  readership	  was	  largely	  unaware	  of	  who	  the	  guerrillas	  were	  and	  
what	  they	  were	  fighting	  for.	  Many	  of	  these	  North	  American	  journalists	  painted	  a	  picture	  
of	  guerrilla	  life	  that	  read	  more	  like	  a	  fairy-­‐tale	  than	  an	  account	  of	  objective	  reality.	  For	  
example,	  Georgie	  Anne	  Geyer	  wrote	  in	  1966	  about	  how	  impressed	  she	  was	  with	  the	  
FAR,	  claiming	  the	  guerrillas	  were	  a	  “well	  oiled	  machine…we’d	  be	  walking	  down	  a	  rode,	  
and	  without	  a	  sound,	  two	  guerrillas	  would	  emerge	  from	  the	  forest,	  and	  join	  us,”	  
continuing	  that	  the	  guerrillas	  used	  bird	  calls	  to	  communicate.	  	  
	   The	  fundamental	  issue	  with	  these	  primary	  sources	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  attention	  given	  
to	  the	  PGT.	  The	  interviews	  with	  the	  FAR	  guerrillas	  seem	  to	  reside	  in	  isolation	  from	  other	  
political	  conditions	  and	  developments	  that	  were	  occurring	  within	  the	  radical	  left	  during	  
this	  time	  period,	  developments	  outside	  the	  isolation	  of	  the	  FAR	  mountain	  camps.	  
However,	  these	  sources	  can	  provide	  crucial	  insight	  into	  a	  diverse	  set	  of	  perspectives	  
held	  by	  the	  guerrillas	  on	  electoral	  reformism	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  their	  armed	  struggle.	  
FAR	  and	  PGT	  primary	  documents	  
The	  most	  valuable	  primary	  research	  that	  provides	  insight	  into	  the	  internal	  debate	  within	  
Guatemala’s	  radical	  left	  in	  the	  1960s,	  regarding	  the	  primacy	  of	  electoral	  reformism	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versus	  armed	  tactics,	  are	  the	  documents	  written	  directly	  by	  the	  PGT	  and	  FAR	  in	  the	  
1960s.	  This	  thesis	  places	  a	  rich	  collection	  of	  documents	  into	  dialogue	  with	  one	  another	  
to	  illustrate	  what	  the	  fundamental	  points	  of	  their	  divergence	  were	  and	  how	  their	  
methodological	  discussion	  evolved	  throughout	  the	  decade.	  	  
	   In	  regard	  to	  the	  PGT’s	  revolutionary	  perspective,	  I	  analyze	  the	  PGT’s	  Second,	  
Third,	  and	  Fourth	  Congresses	  in	  1954,	  1960,	  and	  1969	  respectively.	  The	  Congressional	  
resolutions	  and	  charters	  associated	  with	  the	  convocation	  of	  the	  party’s	  congresses	  
provide	  crucial	  insight	  into	  the	  revolutionary	  strategy	  the	  PGT	  believed	  should	  be	  
followed	  to	  generate	  radical	  changes	  in	  Guatemala.	  These	  documents	  also	  provide	  
insight	  into	  how	  the	  party	  envisioned	  its	  role	  as	  the	  vanguard	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  
struggle	  and	  how	  their	  past	  previous	  electoral	  successes,	  during	  the	  Ten	  Years	  of	  Spring,	  
guided	  their	  political	  line	  and	  revolutionary	  strategy	  going	  forward	  into	  the	  1960s.	  	  
	   	  To	  elucidate	  the	  FAR’s	  revolutionary	  perspective,	  I	  analyze	  a	  series	  of	  
statements	  and	  bulletins	  released	  by	  the	  FAR	  throughout	  the	  1960s,	  documents	  that	  
demonstrated	  the	  FAR’s	  revolutionary	  development	  and	  the	  subsequent	  changes	  to	  
their	  revolutionary	  ideology	  and	  strategy	  over	  time.	  I	  analyze	  a	  series	  of	  letters	  written	  
from	  the	  FAR	  to	  the	  PGT,	  called	  Open	  Letter	  (1965),	  The	  Declaration	  of	  the	  Sierra	  de	  las	  
Minas	  (1964),	  and	  the	  March	  Document	  (1967)	  which	  explained	  the	  FAR’s	  perspective	  
on	  Guatemala’s	  revolutionary	  struggle	  in	  terms	  of	  why	  they	  rejected	  electoral	  
reformism	  as	  a	  capable	  revolutionary	  tool.	  In	  response	  to	  these	  FAR	  documents,	  the	  
PGT	  released	  a	  series	  of	  statements	  responding,	  although	  sometimes	  only	  implicitly	  to	  
the	  aforementioned	  FAR	  statements/letters,	  called	  Ten	  Theses	  on	  Organizational	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Questions	  (1965)	  and	  The	  Struggle	  for	  Unity	  (1968),	  and	  various	  articles	  written	  in	  the	  
World	  Marxist	  Review	  by	  the	  PGT	  leadership.	  	  
	   Lastly,	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  how	  Guatemala’s	  radical	  left	  was	  affected	  by	  its	  decision	  
to	  participate	  in	  the	  election	  of	  1966,	  I	  analyze	  a	  series	  of	  post-­‐mortem	  interviews	  
conducted	  with	  FAR	  leaders	  in	  the	  1980s.	  These	  interviews,	  conducted	  primarily	  by	  
Chilean	  journalist	  Marta	  Harnecker	  in	  1981,	  provide	  a	  post-­‐facto	  reflection	  on	  how	  the	  
elections	  of	  1966	  affected	  the	  radical	  left’s	  revolutionary	  methodology	  going	  forward	  
into	  the	  1970s,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  FAR	  leaders	  who	  were	  active	  in	  both	  decades.	  	  
Chapter	  breakdown	  of	  the	  thesis	  
In	  Chapter	  One,	  I	  analyze	  the	  historical	  conditions	  that	  led	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  PGT	  
and	  the	  FAR,	  and	  how	  the	  construction	  of	  their	  alliance	  in	  the	  early	  1960s	  solidified	  the	  
two	  groups	  as	  the	  most	  powerful	  components	  of	  Guatemala’s	  radical	  left.	  I	  explore	  the	  
PGT’s	  experiences	  of	  advocating	  and	  implementing	  agrarian	  reform	  in	  the	  1950s,	  and	  
examine	  how	  their	  experiences	  working	  from	  within	  electoral	  democracy	  guided	  their	  
revolutionary	  praxis	  into	  the	  1960s.	  Next,	  I	  examine	  how	  Cuba’s	  revolutionary	  
government	  influenced	  the	  FAR’s	  revolutionary	  theory	  and	  praxis,	  producing	  a	  tactical	  
schism	  between	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR.	  I	  introduce	  and	  track	  the	  increasing	  divergences	  
between	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  regarding	  their	  perspectives	  on	  electoral	  democracy	  as	  a	  
revolutionary	  tool	  capable	  of	  producing	  radical	  socio-­‐economics	  changes.	  In	  doing	  so,	  I	  
demonstrate	  various	  points	  of	  internal	  divergence,	  across	  space	  and	  time,	  concerning	  
how	  Guatemala’s	  radical	  left	  perceived	  their	  revolutionary	  actions	  as	  either	  the	  reform	  
or	  the	  erosion	  of	  state	  authority.	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   In	  Chapter	  Two,	  I	  discuss	  the	  Guatemalan	  presidential	  election	  of	  1966,	  using	  the	  
election	  as	  a	  case	  study	  that	  illustrated	  the	  fierce	  debate	  that	  accompanied	  the	  decision	  
made	  by	  the	  PGT	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  election.	  This	  election	  was	  particularly	  divisive	  for	  
the	  radical	  left,	  which	  could	  not	  agree	  on	  the	  revolutionary	  methodology	  they	  believed	  
should	  be	  implemented	  to	  realize	  their	  revolutionary	  objectives.	  Throughout	  the	  
chapter,	  I	  analyze	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  radical	  left	  in	  navigating	  or	  abstaining	  from	  
participating	  in	  electoral	  democracy.	  I	  discuss	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  divergent	  
perceptions	  of	  state	  authority	  and	  political	  hegemony	  from	  the	  early	  1960s	  (Chapter	  
One)	  factor	  into	  the	  decision	  to	  participate	  or	  abstain	  in	  the	  presidential	  election	  of	  
1966.	  Next,	  I	  analyze	  how	  the	  acceleration	  of	  social	  and	  political	  violence	  following	  the	  
election	  of	  1966	  was	  perceived	  and	  negotiated	  by	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  from	  1966-­‐1969,	  
and	  how	  this	  shaped	  their	  ongoing	  strategic	  debate.	  Finally,	  I	  discuss	  the	  collapse	  of	  
revolutionary	  unity	  between	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  in	  1968,	  evaluating	  how	  their	  
fundamental	  strategic	  divergences,	  regarding	  the	  primacy	  of	  electoral	  reformism	  versus	  
armed	  tactics,	  factored	  into	  their	  formal	  split.	  	  
	   In	  Chapter	  Three,	  I	  conclude	  by	  summarizing	  how	  the	  methodological	  debate	  
between	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  evolved	  throughout	  the	  decade.	  To	  many	  in	  the	  radical	  
left,	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  electoral	  democracy	  had	  been	  put	  on	  full	  display	  in	  the	  
election	  of	  1966.	  To	  demonstrate	  this,	  I	  review	  the	  points	  of	  internal	  divergence	  within	  
Guatemala’s	  radical	  left,	  noting	  how	  their	  debate	  evolved	  over	  time.	  Specifically,	  I	  
summarize	  the	  PGT/FAR	  deliberations	  concerning	  divergent	  forms	  of	  struggle	  and	  how	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differing	  interpretations	  of	  Marxism-­‐Leninism	  shaped	  their	  perspectives	  on	  the	  primacy	  





















	   Chapter	  I:	  	  ¡Ya	  Basta!	  The	  Guatemalan	  Revolution	  
Ignites	  
	  
	  “Sure,	  I	  liked	  it…	  We	  had	  the	  officers	  club,	  15-­‐ounce	  Texas	  steaks,	  good	  clothes,	  the	  best	  
equipment.	  Plenty	  of	  money	  too;	  every	  month	  I	  sent	  $150	  to	  my	  mother.	  What	  worries	  
did	  I	  have?62…	  I	  don’t	  think	  the	  Yankees	  suspected	  they	  were	  training	  a	  guerrilla.”63	  	  
	  
- FAR	  guerrilla	  leader	  Luis	  Augusto	  Turcios	  Lima	  on	  his	  time	  training	  infantry	  at	  
Fort	  Benning,	  Georgia	  
Chapter	  introduction	  	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  elucidate	  the	  methodological	  divergences	  that	  inundated	  
Guatemala’s	  radical	  left	  in	  the	  early	  1960s.	  First,	  I	  discuss	  the	  formation	  and	  
development	  of	  the	  PGT	  party	  from	  the	  1950s	  to	  the	  early	  1960s,	  analyzing	  how	  their	  
historic	  experiences	  of	  successfully	  working	  through	  electoral	  democracy,	  (namely,	  
agrarian	  reform	  gains	  in	  the	  early	  1950s),	  shaped	  the	  party’s	  revolutionary	  strategy	  
going	  forward	  into	  the	  1960s.	  Next,	  I	  examine	  the	  military	  uprising	  of	  November	  13,	  
1960,	  and	  its	  correlation	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Rebel	  Armed	  Forces	  (FAR)	  in	  1962.	  
Then,	  I	  analyze	  the	  Cuban	  revolutionary	  government’s	  tactical	  influence	  upon	  the	  
construction	  and	  development	  of	  the	  FAR’s	  revolutionary	  line.	  In	  doing	  so,	  I	  track	  how	  
the	  FAR’s	  revolutionary	  theory	  and	  praxis	  developed	  into	  the	  early	  1960s,	  with	  specific	  
attention	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  armed	  tactics	  within	  their	  revolutionary	  methodology.	  I	  
end	  the	  chapter	  with	  an	  examination	  of	  how	  the	  political	  and	  revolutionary	  unity	  of	  the	  
radical	  left	  was	  tested	  by	  the	  departure	  of	  one	  of	  the	  guerrilla	  columns,	  the	  
Revolutionary	  Movement	  of	  November	  13	  (MR-­‐13),	  from	  the	  PGT/FAR	  revolutionary	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Alan Howard, “With the Guerrillas in Guatemala,” The New York Times, June 26, 1966, 9.  
63 “Turcios Lima,” Cuba Tricontinental (1969), 147. 
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alliance.	  This	  schism	  prompted	  a	  ferocious	  debate	  concerning	  the	  merits	  of	  electoral	  
democracy	  as	  a	  revolutionary	  tool.	  	  
Historical	  framework	  	  	  
In	  June	  1960,	  the	  PGT	  celebrated	  its	  Third	  Congress,	  declaring	  they	  had	  to	  use	  all	  legal	  
forms	  of	  struggle	  to	  fight	  for	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  political	  reforms.	  However,	  their	  
traditional	  revolutionary	  strategy	  of	  electoral	  reformism	  was	  challenged	  following	  the	  
emergence	  of	  the	  FAR	  guerrillas,	  and	  their	  militant	  revolutionary	  tactics,	  in	  the	  early	  
1960s.	  	  
	   Following	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution,	  President	  Miguel	  Ydígoras	  Fuentes	  permitted	  a	  
counter-­‐revolutionary	  army,	  organized	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency,	  to	  
secretly	  train	  in	  Guatemala	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  invading	  Cuba.	  Guatemalan	  officers	  in	  
charge	  of	  guarding	  the	  Cuban-­‐training	  base,	  at	  a	  finca	  called	  La	  Helvetia,	  were	  not	  
allowed	  entry	  into	  the	  military	  compound.	  According	  to	  Guatemalan	  historian	  Michael	  
D.	  Kirkpatrick,	  this	  segregation	  produced	  “patriotic	  humiliation”	  in	  the	  Logia	  del	  Niño	  
Jesús	  (Company	  of	  the	  Baby	  Jesus),	  a	  fraternity	  of	  junior	  officers	  within	  the	  Guatemala	  
military.64	  Junior	  military	  officer	  Luis	  Augusto	  Turcios	  Lima	  felt	  it	  was	  a	  “violation	  of	  
national	  sovereignty.”	  “And	  why	  was	  it	  permitted?”	  Turcios	  Lima	  asked,	  “Because	  our	  
government	  is	  a	  puppet.”65	  The	  growing	  sentiment	  to	  revolt	  within	  the	  Logia	  del	  Niño	  
Jesús,	  already	  fueled	  by	  what	  they	  perceived	  to	  be	  internal	  corruption,	  low	  salaries,	  and	  
the	  promotion	  of	  “traditionalists”	  to	  higher	  ranks,	  reached	  a	  breaking	  point;	  and,	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Michael D. Kirkpatrick, “Manufacturing the Nueva Guatemala,” (MA Thesis, University of 
Manitoba, 2006), 41. 
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November	  13,	  1960	  many	  returned	  from	  their	  posts	  in	  the	  Petén	  Department	  to	  stage	  
an	  ultimately	  unsuccessful	  revolt	  against	  the	  Guatemalan	  military.	  	  
	   The	  military	  rebels	  returned	  from	  exile	  in	  1961	  and	  entered	  into	  a	  political	  
alliance	  with	  the	  PGT.	  On	  February	  6,	  1962	  the	  military	  rebels	  attacked	  two	  army	  posts	  
in	  the	  Guatemalan	  Department	  of	  Izabal	  near	  United	  Fruit	  Company	  holdings.	  On	  
February	  10,	  they	  shot	  down	  a	  military	  jet;	  a	  few	  weeks	  later,	  the	  rebels	  took	  control	  of	  
two	  radio	  stations.66	  From	  their	  occupation	  of	  Radio	  Internacional,	  the	  rebels	  read	  a	  
statement	  proclaiming,	  “what	  we	  are	  fighting	  for,”	  which	  called	  for	  the	  overthrow	  of	  
President	  Ydígoras	  Fuentes	  and	  the	  installation	  of	  democracy	  in	  Guatemala.67	  César	  
Montes,	  a	  leader	  of	  the	  FAR	  guerrillas	  by	  the	  mid	  1960s,	  called	  February	  6,	  1962	  the	  
“conscious	  beginning	  of	  guerrilla	  warfare.”68	  
	   In	  March	  1962,	  many	  in	  the	  Guatemalan	  radical	  left,	  primarily	  students	  from	  the	  
University	  of	  San	  Carlos,	  were	  peacefully	  protesting	  in	  the	  streets	  of	  Guatemala	  City	  
when	  they	  where	  attacked	  by	  the	  police,	  leaving	  12	  killed	  in	  what	  was	  known	  as	  las	  
jornadas.	  The	  blood	  spilled	  during	  las	  jornadas	  converted	  some	  in	  Guatemala’s	  radical	  
left	  to	  the	  perspective	  that	  peaceful	  methods	  of	  resistance	  were	  no	  longer	  viable	  in	  the	  
face	  of	  violent	  state	  repression.	  In	  September	  1962,	  a	  lawyer	  from	  Guatemala	  City	  
approached	  military	  rebel	  leaders	  Turcios	  Lima	  and	  Marco	  Antonio	  Yon	  Sosa	  and	  relayed	  
that	  Cuban	  revolutionary	  Ernesto	  “Che”	  Guevara	  wanted	  to	  meet	  with	  them.	  Thus,	  in	  
the	  fall	  of	  1962,	  the	  young	  Guatemalan	  revolutionaries	  traveled	  to	  Cuba	  to	  receive	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“pragmatic	  guerrilla	  instruction.”69	  Most	  significantly,	  their	  trip	  to	  Cuba	  resulted	  in	  the	  
creation	  of	  a	  new	  Guatemalan	  guerrilla	  group:	  the	  Rebel	  Armed	  Forces	  (FAR).	  The	  FAR	  
were	  to	  be	  the	  armed	  wing	  of	  the	  PGT	  and	  they	  designated	  the	  northeastern	  
departments	  of	  Izabal	  and	  Zacapa	  as	  their	  areas	  of	  operations.70	  FAR	  leader	  César	  
Montes	  explained	  the	  choice	  of	  their	  operating	  zone	  as	  more	  a	  factor	  of	  the	  isolating	  
“topography”	  than	  the	  “social	  conditions.”	  	  The	  Guatemalan	  military	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  
pursue	  the	  guerrillas	  in	  a	  region	  perpetually	  blanketed	  in	  mist,	  where	  clothes	  were	  
always	  damp	  and	  boots	  quickly	  rotted.	  However,	  the	  guerrillas	  already	  contained	  a	  vital	  
supply	  network	  within	  campesino	  communities,	  which	  provided	  the	  guerrillas	  with	  food	  
and	  materials,	  a	  network	  constructed	  years	  before	  by	  the	  PGT.	  
	  	   The	  FAR	  planned	  a	  military	  strategy	  that	  mirrored	  the	  Cuban	  revolutionary	  
model	  of	  foquísmo,	  a	  military	  strategy	  that	  political	  scientist	  Susanne	  Jonas	  defines	  as	  
irregular	  warfare	  that	  transforms	  into	  “popular	  insurrection…	  with	  the	  ‘subjective	  
conditions’	  being	  created	  by	  the	  exemplary	  actions	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  vanguard.”71	  
From	  1963	  to	  1966,	  the	  FAR	  conducted	  various	  guerrilla	  activities	  and	  armed	  
propaganda	  education	  campaigns	  in	  the	  rugged	  mountains	  of	  northeastern	  Guatemala.	  
Throughout	  this	  time	  period,	  communication	  with	  their	  revolutionary	  partners,	  the	  PGT,	  
was	  practically	  non-­‐existent,	  and	  the	  FAR	  guerrillas	  increasingly	  depended	  on	  the	  
campesinos	  who	  lived	  in	  the	  areas	  they	  operated	  in	  for	  food	  and	  supplies.	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   By	  the	  mid	  1960s,	  FAR	  leader	  Yon	  Sosa	  became	  increasingly	  frustrated	  with	  the	  
PGT	  for	  not	  providing	  sufficient	  financial	  or	  material	  support	  for	  his	  guerrilla	  campaigns.	  
Looking	  for	  other	  sources	  of	  support,	  Yon	  Sosa	  met	  with	  Guatemalan	  businessman	  
Francisco	  Armando	  Granados,	  who	  was	  willing	  to	  fund	  Yon	  Sosa’s	  guerrilla	  front	  if	  he	  
adopted	  a	  Trotskyist	  political	  line.72	  According	  to	  Argentinian	  journalist	  and	  pro-­‐MR-­‐13	  
advocate	  Adolfo	  Gilly,	  Yon	  Sosa	  agreed	  and	  pledged	  to	  the	  Fourth	  International	  
(Trotskyist	  governing	  body),	  and	  renamed	  his	  front	  Revolutionary	  Movement	  of	  
November	  13	  (MR-­‐13).	  
	   While	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  maintained	  a	  delicate	  unity,	  primarily	  based	  in	  their	  
shared	  opposition	  to	  MR-­‐13	  and	  its	  Trotskyist	  ideology,	  they	  began	  to	  intensely	  debate	  
the	  primacy	  of	  electoral	  reformism	  versus	  armed	  tactics.	  Wanting	  to	  capitalize	  on	  the	  
FAR’s	  split	  with	  the	  MR-­‐13,	  the	  PGT	  went	  into	  a	  period	  of	  internal	  debate	  regarding	  their	  
party’s	  stance	  on	  armed	  tactics.	  In	  the	  end,	  PGT	  leadership	  decided	  to	  endorse	  the	  
armed	  struggle	  as	  their	  principal	  revolutionary	  method	  by	  January	  1965.	  However,	  this	  
was	  far	  from	  a	  decision	  of	  consensus	  within	  the	  PGT	  leadership.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  PGT	  
reluctantly	  accepted	  the	  incorporation	  of	  armed	  tactics	  into	  their	  methodology,	  but	  only	  
as	  an	  “instrument	  of	  pressure	  which	  could	  force	  the	  government	  to	  negotiate…	  on	  the	  
electoral,	  democratic	  level”	  of	  conciliation.73	  This	  methodological	  debate	  reached	  a	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feverous	  intensity	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1965,	  when	  presidential	  elections	  were	  announced	  for	  
March	  1966.	  	  
The	  origin	  and	  evolution	  of	  the	  PGT’s	  political	  line	  	  
Days	  before	  Juan	  José	  Arévalo	  became	  president	  of	  Guatemala	  in	  March	  1944,	  a	  new	  
constitution	  was	  ratified	  and	  approved	  by	  the	  Guatemalan	  Congressional	  Assembly,	  
which	  disrupted	  the	  political	  grip	  of	  the	  landed	  oligarchy	  over	  Guatemala’s	  governance	  
with	  new	  opportunities	  for	  labour	  organization.	  Article	  #92	  of	  the	  new	  constitution	  
hinted	  at	  the	  initiation	  of	  agrarian	  reform,	  stating:	  “Private	  property	  can	  be	  
expropriated	  with	  prior	  indemnity	  to	  satisfy	  a	  public	  necessity,	  utility	  or	  social	  interest	  
which	  has	  been	  legally	  verified.”	  According	  to	  Guatemalan	  historian	  Jim	  Handy,	  
“[organized	  labour]	  quickly	  organized	  under	  the	  benevolent	  protection	  of	  the	  Arévalo	  
government,	  it	  became	  an	  important	  element	  in	  support	  of	  the	  revolution.”74	  	  
	   In	  August	  1948,	  The	  Confederation	  of	  Workers	  of	  Guatemala	  (CTG)	  was	  legally	  
recognized	  as	  a	  union	  and	  was	  led	  by	  General	  Secretary	  Victor	  Manuel	  Gutiérrez,	  a	  self-­‐
taught	  Marxist	  schoolteacher,	  labour	  organizer,	  and	  former	  Congressman	  who	  would	  
also	  become	  a	  principal	  leader	  of	  the	  PGT	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  ‘60s.	  According	  to	  
Guatemalan	  historian	  Greg	  Grandin,	  Gutiérrez’s	  knowledge	  of	  Marxism	  “helped	  him	  
understand	  Guatemala’s	  October	  Revolution	  within	  a	  larger	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  global	  
history.”	  The	  CTG,	  under	  Gutiérrez’s	  leadership,	  focused	  their	  labour	  mobilization	  
efforts	  and	  education	  campaigns	  in	  the	  rural	  countryside,	  rallying	  campesino	  support	  for	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leftist	  political	  parties.75	  The	  CTG	  advocated	  that	  land	  taken	  illegally,	  primarily,	  during	  
the	  liberal	  regimes	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  centuries,	  should	  be	  
returned	  to	  their	  previous	  owners.	  	  
	   The	  CTG	  became	  an	  umbrella	  labour	  organization	  (the	  CGTG-­‐the	  Confederation	  
of	  Guatemalan	  Workers)	  that	  included	  a	  coalition	  of	  teachers	  and	  railway	  workers.	  
However,	  political	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  interest	  groups	  remained	  an	  issue,	  as	  
the	  more	  radical	  teachers’	  syndicates	  argued	  for	  a	  leftist	  political	  orientation,	  while	  the	  
railway	  workers’	  were	  decidedly	  more	  skeptical	  of	  the	  involvement	  of	  communists	  in	  
their	  organization.	  By	  the	  early	  1950s,	  the	  teachers	  began	  to	  dominate	  the	  CGTG	  and	  
released	  a	  statement	  defending	  their	  active	  political	  participation:	  “For	  us	  to	  speak	  
about	  democracy,	  civil	  liberties,	  free	  civic	  institutions,	  is	  the	  same	  as	  saying	  better	  
salaries,	  better	  houses	  and	  better	  clothing,	  better	  health	  and,	  in	  brief,	  a	  better	  life.”76	  
CGTG	  leader	  Gutiérrez	  advocated	  for	  the	  strategic	  utility	  of	  political	  participation,	  a	  
tactical	  position	  that	  would	  later	  drive	  PGT	  revolutionary	  strategy	  in	  the	  1960s.	  	   Under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Gutiérrez,	  the	  CGTG	  worked	  to	  boost	  unions	  and	  raise	  
awareness	  of	  workers’	  rights	  in	  the	  countryside,	  becoming	  vocal	  defenders	  of	  the	  
October	  Revolution.	  According	  to	  Jim	  Handy,	  Gutiérrez	  was	  instrumental	  in	  organizing	  
and	  mobilizing	  labour	  in	  the	  1950s.	  “Scrupulously	  honest,”	  Handy	  contends,	  “Gutiérrez	  
inspired	  innumerable	  disciples	  with	  his	  example	  of	  hard	  work	  and	  obvious	  dedication.”	  
Handy	  emphasizes	  that	  Gutiérrez	  was	  successful	  because	  he	  was	  dedicated	  to	  staying	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“within	  the	  constraints	  of	  the	  constitution,”	  illustrated	  with	  his	  “tireless	  work”	  on	  the	  
Agrarian	  Reform	  Law	  of	  1952.	  77	  Handy’s	  high	  praise	  for	  Gutiérrez	  is	  not	  surprising	  given	  
Handy’s	  admiration	  for	  what	  future	  PGT	  leaders,	  like	  Gutiérrez,	  were	  able	  to	  accomplish	  
on	  agrarian	  reform	  issues	  in	  the	  1950s.	  	  
	   In	  May	  1950,	  another	  peasant	  league,	  The	  National	  Peasant	  Federation	  of	  
Guatemala	  (CNGG)	  was	  founded	  and	  led	  by	  another	  schoolteacher,	  Leonardo	  Castillo	  
Flores.78	  The	  CNGG,	  led	  by	  a	  group	  of	  teachers	  focused	  on	  fighting	  for	  campesino	  rights,	  
demanded	  equitable	  access	  to	  land	  and	  pressured	  municipal	  governments	  to	  apply	  
agrarian	  reform	  laws.	  In	  a	  co-­‐authored	  document	  by	  the	  CNGG	  and	  CCTG,	  called	  the	  
Camino	  Guatemalteco	  (Guatemalan	  Path),	  the	  peasant	  leagues	  called	  for	  advances	  in	  
agrarian	  reform,	  better	  working	  and	  living	  conditions	  for	  workers	  and	  peasants,	  and	  an	  
end	  to	  feudal	  and	  imperialistic	  monopolies	  over	  land.79	  While	  the	  CNCG	  and	  CGTG	  
initially	  had	  issues	  maintaining	  unity,	  according	  to	  Handy,	  “cooperation	  was	  made	  easier	  
by	  the	  sincerity	  of	  its	  two	  leaders,	  Leonardo	  Castillo	  Flores	  and	  Victor	  Manuel	  Gutiérrez,	  
in	  their	  approach	  to	  peasant	  and	  worker	  concerns.”80	  Handy	  continues	  to	  praise	  the	  
personal	  characteristics	  of	  these	  two	  peasant	  league	  leaders	  and	  the	  work	  they	  
accomplished	  in	  the	  countryside,	  claiming:	  	  
“the	  CNCG	  became	  an	  important	  political	  voice	  and	  its	  leader,	  Castillo	  Flores,	  
one	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  men	  in	  the	  country…Flores	  was	  an	  important	  reason	  
for	  the	  CNGG’s	  success…[He]	  patiently	  responded	  to	  individual	  requests	  for	  aid,	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the	  kind	  of	  wearying	  but	  indispensable	  organizational	  work	  that	  over	  the	  long	  
run	  resulted	  in	  an	  increased	  CNCG	  presence	  in	  the	  countryside.”81	  	  
	  
	   By	  the	  early	  1950s,	  a	  flurry	  of	  socialist	  and	  communist	  political	  parties	  began	  to	  
form,	  dropping	  in	  and	  out	  of	  unity	  as	  they	  competed	  for	  ideological	  and	  material	  lines	  of	  
support.	  In	  1951,	  communist	  politician	  José	  Manuel	  Fortuny	  established	  the	  
Guatemalan	  Communist	  Party,	  amending	  its	  name	  in	  1952	  to	  the	  Guatemalan	  Worker’s	  
Party	  (PGT).82	  The	  PGT	  called	  itself	  the	  party	  that	  could	  organize	  the	  masses	  by	  
strengthening	  the	  syndical	  movement,	  offering	  “concrete	  solutions	  to	  each	  problem.”83	  
Unsurprisingly,	  given	  their	  experiences	  working	  for	  syndical	  organization,	  they	  declared	  
that	  unions	  would	  play	  the	  most	  significant	  role	  in	  their	  struggle	  for	  revolutionary	  
change.	  In	  1965,	  Gutiérrez	  reflected	  on	  what	  it	  meant	  for	  Guatemala	  to	  have	  a	  socialist	  
political	  party	  in	  the	  early	  1950s,	  asserting:	  “The	  recognition	  of	  PGT	  as	  a	  legal	  party	  gave	  
the	  oppressed	  social	  classes	  an	  instrument	  of	  struggle,	  a	  way	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  
political	  life	  of	  the	  country	  to	  advance	  their	  positions	  to	  defend	  their	  rights	  and	  assure	  
their	  future	  development	  as	  a	  social	  class	  in	  society.”84	  Gutiérrez	  clearly	  believed,	  as	  he	  
continued	  to	  argue	  throughout	  the	  1960s,	  that	  the	  revolutionary	  tool	  best	  capable	  of	  
generating	  radical	  changes	  in	  Guatemala	  resided	  in	  the	  free	  ability	  to	  participate	  in	  
Guatemala’s	  electoral	  democracy.	  	  
	   The	  PGT’s	  revolutionary	  strategy	  was	  primarily	  guided	  by	  a	  Marxism-­‐Leninist	  
ideology,	  an	  inheritance	  from	  the	  U.S.S.R’s	  Communist	  Party.	  Guided	  by	  this	  Marxist-­‐
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Leninist	  political	  line,	  the	  PGT	  maintained	  that	  before	  Guatemala	  could	  transition	  into	  a	  
socialist	  state,	  the	  nation	  would	  first	  require	  a	  transitory	  period	  of	  state-­‐directed	  
capitalism.	  According	  to	  Marxism-­‐Leninism,	  part	  of	  this	  transition	  required	  satisfying	  
certain	  “subjective”	  conditions	  by	  raising	  class-­‐consciousness	  of	  campesinos	  and	  
workers.	  While	  rallying	  campesinos	  and	  workers	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  raising	  social	  
consciousness,	  the	  PGT	  prioritized	  agrarian	  reform	  as	  the	  key	  method	  for	  developing	  the	  
“objective”	  conditions	  necessary	  for	  transitioning	  to	  socialism.	  	  
	   	  In	  April	  1951,	  Gutiérrez	  drafted	  a	  law	  that	  called	  for	  fincas	  containing	  more	  than	  
5,000	  hectares	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  “partial	  confiscation	  with	  due	  indemnization.”	  In	  defense	  
of	  this	  law,	  Gutiérrez	  argued	  the	  confiscation	  of	  unused	  lands	  was	  necessary	  to	  establish	  
a	  “capitalist	  system	  in	  agriculture	  that	  would	  bring	  economic	  development	  to	  the	  whole	  
country…no	  indemnization	  at	  all	  is	  more	  just,	  since	  these	  landowners	  have	  already	  
profited	  from	  these	  lands.”85	  Gutiérrez’s	  legislative	  draft	  contributed	  significantly	  to	  the	  
Agrarian	  Reform	  Law	  of	  1952.	  According	  to	  campesino	  turned	  guerrilla,	  Efraín	  Reyes	  
Maaz,	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  peasant	  leagues	  worked	  assiduously	  throughout	  the	  1950s,	  
reflecting:	  
	  	   “even	  as	  the	  countryside	  militarized,	  repression	  grew,	  and	  the	  war	  escalated,	  the	  
	   party	  continued	  to	  work	  with	  local	  Q’eqchi’	  leaders	  and	  other	  reformers	  to	  end	  
	   forced	  labor	  and	  redistribute	  land…	  in	  effect,	  the	  PGT	  helped	  to	  accomplish	  in	  
	   some	  parts	  of	  Cahabon	  what	  it	  had	  hoped	  to	  do	  for	  all	  of	  Guatemala	  with	  its	  
	   agrarian	  reform:	  transform	  a	  private	  fiefdom	  into	  a	  community	  of	  small	  property	  
	   owners	  who	  vote	  for	  the	  left.”86	  	  
	  
According	  to	  Handy,	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   “Much	  of	  the	  success	  of	  the	  agrarian	  reform	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  
	   CNCG	  and	  the	  CGTG.	  During	  the	  two	  years	  the	  reform	  was	  in	  effect,	  both	  
	   organizations	  were	  inundated	  with	  requests	  for	  assistance	  in	  almost	  all	  matters	  
	   pertaining	  to	  the	  law…workers	  for	  both	  the	  CNCG	  and	  the	  CGTG,	  especially	  
	   Leonardo	  Castillo	  Flores,	  responded	  carefully	  and	  courteously	  to	  almost	  all	  
	   requests	  for	  assistance.	  They	  explained	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  law;	  sent	  
	   commissions	  to	  investigate	  land	  disputes;	  held	  congress	  to	  identify	  the	  further	  
	   needs	  of	  peasants…their	  most	  important	  role	  was	  to	  insure	  that	  local	  officials	  
	   upheld	  the	  law”87	  	  
	  
In	  his	  commentary,	  Handy	  reveals	  his	  perspective	  that	  the	  work	  done	  by	  the	  peasant	  
leagues,	  and	  later	  the	  PGT	  party,	  transformed	  Guatemala’s	  countryside	  in	  the	  1940s	  and	  
‘50s,	  constructing	  a	  vital	  network	  of	  support,	  which	  ultimately	  facilitated	  the	  success	  
and	  survival	  of	  guerrilla	  campaigns	  in	  the	  1960s.	  FAR	  guerrilla	  leader	  Pablo	  Monsanto	  
echoed	  Handy’s	  interpretation	  in	  an	  interview	  conducted	  in	  1981,	  asserting,	  “Guerrilla	  
support	  in	  Zacapa	  was	  due	  to	  PGT	  activity	  years	  before.”88	  	  	  
The	  PGT:	  committed	  to	  “all	  legal	  forms”	  
In	  early	  June	  1954,	  just	  days	  before	  the	  coup	  that	  ousted	  Guatemalan	  president	  Jacobo	  
Árbenz	  Guzmán	  in	  late	  June	  1954,	  the	  PGT	  celebrated	  their	  Second	  Congress	  and	  
declared,	  “We	  have	  to	  use	  all	  possible	  legal	  means	  to	  organize	  the	  masses.”89	  Their	  
principal	  goal	  was	  to	  develop,	  support,	  and	  promote	  the	  democratic	  ideals	  of	  the	  
October	  Revolution,	  arguing	  that	  the	  fostering	  of	  popular	  will	  in	  support	  of	  the	  
revolution	  was	  pivotal	  for	  the	  revolution’s	  long-­‐term	  survival.	  The	  PGT	  remained	  open	  
to	  varying	  tactics,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  were	  legal;	  the	  form	  of	  the	  struggle	  was	  flexible,	  the	  
PGT	  maintained,	  depending	  on	  the	  ability	  for	  free	  elections	  and	  political	  determination.	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It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  during	  the	  PGT’s	  Second	  Congress,	  there	  was	  minimal	  
internal	  dialogue	  concerning	  the	  incorporation	  of	  armed	  tactics	  into	  the	  party’s	  
revolutionary	  strategy.	  Before	  the	  Árbenz	  coup,	  the	  PGT	  were	  successful,	  to	  some	  
extent,	  in	  accomplishing	  their	  goals	  through	  electoral	  politics.	  Therefore,	  the	  notion	  of	  
an	  armed	  struggle	  was	  not	  yet	  relevant	  as	  a	  course	  of	  action.	  	  
	   However,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  subsequent	  regimes,	  following	  Árbenz’s	  coup	  
in	  1954,	  would	  not	  tolerate	  the	  PGT’s	  communist	  agenda.	  The	  PGT	  was	  declared	  illegal	  
by	  one	  of	  the	  first	  decrees	  of	  the	  military	  junta,	  forcing	  many	  PGT	  members	  to	  flee	  the	  
country.	  In	  1955,	  the	  PGT	  released	  a	  document	  called	  Auto-­‐crítica	  (Self-­‐criticism),	  which	  
demonstrated	  the	  PGT’s	  perspective	  on	  why	  Árbenz	  was	  overthrown,	  connecting	  the	  
coup	  of	  1954	  as	  a	  function	  of	  imperialism,	  U.S.	  interventionism,	  and	  anti-­‐communism.	  
The	  PGT	  distributed	  Auto-­‐crítica,	  along	  with	  Karl	  Marx’s	  Communist	  Manifesto	  and	  
Vladimir	  Lenin’s	  Imperialism,	  to	  campesinos	  during	  clandestine	  education	  campaigns.	  In	  
doing	  so,	  Guatemalan	  historian	  Michael	  D.	  Kirkpatrick	  maintains,	  the	  PGT	  leadership	  in	  
the	  late	  1950s	  sought	  to	  reinstitute	  a	  “trans-­‐generational	  tradition”	  that	  invoked	  the	  
memory	  of	  Árbenz	  by	  linking	  their	  current	  struggle	  to	  the	  October	  Revolution.90	  
According	  to	  Guatemalan	  sociologist	  Carlos	  Figueroa	  Ibarra,	  “From	  1955	  to	  1960,	  the	  
PGT	  did	  not	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  armed	  struggle,	  proclaiming	  any	  form	  of	  struggle	  that	  
fit	  the	  subjective	  conditions	  of	  the	  country	  should	  be	  made–	  they	  were	  focused	  on	  the	  
party’s	  reconstruction,	  not	  arms.”91	  According	  to	  Figueroa	  Ibarra,	  after	  the	  Árbenz	  coup	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the	  PGT	  were	  primarily	  in	  a	  state	  of	  recovery	  as	  a	  political	  party.	  From	  1955-­‐1960,	  the	  
PGT	  struggled	  to	  secure	  legal	  recognition	  for	  the	  party;	  they	  were	  not	  focused	  on	  
developing	  an	  armed	  struggle.	  
	   After	  four	  years	  in	  exile,	  many	  PGT	  members	  returned	  from	  abroad	  and	  began	  to	  
regroup	  by	  1958,	  counting	  600	  members	  by	  1960.92	  However,	  when	  the	  PGT	  regrouped	  
in	  the	  late	  1950s,	  a	  new	  methodological	  divergence	  began	  to	  fragment	  the	  party.	  The	  
original	  founders	  of	  the	  PGT	  party	  (namely,	  Huberto	  Alvarado,	  Mario	  Silva	  Jonama,	  
Alfredo	  Guerra	  Borges,	  Victor	  Manuel	  Gutiérrez,	  and	  Leonardo	  Castillo	  Flores),	  those	  
who	  had	  been	  actively	  involved	  in	  organizing	  campesino	  leagues	  and	  labour	  unions	  
during	  the	  Árbenz	  administration,	  were	  confronted	  by	  a	  younger,	  more	  militant	  bloc	  in	  
the	  party,	  generally	  those	  who	  joined	  after	  the	  Árbenz	  coup.	  These	  radical	  PGT	  
members	  began	  to	  call	  for	  the	  incorporation	  of	  armed	  tactics	  into	  the	  party’s	  
revolutionary	  methodology.93	  By	  the	  early	  1960s,	  PGT	  leaders	  Castillo	  Flores	  and	  
Gutiérrez	  shifted	  their	  methodological	  stance	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  armed	  tactics,	  eventually	  
admitting	  the	  need	  for	  an	  armed	  struggle.	  Castillo	  Flores	  and	  Gutiérrez	  began	  to	  support	  
the	  more	  militant	  bloc	  of	  the	  party,	  advocating	  for	  a	  political	  re-­‐orientation	  that	  
embraced	  armed	  tactics.	  
	   Ironically,	  the	  FAR	  chastised	  the	  PGT	  throughout	  the	  1960s	  for	  their	  
“conservative”	  strategy	  that	  favored	  electoral	  reformism	  over	  armed	  tactics,	  despite	  
that	  the	  PGT	  was	  deeply	  divided	  on	  this	  issue	  when	  the	  FAR	  formed	  in	  1962.	  According	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to	  Grandin,	  Leonardo	  Castillo	  Flores	  was	  “more	  militant	  than	  many	  of	  the	  party’s	  
Arbencista	  leaders,”	  eventually	  leading	  a	  guerrilla	  group	  in	  the	  mid	  1960s.94	  
Furthermore,	  Grandin	  maintains	  that	  Gutiérrez	  was	  “misunderstood	  posthumously	  as	  a	  
conservative	  and	  traditionalist”	  by	  the	  FAR	  revolutionaries,	  despite	  his	  calls	  for	  armed	  
tactics	  by	  the	  early	  1960s.95	  	  
	   	  In	  June	  1960,	  the	  PGT	  celebrated	  its	  Third	  Congress,	  stating	  their	  principal	  goals	  
were,	  “developing	  internal	  democracy”	  to	  generate	  a	  “profound	  change…that	  gives	  
power	  to	  a	  democratic,	  patriotic,	  anti-­‐imperialist	  government”	  with	  the	  ultimate	  
objective	  of	  a	  “national-­‐democratic	  revolution.”96	  The	  greatest	  danger	  to	  the	  struggle	  
for	  revolutionary	  change,	  according	  to	  the	  PGT,	  was	  the	  “political	  immaturity”	  of	  the	  
lower	  classes.	  “The	  principal	  factor	  that	  has	  led	  to	  repression,”	  the	  PGT	  asserted,	  “has	  
been	  the	  disorganization	  of	  the	  campesinos.”97	  	  
	   In	  their	  Third	  Congress,	  the	  PGT	  reveal	  that	  political	  mobilization	  and	  electoral	  
participation	  remained	  key	  components	  for	  their	  revolutionary	  strategy	  of	  the	  future.	  
Reviewing	  past	  political	  errors,	  the	  PGT	  linked	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  October	  Revolution	  and	  
the	  Árbenz	  coup	  not	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  arms	  given	  to	  the	  campesinos	  (as	  the	  FAR	  later	  
maintained),	  but	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  participation	  of	  the	  masses,	  a	  failure	  to	  generate	  
enough	  political	  will	  to	  gain	  a	  significant	  electoral	  and	  democratic	  position.98	  In	  the	  
PGT’s	  Third	  Congressional	  Resolution,	  the	  PGT	  hinted	  at	  the	  demands	  increasingly	  being	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made	  by	  the	  more	  militant	  members	  of	  the	  party	  for	  the	  incorporation	  of	  an	  armed	  
struggle	  into	  the	  party’s	  revolutionary	  methodology,	  declaring:	  	  
	   “We	  have	  to	  use	  all	  possible	  legal	  forms	  to	  organize	  the	  masses…and	  only	  in	  
	   exceptional	  cases,	  where	  there	  does	  not	  exist	  to	  legally	  organize	  the	  masses	  in	  a	  
	   legal	  and	  open	  way,	  should	  we	  navigate	  other	  forms…We	  can’t	  just	  use	  one	  form	  
	   of	  struggle	  at	  the	  exclusion	  of	  other	  forms…	  the	  form	  of	  the	  struggle	  depends	  on	  
	   the	  ability	  for	  free	  elections	  and	  self-­‐determination,	  only	  then	  should	  we	  resort	  
	   to	  violence.”99	  	  
	  
Here,	  the	  PGT’s	  Third	  Congressional	  Resolution	  demonstrated	  the	  lack	  of	  consensus	  
within	  the	  PGT’s	  leadership	  concerning	  the	  role	  of	  armed	  tactics	  in	  their	  electoral	  
struggle.	  However,	  the	  PGT	  affirmed	  that	  violence	  should	  only	  be	  used	  as	  a	  last	  resort,	  
with	  other	  forms	  of	  struggle	  superseding	  any	  implementation	  of	  armed	  tactics.	  	  
	   By	  May	  1961,	  under	  pressure	  from	  more	  radical	  factions	  of	  the	  party,	  the	  PGT’s	  
revolutionary	  line	  was	  forced	  to	  evolve	  and	  the	  party	  reluctantly	  voted	  to	  incorporate	  
armed	  tactics	  into	  the	  their	  methodology	  of	  resistance.	  Reflecting	  on	  this	  new	  strategy,	  
PGT	  leader	  José	  Manuel	  Fortuny	  recalled	  that,	  “owing	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  experience	  and	  
uncertainty	  as	  to	  the	  correctness	  of	  the	  path	  chosen,	  we	  were	  poorly	  prepared…”100	  
Throughout	  the	  early	  1960s,	  a	  severe	  lack	  of	  internal	  consensus	  persisted	  within	  the	  
PGT	  regarding	  how	  armed	  tactics	  could	  be	  incorporated	  within	  the	  PGT’s	  entrenched	  
strategy	  of	  electoral	  reformism—an	  approach	  that	  sought	  broad	  inclusion	  of	  the	  masses	  
and	  which	  concentrated	  on	  the	  construction	  of	  coalitions	  with	  liberal-­‐minded	  parties.	  To	  
some	  members	  of	  the	  party,	  the	  incorporation	  of	  an	  armed	  conflict	  was	  only	  to	  be	  used	  
as	  an	  “instrument	  of	  pressure,”	  ideally	  forcing	  the	  government	  to	  negotiate	  on	  an	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electoral	  and	  democratic	  level.	  By	  the	  early	  1960s,	  this	  internal	  tactical	  schism	  magnified	  
as	  the	  PGT	  entered	  into	  a	  revolutionary	  alliance	  with	  the	  FAR	  guerrillas.	  	  
November	  13	  1960:	  military	  rebels	  or	  leftist	  guerrillas?	  
Reflecting	  on	  the	  political-­‐line	  that	  motivated	  his	  participation	  in	  the	  failed	  November	  
13	  coup,	  Turcios	  Lima	  explained	  that	  it	  was	  a	  “typical	  nationalist	  officer	  revolt,”	  aimed	  at	  
restoring	  national	  sovereignty	  and	  consumed	  with	  anti-­‐imperialism.101	  Turcios	  Lima	  
maintained	  that	  there	  was	  no	  ideology	  other	  than	  “patriotism”	  and	  “humanity”	  that	  
motivated	  the	  coup.102	  Adolfo	  Gilly,	  a	  pro-­‐guerrilla	  journalist	  who	  covered	  the	  FAR	  in	  the	  
mid	  1960s	  explains	  that	  while	  in	  exile,	  the	  rebels	  lived	  amongst	  the	  campesinos	  of	  El	  
Salvador	  and	  Honduras.	  Gilly,	  who	  strongly	  advocated	  for	  a	  campesino-­‐led	  revolution,	  
shared	  an	  anecdote	  from	  Augusto	  Lorca,	  an	  officer	  who	  participated	  in	  the	  November	  
13	  revolt.	  Lorca	  described	  the	  generosity	  he	  received	  from	  a	  Honduran	  campesino	  while	  
in	  hiding,	  recalling:	  “the	  peasant	  came	  twice	  a	  day	  to	  talk	  with	  me	  and	  bring	  me	  
food…food	  that	  was…	  much	  better	  than	  he	  could	  afford…	  by	  protecting	  a	  rebel	  he	  was	  
running	  a	  serious	  risk…	  [the	  campesino	  said],	  ‘If	  you	  and	  your	  people	  win,	  please	  
remember	  this	  village	  when	  you’re	  in	  the	  government.”103	  According	  to	  Gilly,	  the	  period	  
the	  rebels	  spent	  in	  exile	  expanded	  the	  dissidents’	  political	  consciousness	  to	  the	  extent	  
of	  campesino	  misery	  in	  Central	  America.	  Gilly	  implied	  that	  it	  was	  a	  natural	  transition	  for	  
the	  rebels	  to	  embrace	  peasants	  as	  their	  primary	  base	  of	  support	  because,	  in	  Gilly’s	  
perspective,	  it	  was	  the	  peasant	  class	  that	  represented	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  proletariat.	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   Upon	  return	  from	  exile,	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  military	  rebels	  entered	  into	  a	  political	  
alliance.	  For	  the	  PGT,	  their	  alliance	  with	  the	  rebels	  made	  sense	  in	  a	  time	  when	  they	  
hesitantly	  began	  to	  embrace	  armed	  tactics	  as	  a	  method	  of	  resistance.	  While	  the	  PGT	  
and	  the	  military	  rebels	  were	  now	  working	  together,	  they	  were	  not	  unified	  regarding	  the	  
decision	  to	  take	  up	  arms	  at	  the	  exclusion	  of	  electoral	  participation.	  The	  military	  rebels,	  
together	  with	  the	  more	  radical	  faction	  of	  the	  PGT,	  began	  to	  advocate	  for	  the	  primacy	  of	  
armed	  insurrection.	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  subordinated	  electoral	  reformism	  within	  their	  
revolutionary	  strategy.	  Pablo	  Monsanto,	  a	  FAR	  guerrilla	  leader	  in	  the	  late	  1960s,	  
reflected	  on	  the	  lack	  of	  unity	  amongst	  the	  early	  1960s	  radical	  left,	  maintaining	  they:	  
	  	   “represented	  the	  interests	  of	  different	  democratic	  sectors	  unified	  under	  a	  
	   common	  objective…But,	  they	  didn’t	  elaborate	  on	  their	  shared	  political	  line,	  
	   they	  didn’t	  have	  a	  dialectical	  understanding	  of	  the	  armed	  struggle	  and	  they	  
	   didn’t	  establish	  a	  defined	  strategy…they	  didn’t	  interpret	  the	  political	  and	  
	   military	  parts	  of	  the	  struggle	  as	  unified…they	  devalued	  armed	  action	  as	  a	  	  mere	  
	   political	  instrument…which	  caused	  combative	  groups	  to	  lack	  perspective	  and	  
	   forged	  no	  unity.”104	  	  
	  
	   In	  early	  1962,	  the	  military	  rebels	  established	  a	  guerrilla	  front	  called	  The	  
Alejandro	  de	  León-­‐November	  13,	  with	  the	  dual	  goals	  of	  overthrowing	  President	  Ydígoras	  
Fuentes	  while	  also	  forging	  a	  government	  that	  valued	  “human	  rights”	  with	  a	  “self-­‐
respecting	  foreign	  policy.”105	  In	  late	  February	  1962,	  Alejandro	  de	  Leon-­‐November	  13	  
issued	  a	  statement	  explaining	  why	  they	  believed	  the	  “objective”	  conditions	  in	  
Guatemala	  required	  a	  modification	  of	  revolutionary	  strategy	  from	  an	  electoral	  to	  an	  
armed	  struggle,	  “Democracy	  vanished	  from	  our	  country	  long	  ago.	  No	  people	  can	  live	  in	  a	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country	  where	  there	  is	  no	  democracy…	  We	  must	  overthrow	  the	  Ydígoras	  government	  
and	  set	  up	  a	  new	  government	  which	  respects	  human	  rights.”106 	  
	   In	  the	  spring	  of	  1962,	  the	  human	  casualties	  endured	  during	  the	  las	  jornadas	  riots	  
left	  the	  radical	  left	  at	  a	  methodological	  crossroads;	  for	  many,	  the	  riots	  served	  to	  
demonstrate	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  legal	  modes	  of	  resistance,	  such	  as	  peaceful	  protests,	  
while	  simultaneously	  opening	  up	  the	  prospect	  for	  many	  to	  engage	  with	  violent	  tactics	  
for	  the	  first	  time.	  In	  late	  March	  1962,	  Alejandro	  de	  Leon-­‐November	  13	  released	  a	  
statement	  affirming	  that	  the	  revolutionary	  movement	  must	  fully	  accept	  the	  necessity	  of	  
an	  armed	  struggle,	  proclaiming	  “The	  only	  road	  left	  is	  the	  road	  of	  uprising…No	  matter	  in	  
which	  part	  of	  our	  motherland	  we	  may	  be,	  we	  will	  take	  up	  arms.”107 	  
Becoming	  the	  Guatemalan	  guerrilla	  (in	  Cuba)	  
In	  1962,	  the	  military	  rebels	  lacked	  a	  firm	  revolutionary	  direction	  and	  sought	  a	  new	  
political	  line	  that	  more	  accurately	  reflected	  the	  national	  conditions	  of	  Guatemala.	  To	  the	  
young	  rebels,	  the	  U.S.S.R.’s	  Communist	  Party,	  the	  ideological	  guide	  of	  the	  PGT	  party,	  
was	  far	  removed	  from	  the	  Guatemalan	  situation;	  it	  was	  beginning	  to	  become	  
increasingly	  difficult	  to	  relate	  to	  their	  brand	  of	  revolution.	  Likewise,	  the	  Cuban	  
Revolution	  in	  1959	  was	  certainly	  inspiring	  to	  the	  young	  Guatemalan	  guerrillas;	  Fidel	  
Castro	  and	  Ernesto	  “Che”	  Guevara	  had	  achieved	  what	  Guatemala’s	  radical	  left	  aspired	  
to.	  However,	  it	  wasn’t	  until	  Cuban	  President	  Fidel	  Castro	  delivered	  the	  Second	  
Declaration	  of	  Havana	  that	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  seemed	  ripe	  for	  export.	  On	  February	  4,	  
1962,	  Cuban	  President	  Fidel	  Castro	  triumphantly	  declared	  a	  victory	  over	  the	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“imperialists,”	  attempting	  to	  link	  Cuba’s	  revolutionary	  struggle	  to	  the	  struggles	  ongoing	  
in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  post-­‐colonialized	  world.	  Castro	  called	  on	  guerrillas	  around	  the	  
“undeveloped”	  tri-­‐continental	  world	  of	  Asia,	  Africa,	  and	  Latin	  America	  to	  take	  up	  arms,	  
declaring	  Cuba	  a	  “free	  territory”	  to	  organize	  against	  what	  he	  perceived	  to	  be	  a	  shared	  
tri-­‐continental	  history	  of	  colonialism	  and	  imperialism.108	  	   	  
Kirkpatrick	  argues	  that	  the	  military	  rebels,	  eager	  to	  find	  a	  revolutionary	  path	  that	  
fit	  the	  particular	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  conditions	  of	  Guatemala,	  began	  to	  
reference	  their	  struggle	  in	  new	  terms.	  They	  began	  to	  revise	  Guatemala’s	  historical	  
narrative	  within	  a	  new	  “genealogy	  of	  decolonization,”	  distancing	  the	  Guatemalan	  
revolutionary	  struggle	  from	  the	  hegemonic	  influence	  of	  the	  U.S.S.R.109	  But	  as	  they	  
distanced	  themselves	  from	  Soviet	  hegemony,	  the	  rebels	  became	  increasingly	  influenced	  
by	  a	  Cuban	  model	  of	  insurrection,	  leading	  many	  in	  the	  PGT	  to	  question	  the	  international	  
influence	  over	  the	  young	  rebels.	  	  
	   In	  late	  1962,	  after	  traveling	  to	  Cuba,	  the	  military	  rebels	  joined	  with	  the	  more	  
radical	  student-­‐faction	  of	  the	  PGT,	  and	  created	  a	  new	  guerrilla	  movement	  called	  the	  
Rebel	  Armed	  Forces	  (FAR),	  which	  was	  to	  be	  the	  militaristic	  wing	  of	  the	  PGT	  party.	  The	  
FAR’s	  militant	  strategy	  aimed	  at	  overthrowing	  the	  government	  in	  order	  to	  implement	  a	  
“modern”	  Guatemalan	  state,	  a	  new	  society	  capable	  of	  addressing	  social	  inequalities	  and	  
economic	  inequities.	  The	  FAR’s	  rhetoric	  was	  guided	  by	  their	  juxtaposition	  of	  a	  “Nueva	  
Guatemala”	  with	  an	  older	  order,	  a	  historical	  legacy	  characterized	  by	  feudal	  modes	  of	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production	  and	  power.110	  The	  FAR	  aimed	  to	  reduce	  the	  sway	  of	  imperial	  and	  oligarchic	  
interests	  by	  giving	  a	  voice	  to	  the	  historically	  marginalized	  fragments	  (campesinos,	  
indigenous	  peoples,	  women)	  of	  Guatemalan	  society.	  To	  do	  so,	  FAR	  leadership	  realized	  
they	  needed	  to	  mount	  a	  massive	  education	  campaign	  to	  inform	  those	  who	  they	  referred	  
to	  as	  the	  “masses”	  to	  the	  “true	  nature”	  of	  the	  injustices	  they	  were	  enduring.	  
	   The	  development	  of	  the	  FAR	  guerrilla	  movement	  marked	  a	  radical	  break	  in	  
Guatemalan	  resistance	  strategy	  in	  its	  emphasis	  on	  the	  primacy	  of	  armed	  tactics	  over	  
democratic	  reformism.	  Kirkpatrick	  argues	  this	  transformed	  “geo-­‐political	  insurgent”	  
strategy	  in	  Latin	  America,	  challenging	  the	  “counter-­‐hegemonic	  grip	  over	  Latin	  American	  
Marxist	  ideologues	  [PGT],”	  who	  favored	  a	  reformist	  path.111	  	  
The	  delegation	  of	  revolutionary	  duties	  
Upon	  returning	  home	  from	  Cuba,	  the	  newly	  established	  FAR	  met	  with	  the	  PGT	  in	  
December	  1962,	  officially	  detailing	  the	  delegation	  of	  revolutionary	  responsibilities	  
within	  a	  hierarchal	  organization	  of	  leadership.	  They	  agreed	  the	  FAR	  would	  “supply	  the	  
moving	  force	  and	  material	  resources,”	  for	  the	  revolution,	  while	  the	  PGT	  would	  
“contribute	  financial	  support	  and	  supply	  cadres	  from	  its	  own	  military	  organization.”112	  
Many	  in	  the	  PGT	  did	  not	  support	  the	  new	  FAR,	  anxious	  over	  how	  the	  FAR	  would	  
challenge	  the	  PGT’s	  historic	  strategy	  of	  electoral	  reformism	  with	  the	  FAR’s	  revolutionary	  
strategy	  of	  violence.	  Similarly,	  many	  in	  the	  FAR	  were	  unhappy	  playing	  a	  subordinate	  
political	  role	  to	  the	  PGT,	  a	  role,	  according	  to	  Gilly,	  that	  had	  to	  “accept	  this	  division	  of	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labour	  in	  which	  their	  armed	  struggle	  was	  carried	  out	  under	  outside	  political	  leadership,	  
in	  whose	  decisions	  they	  had	  no	  direct	  participation.”113	  	  
	   Despite	  that	  the	  PGT	  accepted,	  to	  some	  degree,	  the	  FAR’s	  calls	  for	  an	  armed	  
struggle,	  they	  remained	  firm	  in	  their	  commitment	  to	  electoral	  openings	  throughout	  the	  
early	  1960s.	  For	  example,	  the	  PGT	  supported,	  and	  actively	  campaigned	  for	  Guatemala	  
City	  mayoral	  candidate	  Jorge	  Toriello	  Garrido	  in	  1963,	  despite	  the	  FAR’s	  objections	  that	  
such	  participation,	  according	  to	  FAR	  leader	  César	  Montes,	  “distracted	  attention	  and	  
revolutionary	  effort”	  from	  the	  armed	  struggle,	  a	  distraction	  that	  brought	  “foreseeable	  
political	  defeat.”114	  	  	  
	   From	  1963-­‐1966,	  the	  FAR	  guerrillas	  were	  relatively	  isolated	  in	  Guatemala’s	  
northeastern	  mountains,	  increasingly	  relying	  on	  campesinos	  as	  their	  lifelines	  of	  support.	  
As	  a	  result,	  the	  FAR	  gradually	  became	  disconnected	  from	  the	  bureaucratic	  affairs	  of	  the	  
PGT	  and	  began	  to	  advocate	  for	  a	  campesino-­‐led	  revolution	  in	  the	  countryside.	  By	  the	  
mid	  1960s,	  the	  FAR	  also	  began	  to	  emphasize	  their	  opposition	  to	  any	  form	  of	  electoral	  
participation,	  explaining	  to	  the	  campesinos	  that	  electoral	  reform	  was	  not	  a	  viable	  path	  
to	  radical	  social	  change.	  “The	  peasant	  has	  nowhere	  to	  go	  and	  accepts	  death	  when	  it	  
comes…”	  FAR	  leader	  Yon	  Sosa	  told	  a	  group	  of	  campesinos	  during	  an	  armed	  propaganda	  
meeting,	  “We	  don’t	  get	  anything	  from	  elections,	  only	  bourgeois	  governments	  defending	  
the	  interests	  of	  the	  rich	  and	  the	  imperialists.”115	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   During	  the	  mid	  1960s,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  increasing	  levels	  of	  social	  and	  
political	  repression,	  many	  Guatemalan	  leftists	  became	  increasingly	  radicalized,	  
transitioning	  from	  peaceful	  protesters	  to	  armed	  insurgents.	  Leonidas	  Reyes,	  a	  student	  
turned	  guerrilla	  explains,	  “My	  political	  participation	  began	  at	  the	  student	  level.	  In	  1960	  I	  
saw	  the	  army	  close	  Communist	  bookstores…Cesar	  Montes	  told	  me	  that	  the	  ‘guerrilla	  
was	  not	  a	  football	  pitch	  to	  go	  and	  observe.”116	  	  PGT	  leader	  Alfredo	  Guerra	  Borges	  
recalled	  that	  this	  period	  of	  rapid	  radicalization	  made	  him	  feel	  “that	  if	  he	  did	  not	  go	  out	  
and	  engage	  in	  acts	  of	  sabotage,	  then	  those	  from	  the	  FAR	  and	  the	  JPT	  [Patriotic	  Youth	  
Party]	  would	  accuse	  us	  of	  being	  cowards.”117	  	  
Trotskyism	  and	  The	  Revolutionary	  Movement	  of	  November	  13	  (MR-­‐13)	  	  
When	  Yon	  Sosa’s	  FAR	  guerrilla	  column	  adopted	  Trotskyism	  in	  1964,	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  
were	  forced	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  their	  political	  alliance.	  Gilly	  defended	  Yon	  Sosa’s	  decision	  to	  
abandon	  the	  PGT’s	  revolutionary	  alliance	  as	  a	  natural	  consequence	  to	  the	  PGT’s	  failed	  
leadership	  of	  the	  Guatemalan	  radical	  left.	  For	  Yon	  Sosa,	  Trotskyism	  provided	  an	  
alternative	  to	  the	  PGT	  ‘s	  bureaucratic	  control,	  and	  would	  also	  provide	  his	  guerrilla	  front	  
with	  much	  needed	  resources	  for	  weapons	  and	  supplies.	  French	  revolutionary	  theorist	  
Régis	  Debray,	  later	  a	  vocal	  critic	  of	  Trotskyism	  and	  ardent	  supporter	  of	  Cuban	  foquísmo,	  
described	  MR-­‐13	  and	  Trotskyism	  as	  a	  “bizarre	  marriage	  between	  isolated	  native	  
guerrilla	  force	  and	  an	  international	  organization	  of	  intellectuals.”118	  Debray	  implied	  that	  
the	  MR-­‐13	  guerrillas	  were	  manipulated	  by	  the	  Trotskyists.	  In	  doing	  so,	  Debray	  ignores	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other	  material	  and	  ideological	  factors	  that	  may	  have	  prompted	  Yon	  Sosa	  to	  abandon	  the	  
PGT.	  	  
	   According	  to	  Gilly,	  Trotskyism	  exceeded	  what	  Yon	  Sosa	  perceived	  to	  be	  the	  
shortsighted	  goals	  of	  the	  PGT.	  As	  a	  result,	  Yon	  Sosa	  increasingly	  “infused”	  a	  Trotskyist	  
orientation	  into	  the	  MR-­‐13’s	  revolutionary	  political	  line,	  transforming	  MR-­‐13’s	  anti-­‐
imperialist	  political	  orientation	  into	  the	  explicit	  “acceptance	  of	  Marxism	  as	  a	  method	  of	  
analysis	  and	  action,	  and	  socialism	  as	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  struggle.”119	  Gilly	  went	  on	  to	  
criticize	  the	  PGT	  party	  as	  an	  outdated	  and	  outmoded	  extension	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  
that	  could	  not	  adapt	  to	  the	  subjective	  conditions	  in	  Guatemala,	  contending:	  
	  	   “neither	  the	  method	  nor	  the	  programme	  was	  drawn	  up	  by	  a	  group	  of	  pure	  
	   theoreticians	  [Trotskyism],	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  parlor	  game.	  If,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  Latin	  
	   America,	  a	  guerrilla	  movement	  has	  sprung	  up	  in	  Guatemala	  that	  openly	  declares	  
	   its	  Socialist	  objectives…[it	  is]	  especially	  due	  to	  the	  deep	  collective	  experience	  of	  
	   the	  Guatemalan	  people,	  to	  the	  defeat	  suffered	  in	  1954,	  and	  to	  the	  fact	  that,	  
	   since	  then,	  workers	  and	  peasants,	  instead	  of	  lapsing	  into	  resignation	  or	  retreat,	  
	   have	  gone	  on	  fighting	  the	  best	  they	  can.”120	  
Unraveling	  unity	  
In	  July	  1964,	  an	  issue	  of	  the	  Trotskyist	  publication	  Revolución	  Socialista	  reaffirmed	  the	  
MR-­‐13’s	  criticism	  of	  the	  PGT’s	  links	  with	  the	  national	  bourgeoisie,	  also	  taking	  aim	  at	  the	  
FAR’s	  foco	  strategy	  that	  advocated	  for	  a	  “prolonged	  war.”	  Now,	  MR-­‐13	  had	  made	  
enemies	  not	  just	  of	  the	  PGT,	  but	  also	  had	  challenged	  the	  FAR’s	  revolutionary	  line.	  
	   The	  chief	  point	  of	  divergence	  within	  the	  FAR/PGT	  and	  the	  MR-­‐13	  concerned	  the	  
form	  they	  believed	  the	  Guatemalan	  revolution	  should	  take.	  The	  FAR	  advocated	  for	  a	  
“democratic”	  revolution,	  while	  MR-­‐	  13	  called	  for	  a	  “socialist”	  revolution.	  While	  both	  the	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FAR	  and	  the	  MR-­‐13	  prioritized	  armed	  propaganda	  campaigns,	  they	  disagreed	  on	  what	  
organizational	  structure	  the	  guerrillas	  should	  leave	  behind	  after	  they	  had	  left	  the	  village.	  
The	  FAR	  organized	  clandestine	  resistance	  cells,	  operating	  through	  underground	  
networks,	  while	  the	  MR-­‐13	  declared	  the	  villages	  “liberated	  zones”	  and	  created	  “peasant	  
committees,”	  which	  were	  aimed	  to	  counter	  ‘real’	  authority	  outside	  “bourgeois	  
justice.”121	  The	  FAR	  claimed	  such	  flamboyant	  peasant	  committees	  made	  villages	  too	  
vulnerable	  as	  targets	  of	  counter-­‐repression,	  arguing	  that	  such	  brazenness	  put	  the	  village	  
at	  too	  much	  risk.	  In	  response,	  the	  MR-­‐13	  countered	  that	  without	  a	  more	  developed	  
“political	  understanding,”	  the	  FAR’s	  resistance	  cells	  would	  not	  survive	  in	  the	  long-­‐
term.122	  “The	  function	  of	  the	  peasants	  was	  to	  support	  and	  aid	  the	  guerrilla	  army…to	  
defeat	  the	  regular	  army.	  After…a	  new	  government	  (would	  be	  installed)	  which	  would	  
bring	  the	  benefits	  of	  basic	  reforms	  to	  the	  peasantry,”	  Gilly	  maintained,	  continuing	  that	  
the	  FAR’s	  conception	  of	  armed	  propaganda	  was	  “essentially	  a	  paternalistic	  
conception…located	  in	  a	  guerrilla	  elite.”123	  	  
	   In	  March	  1965,	  FAR	  leader	  Turcios	  Lima	  sent	  a	  letter	  to	  MR-­‐13	  called	  Carta	  
Abierta	  (Open	  Letter).	  In	  the	  letter,	  Turcios	  Lima	  declared:	  “He	  [Yon	  Sosa]	  dreams	  of	  a	  
socialist	  revolution	  when	  the	  people	  have	  no	  social	  consciousness.”	  Trotskyism,	  Carta	  
Abierta	  continued,	  was	  only	  a	  distraction	  from	  the	  true	  “revolutionary	  goal.”	  Turcios	  
Lima	  went	  on	  to	  criticize	  MR-­‐13’s	  revolutionary	  praxis:	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   “The	  slogan	  calling	  for	  occupation	  of	  land	  and	  factories…provokes,	  when	  used	  
	   anarchically,	  massacres,	  and	  tremendous	  setbacks	  for	  peasants	  and	  workers	  who	  
	   do	  not	  yet	  have	  the	  strength	  to	  sustain	  these	  invasions…it	  exposes	  the	  people’s	  
	   most	  vulnerable	  targets	  to	  the	  enemy’s	  blows…causing	  defeats	  that	  oblige	  the	  
	   people	  to	  retreat	  politically	  as	  the	  only	  way	  of	  protecting	  themselves	  against	  
	   repression.”124	  	  	  
	  
However,	  in	  Carta	  Abierta,	  Turcios	  Lima	  also	  criticized	  the	  PGT’s	  “insistence	  on	  electoral	  
reform,”	  instead	  calling	  for	  the	  primacy	  of	  armed	  tactics.125	  Furthermore,	  Turcios	  Lima	  
demanded	  less	  division	  between	  the	  PGT’s	  political	  decision-­‐making	  apparatus,	  the	  PGT	  
Central	  Committee,	  and	  the	  FAR’s	  military	  leadership	  in	  the	  countryside.	  Turcios	  Lima	  
asserted	  that	  separating	  the	  two	  was	  like	  “separating	  a	  knife	  from	  its	  blade”	  and	  could	  
lead	  to	  “serious	  mistakes.”126	  Implying	  that	  the	  PGT	  was	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  the	  national	  
conditions	  in	  Guatemala,	  conditions	  that	  required	  an	  armed	  struggle,	  Turcios	  Lima	  
wrote	  that	  the	  revolutionary	  movement	  “needs	  to	  have	  a	  revolutionary	  direction	  that	  
keeps	  in	  mind	  the	  national	  reality	  of	  the	  country	  in	  practice	  and	  in	  life,	  not	  just	  in	  
theory.”127	  	  
	   Interestingly,	  much	  of	  the	  FAR’s	  criticism	  of	  the	  PGT’s	  revolutionary	  strategy	  is	  
strikingly	  similar	  to	  criticism	  delivered	  by	  the	  MR-­‐13	  in	  their	  manifesto	  Documento	  de	  
las	  Sierra	  de	  las	  Minas	  (Document	  of	  Sierra	  de	  las	  Minas),	  which	  criticized	  the	  PGT’s	  
prioritization	  of	  electoral	  reformism	  over	  armed	  tactics,	  demonstrating	  how	  the	  FAR	  had	  
been	  shaped	  by	  their	  ideological	  debate	  with	  the	  MR-­‐13.	  With	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  
debilitating	  rift	  in	  oppositional	  unity	  looming	  on	  the	  horizon	  if	  the	  FAR	  were	  to	  abandon	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their	  coalition	  with	  the	  PGT,	  the	  PGT	  agreed	  to	  integrate	  a	  more	  militant	  position	  into	  
their	  revolutionary	  methodology	  by	  March	  1965.	  Thus,	  while	  the	  MR-­‐13	  faded	  into	  
obscurity	  after	  their	  separation	  from	  the	  FAR	  in	  the	  mid	  1960s,	  they	  fashioned	  an	  
ideological	  and	  methodological	  debate	  that	  would	  be	  borrowed	  and	  reshaped	  by	  the	  
FAR	  when	  confronting	  their	  strategic	  divergences	  with	  the	  PGT	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
The	  evolution	  of	  the	  PGT’s	  revolutionary	  strategy	  
In	  late	  1964,	  PGT	  leader	  Victor	  Manuel	  Gutiérrez	  released	  a	  statement	  that	  sought	  to	  
explain	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  armed	  struggle	  in	  Guatemala	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  inability	  
for	  free	  political	  determination	  or	  sovereignty:	  	  
“The	  armed	  struggle	  is	  a	  response	  by	  the	  democratic	  forces	  to	  the	  violence	  of	  
the	  dominant	  classes	  and	  imperialists	  that	  have	  closed	  the	  door	  to	  the	  electoral	  
possibility	  of	  the	  pueblo…the	  armed	  revolution	  is	  one	  of	  the	  forms	  of	  popular	  
struggle…the	  political	  struggle,	  the	  syndical	  movement,	  and	  the	  armed	  struggle	  
are	  aimed	  at	  modifying	  the	  economic	  structure	  of	  this	  country…and	  to	  create	  the	  
conditions	  that	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  new	  society	  demands.”128	  	  
	  
While	  admitting	  the	  national	  conditions	  of	  Guatemala	  now	  required	  the	  use	  of	  armed	  
tactics,	  Gutiérrez	  remained	  defiant	  that	  an	  armed	  struggle	  should	  be	  one	  of	  many	  forms	  
implemented	  in	  their	  strategy	  of	  resistance.	  In	  a	  press	  release	  on	  December	  18,	  1965,	  
Gutiérrez	  defended	  the	  PGT’s	  revolutionary	  strategy	  of	  incorporating	  multiple	  forms	  of	  
struggle	  in	  tandem	  with	  an	  armed	  struggle:	  
	  	   “The	  Party	  has	  not	  underappreciated	  other	  forms	  of	  political	  struggle,	  on	  the	  
	   contrary,	  we	  have	  analyzed	  the	  value	  of	  such	  perspectives	  and	  respect	  the	  
	   position	  of	  various	  organizations	  who	  think	  that	  we	  can	  end	  the	  military	  
	   dictatorship	  through	  electoral	  processes.	  The	  Party	  knows	  that	  the	  particular	  
	   experiences	  of	  each	  organization	  informs	  what	  road	  they	  choose….the	  Party	  
	   continues	  to	  be	  the	  only	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  organization	  in	  Guatemala,	  whose	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   mission	  is	  to	  end	  the	  division	  of	  classes,	  the	  exploitation	  of	  man	  by	  man,	  and	  the	  
	   construction	  of	  a	  socialist	  society	  in	  Guatemala.”129	  
	  
	   In	  the	  FAR’s	  perspective,	  however,	  the	  PGT	  did	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  in	  their	  
endorsement	  of	  the	  armed	  struggle,	  taking	  issue	  with	  the	  PGT’s	  continued	  insistence	  on	  
looking	  for	  electoral	  openings,	  while	  rejecting	  the	  “electoral	  farce	  of	  liberal	  bourgeois	  
democracy.”130	  To	  the	  FAR,	  there	  was	  only	  one	  revolutionary	  path,	  the	  armed	  path.	  	  
In	  May	  1965,	  the	  PGT	  clarified	  their	  position	  on	  armed	  tactics	  in	  a	  document	  called	  Diez	  
Tesis	  sobre	  Cuestiones	  de	  Organización	  (Ten	  Theses	  on	  Organizational	  Questions):	  	  
	   “For	  us	  the	  question	  of	  the	  way	  of	  revolution	  is	  a	  strategic	  one…	  forms	  of	  
	   struggle	  change	  with	  the	  changing	  political	  situation…	  we	  believe	  that	  	   the	  
	   objective	  conditions	  exist	  in	  Guatemala	  only	  for	  the	  armed	  way…this	  does	  
	   not	  mean	  however,	  that	  this	  is	  our	  immediate	  objective.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  we	  
	   are	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  Guatemalan	  revolution	  will	  be	  a	  long	  process…	  
	   will	  pass	  through	  various	  stages	  (characteristic	  of	  any	  people’s	  war).”131	  	  
	  
The	  PGT	  retained	  hopes	  that	  a	  “peaceful”	  resolution	  could	  be	  reached	  by	  fighting	  for	  
democratic	  position	  and	  initiating	  reform	  from	  within	  Guatemala’s	  current	  system	  of	  
governance.	  The	  PGT	  argued	  that	  they	  could	  implement	  a	  tactical	  offensive,	  while	  
simultaneously	  retaining	  a	  policy	  of	  strategic	  self-­‐defense.	  Diez	  Tesis	  sobre	  Cuestiones	  
de	  Organización	  concluded	  that	  the	  party	  should	  simplify	  their	  organizational	  structure	  
in	  hopes	  that	  by	  removing	  unnecessary	  bureaucracy	  they	  could	  refocus	  their	  time	  and	  
resources	  more	  efficiently.	  PGT	  General	  Secretary	  Bernardo	  Alvarado	  Monson	  explained	  
that	  the	  document	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  PGT’s	  “traditional	  organizational	  structure	  no	  
longer	  answered	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  new	  conditions”	  and	  that	  	  “new	  forms	  of	  struggle	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call	  for	  new	  organizational	  forms…	  with	  regional	  committees	  dedicated	  to	  organizing	  
the	  masses	  with	  armed	  struggle.”132	  The	  PGT	  were	  beginning	  to	  realize	  that	  they	  could	  
no	  longer	  serve	  as	  the	  sole	  vanguard	  of	  the	  revolution.	  However,	  the	  notion	  of	  multiple	  
vanguards	  did	  not	  necessarily	  contradict	  the	  party’s	  methodological	  approach	  of	  
popular	  front	  building,	  a	  political	  strategy	  that	  advocated	  for	  a	  multi-­‐class	  political	  
movement	  capable	  of	  rallying	  diverse	  segments	  of	  Guatemalan	  society	  into	  the	  struggle	  
for	  revolutionary	  change.	  According	  to	  Debray,	  the	  PGT’s	  insistence	  on	  democratic	  
solutions	  was	  partially	  to	  ensure	  their	  participation	  in	  any	  “future	  negotiations	  for	  
setting	  up	  a	  civilian-­‐cum-­‐military	  junta	  or	  coalition.”133	  	  
	   However,	  Monson	  defended	  the	  Party’s	  utility	  within	  the	  revolutionary	  
movement,	  proclaiming,	  “We	  are	  part	  of	  the	  continental	  revolution…however,	  we	  know	  
that	  doubts	  and	  apprehensions	  are	  being	  voiced	  as	  regards	  our	  general	  line…we	  believe	  
that	  the	  people,	  and	  their	  vanguard,	  the	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  party,	  must	  find	  their	  own	  
path	  of	  revolution.”134	  The	  PGT	  were	  committed	  to	  securing	  a	  middle-­‐ground	  
revolutionary	  strategy	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  mitigate	  the	  internal	  polarization	  that	  was	  
fragmenting	  the	  party.	  Monson	  declared	  the	  ‘far	  left’	  
	  	  	  	   “have	  a	  tendency	  to	  ‘skip	  stages’…[they]	  underestimate	  the	  need	  to	  build	  a	  
	   united	  front.	  They	  insisted	  solely	  on	  armed	  struggle,	  underestimating	  other	  
	   forms	  as	  well	  as	  the	  role	  of	  the	  working	  class	  and	  its	  Party…had	  this	  trend	  gained	  
	   the	  upper	  hand	  (in	  PGT	  rank-­‐in-­‐file)	  we	  clearly	  would	  have	  succumbed	  to	  sheer	  
	   adventurism.”	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However,	  Monson	  also	  maintained	  that	  the	  most	  ‘conservative’	  faction	  of	  the	  party,	  
those	  who	  rejected	  the	  role	  of	  armed	  tactics	  completely,	  were	  just	  as	  dangerous	  as	  the	  
“far	  left”	  and	  were	  “risking	  isolation	  from	  the	  masses”	  135	  	  	  
Chapter	  conclusion	  	  
In	  the	  early	  1960s,	  the	  establishment	  of	  Guatemala’s	  first	  significant	  guerrilla	  
movement,	  the	  FAR,	  and	  its	  Cuban-­‐styled	  revolutionary	  strategy	  of	  armed	  insurrection,	  
challenged	  the	  PGT’s	  historic	  leadership	  of	  Guatemala’s	  radical	  left.	  This	  chapter	  has	  
illustrated	  why	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  diverged	  so	  vehemently	  on	  revolutionary	  strategy	  
by	  tracking	  their	  historical	  origins	  and	  guiding	  political	  ideologies	  (the	  Communist	  Party,	  
Cuban	  foquísmo,	  and	  Trotskyism).	  While	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  forged	  an	  alliance	  in	  
hopes	  that	  revolutionary	  unity	  would	  make	  their	  objective	  of	  constructing	  a	  “Nueva	  
Guatemala”	  easier	  to	  realize,	  they	  struggled	  to	  secure	  a	  shared	  methodology	  of	  
resistance,	  one	  that	  reconciled	  the	  fundamental	  disagreement	  on	  the	  role	  of	  electoral	  
reformism	  versus	  armed	  tactics.	  The	  tension	  between	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  was	  far	  from	  
over;	  in	  December	  1965,	  with	  the	  announcement	  of	  presidential	  elections	  scheduled	  for	  
March	  1966,	  the	  new	  PGT/FAR	  leadership	  would	  face	  a	  serious	  challenge	  to	  their	  
revolutionary	  unity,	  consumed	  in	  the	  polarizing	  debate	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  participate	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Chapter	  Two:	  Experimenting	  with	  Electoral	  Democracy	  
	  
	  “She	  [PGT]	  thinks	  with	  certainty	  that	  tomorrow	  she	  will	  be	  alive,	  I	  [the	  FAR]	  on	  the	  
other	  hand,	  know	  that	  most	  likely	  tomorrow	  I’ll	  be	  dead.”136	  	  
	  
–FAR	  leader	  César	  Montes	  on	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  
	  
	  
“The	  problem	  with	  voting	  for	  Mendez	  in	  ‘66	  was	  that	  his	  political	  success	  depended	  on	  
the	  eradication	  of	  the	  FAR.”137	  	  
	  
–	  FAR	  guerrilla	  leader	  Pablo	  Monsanto	  
	  
	  
Chapter	  introduction	  	  
The	  primary	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  the	  Guatemalan	  presidential	  election	  of	  1966.	  
Utilizing	  this	  election	  as	  a	  case	  study	  of	  strategic	  divergence,	  I	  analyze	  the	  fierce	  debate	  
that	  ensued	  between	  the	  FAR	  and	  the	  PGT	  regarding	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  participate	  in	  
the	  election.	  
	   Following	  the	  1966	  election,	  the	  deteriorating	  socio-­‐political	  conditions	  in	  
Guatemala	  shaped	  the	  ongoing	  internal	  debate	  between	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  into	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  decade.	  	  I	  discuss	  how	  the	  acceleration	  of	  social	  and	  political	  violence	  from	  
1966-­‐1968	  affected	  the	  methodological	  debate	  between	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  
concerning	  the	  primacy	  of	  electoral	  versus	  armed	  tactics.	  	  
	   Finally,	  I	  examine	  how	  both	  the	  revolutionary	  perspectives	  of	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  
FAR	  evolved	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade,	  after	  it	  became	  apparent	  that	  the	  new	  Julio	  César	  
Méndez	  Montenegro	  administration,	  and	  by	  extension	  electoral	  democracy	  in	  general,	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was	  incapable	  of	  generating	  the	  radical	  changes	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  envisioned	  for	  
Guatemala.	  
Historical	  framework	  
As	  the	  FAR	  increasingly	  applied	  pressure	  on	  the	  PGT	  to	  embrace	  armed	  tactics	  over	  
electoral	  reformism,	  the	  radical	  left	  became	  embroiled	  in	  a	  larger	  geo-­‐political	  debate	  
that	  was	  dividing	  the	  global	  left.	  Historian	  David	  A.	  Crain	  explains	  that	  the	  PGT	  was	  
divided	  between	  Moscow’s	  Party	  Communism	  with	  its	  “flexibility	  towards	  the	  peaceful	  
road	  to	  socialism	  which	  better	  suited	  standard	  operating	  procedures	  of	  the	  traditional	  
Latin	  American	  Communist	  parties”	  and	  the	  growing	  influence	  of	  Cuba’s	  foquísmo	  
within	  the	  FAR	  –	  which	  called	  for	  the	  preeminence	  of	  armed	  tactics.138	  PGT	  leader	  
Bernardo	  Alvarado	  Monson	  attempted	  to	  mitigate	  the	  methodological	  divide	  between	  
the	  Communist	  Party	  and	  Cuban	  foquísmo,	  declaring:	  “We	  manifest	  our	  solidarity	  with	  
all	  other	  legitimate	  groups	  who	  oppose	  and	  fight	  North	  American	  imperialism,	  our	  
principle	  enemy…	  we	  sadly	  regret	  the	  divergences	  between	  the	  brothers	  Cuba	  and	  
Venezuela.”139	  However,	  Monson	  also	  asserted	  that	  while	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  should	  
be	  hailed,	  “now	  Cuba	  is	  exerting	  too	  strong	  an	  influence	  on	  Guatemala	  affairs.”140	  This	  
global	  debate,	  which	  was	  primarily	  a	  source	  of	  divergence	  within	  the	  FAR	  and	  the	  PGT	  
theoretically,	  concretely	  manifested	  when	  the	  prospect	  of	  presidential	  elections	  forced	  
the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  election.	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  On	  September	  15,	  1965	  Guatemala	  passed	  a	  new	  constitution,	  which	  called	  for	  
“democratic”	  elections	  to	  be	  held	  in	  March	  1966.141	  The	  constitution	  included	  a	  new	  
electoral	  law	  that	  required	  political	  parities	  to	  submit	  a	  list	  of	  50,000	  members	  if	  they	  
wanted	  to	  run	  a	  candidate	  in	  the	  election.	  This	  clause	  prevented	  most	  political	  parties,	  
including	  the	  PGT,	  from	  directly	  participating	  in	  the	  upcoming	  elections.	  It	  was	  a	  “tool	  of	  
electoral	  fraud,”	  Guatemalan	  historian	  Jim	  Handy	  asserted;	  and,	  in	  the	  end,	  only	  three	  
political	  parties	  were	  permitted	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  presidential	  election.142	  The	  
Revolutionary	  Party	  (PR),	  the	  most	  progressive	  of	  the	  three,	  fashioned	  a	  political	  
platform	  that	  promised	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  political	  reforms.	  The	  PR	  selected	  its	  leader	  
Mario	  Méndez	  Montenegro	  as	  its	  candidate,	  a	  career	  politician	  who	  contributed	  to	  the	  
passing	  of	  a	  new	  Guatemalan	  Constitution	  in	  1945,	  igniting	  the	  politically	  progressive	  
period	  in	  Guatemala	  known	  as	  the	  “Ten	  Years	  of	  Spring”	  from	  1944-­‐1954.	  However,	  
before	  the	  election	  Méndez	  Montenegro	  was	  found	  dead	  from	  a	  “suspicious	  suicide”	  on	  
October	  31,	  1965.143	  As	  a	  result,	  his	  brother	  Julio	  César	  Méndez	  Montenegro	  took	  his	  
place	  and	  began	  campaigning	  for	  the	  presidency.144	  César	  Méndez	  Montenegro,	  like	  his	  
brother,	  ran	  a	  campaign	  promising	  “cautious	  reform,”	  but	  he	  also	  pledged	  not	  to	  
interfere	  with	  the	  military.145	  	  
	   	  In	  early	  January	  1966,	  while	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  were	  debating	  whether	  or	  not	  
to	  support	  Méndez	  Montenegro,	  FAR	  leader	  Luis	  Augusto	  Turcios	  Lima	  traveled	  to	  Cuba	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to	  participate	  in	  the	  first	  Tri-­‐continental	  Conference	  of	  Solidarity	  against	  foreign	  
imperialism	  from	  January	  3-­‐15.146	  While	  Turcios	  Lima	  was	  abroad	  in	  Cuba,	  the	  PGT’s	  
Provisionary	  Revolutionary	  Leadership	  Center	  voted	  to	  formally	  support	  Méndez	  
Montenegro	  and	  participate	  in	  the	  upcoming	  presidential	  elections.147	  The	  PGT	  
leadership	  was	  encouraged	  by	  Méndez	  Montenegro’s	  campaign	  of	  reform,	  and	  began	  
actively	  advocating	  on	  his	  behalf	  in	  the	  hopes	  that	  this	  election	  could	  be	  the	  electoral	  
opportunity	  that	  could	  transform	  their	  revolutionary	  struggle	  back	  into	  democratic	  
form.	  Historian	  Greg	  Grandin	  contends	  that	  the	  PGT	  believed	  the	  election	  of	  1966	  
“could	  reproduce	  the	  October	  Revolution”	  and	  could	  return	  the	  Communists	  [PGT]	  to	  
legal	  status	  and	  influence,”	  to	  establish	  a	  democratic	  and	  patriotic	  regime.148	  César	  
Montes,	  acting	  leader	  of	  the	  FAR	  in	  Turcios	  Lima’s	  absence	  in	  Cuba,	  voted	  against	  
participating	  in	  the	  election	  but	  was	  outnumbered	  by	  the	  mainly-­‐PGT	  pro-­‐participatory	  
lobby.	  The	  PGT’s	  decision	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  elections	  of	  1966	  infuriated	  the	  FAR	  
leadership,	  particularly	  because	  the	  decision	  was	  voted	  upon	  in	  Turcios	  Lima’s	  absence.	  
	   As	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  ferociously	  debated	  the	  merits	  of	  participating	  in	  the	  
upcoming	  presidential	  election,	  the	  U.S.	  assisted	  the	  Guatemalan	  military	  plan	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“Operation	  Cleanup,”	  a	  military	  operation	  designed	  to	  eradicate	  the	  guerrillas	  in	  a	  major	  
counter-­‐insurgency	  surge.149	  On	  the	  day	  before	  the	  presidential	  election,	  March	  5,	  1966,	  
“Operation	  Cleanup”	  came	  into	  full	  effect;	  at	  least	  twenty-­‐eight	  “communists”	  were	  
rounded	  up,	  tortured,	  and	  killed	  including	  most	  of	  the	  PGT	  leaders	  who	  had	  worked	  for	  
revolutionary	  change	  during	  the	  Arévalo	  and	  Árbenz	  administrations.	  However,	  the	  next	  
day	  on	  March	  6,	  1966	  the	  Guatemalan	  electorate	  went	  to	  the	  polls	  without	  any	  
knowledge	  of	  what	  had	  transpired	  the	  day	  before.	  To	  the	  surprise	  of	  most	  observers	  
including	  the	  CIA,	  Méndez	  Montenegro	  won	  the	  election,	  indicating	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  
the	  Guatemalan	  electorate	  desired	  reform.150	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  PGT	  were	  cautiously	  
optimistic	  that	  they	  may	  have	  succeeded	  in	  bringing	  democracy	  back	  to	  Guatemala.	  	  
	   In	  the	  mid	  1960s,	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)	  ranked	  Guatemala’s	  tax	  
system	  71/72	  on	  “effectiveness”	  and	  “equality,”	  with	  the	  Guatemalan	  National	  Planning	  
Council	  calculating	  90%	  of	  rural	  families	  were	  “landless”	  or	  “lack	  enough	  to	  subsist.”151	  
Furthermore,	  as	  of	  1964,	  Guatemalan	  government	  revenue	  was	  a	  mere	  7.9%	  of	  GNP,	  
and	  tax	  revenue	  only	  constituted	  7.1%	  of	  total	  government	  revenue,	  a	  percentage	  that	  
was	  the	  lowest	  in	  Central	  America.	  To	  address	  these	  serious	  fiscal	  issues,	  Méndez	  
Montenegro	  proposed	  a	  “modest	  property	  tax,”	  but	  his	  efforts	  at	  tax	  reform	  were	  
quickly	  abandoned	  when	  he	  was	  labeled	  a	  “communist”	  and	  faced	  overwhelming	  
opposition.152	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   On	  July	  15,	  1966	  the	  PGT	  accepted	  a	  government	  ceasefire	  and	  truce.	  As	  a	  result,	  
the	  FAR	  guerrillas	  demobilized	  and	  made	  permanent	  camps.	  By	  September	  1966,	  FAR	  
leader	  Turcios	  Lima	  began	  to	  question	  whether	  the	  decision	  to	  demobilize	  might	  be	  a	  
costly	  error,	  anticipating	  the	  military’s	  counter-­‐insurgency	  offensive.	  However,	  before	  
Turcios	  Lima	  could	  see	  if	  his	  premonition	  of	  a	  counter-­‐insurgency	  offensive	  would	  come	  
true,	  he	  was	  killed	  on	  October	  2,	  1966	  in	  a	  car	  crash.	  On	  October	  3,	  1966,	  Turcios	  Lima’s	  
forewarning	  of	  a	  military	  offensive	  proved	  to	  be	  true;	  from	  1966-­‐1967,	  the	  Guatemalan	  
military	  initiated	  a	  scorched	  earth	  campaign	  that	  left	  an	  estimated	  8,000	  civilians	  dead	  
to	  defeat	  only	  100	  guerrillas.153	  
	   On	  December	  1,	  1966	  president	  Méndez	  Montenegro	  declared	  martial	  law	  and	  
suspended	  constitutional	  liberties.154	  From	  1967	  to	  1968,	  violence	  continued	  to	  escalate	  
in	  Guatemala,	  leading	  Handy	  to	  claim	  the	  “level	  of	  violence	  reached	  epidemic	  
proportions	  by	  mid-­‐term	  of	  the	  Méndez	  Administration.”155	  Facing	  a	  brutal	  counter-­‐
insurgency	  offensive,	  on	  January	  10,	  1968,	  the	  FAR	  formally	  withdrew	  from	  its	  alliance	  
with	  the	  PGT.156	  For	  the	  first	  time	  since	  the	  two	  oppositional	  movements	  united	  in	  1962,	  
they	  would	  be	  working	  completely	  independently	  of	  one	  another.	  Fresh	  from	  their	  split	  
with	  the	  FAR,	  the	  PGT	  called	  for	  their	  Fourth	  Congress	  to	  be	  held	  from	  December	  20-­‐22,	  
1969	  where	  they	  discussed	  the	  future	  of	  the	  party.	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   By	  1970,	  the	  FAR	  guerrillas	  were	  too	  weak	  to	  continue	  battling	  the	  Guatemalan	  
military	  and	  were	  unable	  to	  sustain	  significant	  guerrilla	  operations.	  Reflecting	  on	  the	  
FAR’s	  collapse	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1960s,	  FAR	  leader	  Mario	  Sánchez	  explained:	  
	   	  “the	  division	  of	  the	  FAR	  in	  ’67	  and	  ’68	  was	  practically	  the	  temporal	  defeat	  of	  the	  
	   armed	  revolution	  movement…There	  will	  always	  be	  organizations	  with	  more	  
	   power	  than	  others…	  some	  organizations	  have	  many	  resources	  but	  a	  limited	  
	   political	  understanding,	  some	  have	  good	  military	  organization	  but	  have	  organic	  
	   weaknesses.	  Hegemony	  fuels	  rivalry	  and	  lack	  of	  consensus.”157	  	  
The	  election	  of	  1966	  
When	  presidential	  elections	  were	  scheduled	  for	  March	  1966,	  Guatemala’s	  radical	  left	  
had	  a	  crucial	  decision	  to	  make:	  continue	  to	  exclusively	  develop	  the	  guerrilla	  war	  (as	  
proposed	  by	  the	  FAR),	  or	  participate	  in	  the	  elections	  (as	  advocated	  by	  the	  PGT).	  The	  
PGT,	  led	  by	  Victor	  Manuel	  Gutiérrez	  from	  exile	  in	  Mexico	  City,	  believed	  the	  elections	  
could	  shift	  the	  revolutionary	  struggle	  back	  onto	  an	  electoral	  and	  democratic	  stage,	  
arguing	  that	  the	  elections	  could	  serve	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  guerrilla	  violence.158	  In	  
January	  1966,	  Gutiérrez	  published	  a	  statement	  explaining	  PGT’s	  decision	  to	  participate	  
in	  the	  elections,	  contending	  “the	  principal	  task”	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  struggle	  was	  to	  
“end	  the	  military	  dictatorship	  and	  establish	  a	  democratic	  regime	  that	  is	  respectful	  of	  
human	  life.”	  159	  And,	  in	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  PGT,	  participation	  in	  the	  presidential	  
election	  of	  1966	  was	  the	  best	  opportunity	  they	  had	  to	  achieve	  these	  goals.	  Inspired	  by	  
their	  memories	  of	  the	  October	  Revolution,	  the	  PGT	  believed	  that	  the	  election	  could	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reproduce	  the	  democratic	  reformism	  that	  the	  party	  had	  helped	  Guatemala	  achieve	  from	  
1944-­‐1954.	  	  
	   In	  contrast,	  guided	  by	  Cuba’s	  non-­‐compromising	  revolutionary	  strategy	  of	  
foquísmo,	  and	  its	  related	  calls	  for	  revolutionary	  stamina,	  the	  FAR	  refused	  to	  believe	  that	  
a	  corrupt	  democracy	  could	  produce	  any	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  objectives	  they	  had	  
committed	  to	  achieving.	  The	  FAR	  reaffirmed	  that	  only	  road	  for	  the	  Guatemalan	  
revolution	  was	  the	  armed	  road,	  and	  that	  they	  must	  stand	  firm	  in	  their	  revolutionary	  
fight	  within	  a	  “prolonged	  war.”160	  In	  the	  perspective	  of	  FAR	  leader	  Turcios	  Lima,	  if	  the	  
FAR	  and	  the	  PGT	  participated	  in	  the	  upcoming	  presidential	  election	  of	  1966,	  their	  
strategy	  of	  a	  “prolonged	  war”	  would	  not	  have	  had	  time	  to	  run	  its	  course.	  Therefore,	  the	  
FAR	  diametrically	  rejected	  any	  utility	  of	  participating	  in	  the	  upcoming	  election.	   
	   When	  Turcios	  Lima	  learned	  of	  the	  PGT’s	  formal	  endorsement	  of	  PR	  candidate	  
Julio	  César	  Méndez	  Montenegro,	  he	  released	  a	  statement	  from	  the	  Tri-­‐continental	  
Conference,	  contending	  the	  debate	  between	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  demonstrated	  the:	  	  
“Sharpening	  crisis…	  between	  old	  and	  the	  new,	  between	  a	  conservative	  and	  
opportunistic	  perspective	  versus	  a	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  line	  and	  a	  static,	  dependent,	  
revisionist	  line	  of	  the	  PGT.	  The	  PGT,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  origin	  in	  class,	  reflect	  a	  
right-­‐wing,	  conservative,	  and	  compromising	  organization	  willing	  to	  negotiate	  
with	  the	  counter-­‐revolution…	  The	  bourgeoisie	  influence	  of	  PGT	  is	  enormous…[it]	  
reflects	  their	  methodological	  errors…	  [the	  PGT]	  are	  determined	  to	  fight	  for	  
legality	  under	  a	  bourgeoisie	  constitution,	  they	  are	  only	  interested	  in	  strong	  a	  
electoral	  movement…they	  are	  incapable	  of	  incorporating	  a	  clandestine	  fight	  with	  
the	  legal…and	  even	  less	  capable	  of	  creating	  the	  militaristic	  instruments	  capable	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of	  fighting	  imperialism…In	  reality,	  they	  are	  addicted	  to	  bourgeoisie	  habits	  of	  
compromise.”161	  
	  
Turcios	  Lima	  attacked	  the	  PGT’s	  exhaustive	  commitment	  to	  electoral	  participation,	  
suggesting	  that	  electoral	  participation	  was	  not	  a	  valid	  form	  of	  revolutionary	  struggle	  
because	  it	  demanded	  compromising	  with	  counter-­‐revolutionary	  forces,	  namely	  the	  
bourgeoisie.	  Turcios	  Lima	  declared	  that	  “no	  pacifist	  or	  legal	  possibilities”	  exist	  in	  the	  
Guatemalan	  revolution;	  instead,	  he	  called	  for	  violence	  to	  be	  met	  with	  violence.	  “The	  
road	  to	  our	  revolution	  doesn’t	  pass	  through	  ballot	  boxes,”	  Turcios	  Lima	  proclaimed.	  
Turcios	  Lima	  went	  on	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  FAR	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  participation	  in	  the	  
elections	  could	  translate	  into	  radical	  changes:	  “Reform	  is	  not	  an	  option,	  only	  a	  tricky	  
vicious	  circle	  of	  apparent	  change	  and	  illusions	  of	  democracy,	  history	  of	  this	  is	  repeated	  
time	  and	  time	  again.”162	  In	  an	  interview	  with	  French	  journalist	  Marcel	  Niedergang	  at	  the	  
Tri-­‐continental	  Conference,	  Turcios	  Lima	  described	  his	  perspective	  that	  the	  PGT	  were	  
incapable	  of	  leading	  a	  guerrilla	  war,	  proclaiming:	  “For	  us,	  guerrilla	  warfare	  is	  basic,	  and	  
that’s	  what	  brings	  us	  against	  the	  Communists,	  who	  are	  too	  often	  timid	  and	  
cautious…”163	  However,	  despite	  the	  vigorous	  protests	  of	  Turcios	  Lima,	  the	  FAR	  
ultimately	  accepted	  the	  PGT’s	  decision.	  At	  the	  Tri-­‐continental	  conference,	  Turcios	  Lima	  
explained:	  	  
	   “We	  do	  not	  propose	  to	  prevent	  the	  elections	  from	  taking	  place,	  because	  as	  yet	  
	   we	  do	  not	  have	  sufficient	  strength	  to	  do	  so.	  Quite	  a	  lot	  of	  people	  remain	  who	  
	   still	  naively	  expect	  something	  from	  the	  electoral	  game.	  But	  let	  it	  be	  clear	  that	  we	  
	   are	  strong	  enough…we	  shall	  forcibly	  prevent	  this	  vile	  deceit	  of	  the	  people	  from	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   continuing…If	  we	  revolutionaries	  were	  to	  participate	  in	  these	  elections,	  or	  if	  we	  
	   called	  upon	  the	  people	  to	  participate	  in	  them	  by	  voting	  for	  the	  Revolutionary	  
	   party	  or	  any	  of	  the	  other	  opposition	  parties,	  we	  would	  be	  giving	  our	  backing,	  our	  
	   principled	  support,	  our	  revolutionary	  approval	  and	  the	  support	  of	  the	  masses	  
	   who	  believe	  in	  us,	  to	  people	  who	  we	  know	  have	  no	  scruples,	  who	  we	  know	  are	  
	   the	  accomplices	  of	  reaction	  and	  imperialism.”164	  	  
	  
Turcios	  Lima	  perceived	  the	  PGT’s	  decision	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  elections	  of	  1966	  as	  a	  
triumph	  for	  the	  counter-­‐revolution,	  only	  serving	  to	  distract	  the	  radical	  left	  from	  the	  
principal	  conflict,	  that	  is,	  the	  armed	  conflict.	  The	  FAR	  deemed	  Guatemala’s	  democracy	  
as	  a	  hegemonic	  farce,	  where	  elections	  could	  only	  produce	  one	  possible	  outcome	  –	  
where	  there	  could	  be	  only	  one	  possible	  winner:	  that	  is,	  the	  dominant	  classes:	  the	  landed	  
oligarchy,	  urban	  bourgeoisie,	  foreign	  imperialists,	  and	  the	  Guatemalan	  military	  machine.	  
“There	  never	  really	  existed	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  new	  government,”	  the	  FAR	  said	  in	  an	  
official	  statement	  in	  1967—maintaining	  that	  the	  PGT	  was	  incapable	  of	  escaping	  their	  
propensity	  for	  legality—perpetually	  clinging	  to	  unrealistic	  notions	  of	  democracy.	  “No	  
reformists	  have	  been	  permitted	  to	  take	  power…even	  if	  they	  did	  take	  office,”	  FAR	  and	  
Cakchiquel	  indigenous	  leader	  Emilio	  Román	  López	  (Pasquel)	  asserted.165	  
	   Orlando	  Fernández,	  a	  FAR	  guerrilla,	  further	  criticized	  the	  PGT’s	  insistence	  on	  
electoral	  reformism	  because,	  in	  his	  view,	  it	  subjected	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  campesinos	  in	  the	  
countryside	  to	  urban	  politicking:	  “cities	  are	  easy	  traps	  of	  reformism	  …it	  should	  be	  the	  
countryside	  and	  guerrilla	  fighters	  that	  form	  the	  base	  nucleus	  of	  the	  worker-­‐peasant	  
alliance”166	  In	  an	  armed	  propaganda	  campaign	  in	  late	  1966,	  MR-­‐13	  leader	  Marco	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166 Crain, “Guatemalan Revolutionaries and Havana’s Ideological Offensive of 1966-1968,” Journal 
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Antonio	  Yon	  Sosa	  demonstrated	  the	  MR-­‐13’s	  position	  on	  the	  participating	  in	  the	  
election,	  proclaiming:	  “The	  peasant	  has	  nowhere	  to	  go	  and	  accepts	  death	  when	  it	  
comes…we	  want	  to	  live	  like	  in	  socialist	  countries,	  where	  there	  is	  food.	  We	  don’t	  get	  
anything	  from	  elections,	  only	  bourgeoisie	  governments	  defending	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  
rich	  and	  the	  imperialists.”167	  Like	  the	  FAR,	  the	  MR-­‐13	  maintained	  that	  electoral	  
democracy	  was	  not	  capable	  of	  generating	  radical	  changes	  for	  the	  campesinos	  in	  the	  
countryside.	  In	  Yon	  Sosa’s	  perspective,	  by	  compromising	  with	  counter-­‐revolutionary	  
forces,	  electoral	  participation	  only	  solidified	  the	  dominant	  classes’	  consolidation	  of	  
power.	  	  
	   Turcios	  Lima	  elucidates	  why	  the	  FAR	  were	  unequivocally	  opposed	  to	  electoral	  
participation	  by	  1966,	  arguing	  reformism	  was	  not	  sufficiently	  radical,	  maintaining	  
“economic	  problems	  can	  not	  be	  solved	  with	  partial	  reforms	  but	  with	  the	  revolutionary	  
transformations,	  diametrically	  opposed	  to	  the	  subservient	  policy	  of	  deferring	  to	  the	  
interests	  of	  the	  Yankee	  monopolies…Guatemalan	  guerrillas	  are	  not	  a	  sporadic	  
occurrence”168	  In	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  FAR,	  reform	  was	  not	  synonymous	  with	  
revolution,	  and	  they	  were	  not	  willing	  to	  compromise	  on	  this	  ideological	  distinction.	  
According	  to	  Uruguayan	  journalist	  Eduardo	  Galeano,	  a	  FAR	  sympathizer,	  participating	  in	  
the	  election	  of	  1966	  would	  merely	  serve	  to	  give	  the	  “dictatorship	  democratic	  form.”169	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The	  “Case	  of	  28”	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  PGT’s	  revolutionary	  line	  
The	  disappearance,	  torture,	  and	  murder	  of	  at	  least	  twenty-­‐eight	  of	  the	  PGT’s	  leaders	  on	  
the	  eve	  of	  the	  presidential	  election	  in	  March	  1966	  had	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  the	  PGT	  
party	  and	  their	  commitment	  to	  electoral	  democracy.	  Among	  those	  killed	  were	  PGT	  
leaders	  Victor	  Manuel	  Gutiérrez	  and	  Leonardo	  Castillo	  Flores.	  Without	  these	  leaders,	  
who	  had	  been	  active	  proponents	  of	  electoral	  participation	  and	  viewed	  electoral	  
democracy	  as	  a	  capable	  venue	  for	  radical	  reforms,	  the	  PGT’s	  political	  line	  defending	  
electoral	  reformism	  became	  problematic.	  While	  the	  PGT	  continued	  to	  advocate	  for	  the	  
merits	  of	  electoral	  reformism	  as	  one	  form	  of	  revolutionary	  struggle,	  the	  “case	  of	  28”	  
radicalized	  many	  in	  the	  party,	  converting	  them	  to	  a	  more	  militant	  position	  regarding	  the	  
future	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  struggle.	  Despite	  the	  “case	  of	  28,”	  the	  PGT,	  at	  least	  publicly,	  
initially	  retained	  their	  position	  that	  the	  elections	  had	  been	  a	  triumph	  for	  the	  revolution.	  
However,	  it	  quickly	  became	  evident	  that	  the	  Méndez	  Montenegro	  administration	  was	  
not	  capable	  of	  implementing	  most	  of	  the	  reforms	  that	  it	  had	  promised	  during	  the	  
presidential	  campaign;	  the	  military	  had	  consolidated	  power	  and	  Méndez	  Montenegro	  
was	  unable	  to	  escape	  its	  authoritative	  directive.	  In	  an	  article	  published	  in	  the	  World	  
Marxist	  Review	  in	  October	  1966,	  PGT	  leader	  Bernardo	  Alvarado	  Monson	  maintained	  
that	  many	  in	  the	  PGT	  retained	  their	  position	  that	  electoral	  participation	  was	  a	  valid	  
revolutionary	  tool;	  but,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  Monson	  asserted,	  the	  PGT	  had	  become	  
increasingly	  disillusioned	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  tangible	  reforms:	  	  	  
	   “Montenegro’s	  victory	  does	  not	  refute	  the	  fundamental	  conclusions	  of	  the	  Party	  
	   because,	  among	  other	  things,	  it	  has	  in	  effect	  led	  to	  no	  appreciable	  shift	  in	  the	  
	   balance	  of	  class	  forces…Montenegro	  cannot,	  even	  if	  he	  wanted	  to	  do	  so,	  carry	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   out	  the	  revolutionary	  changes	  needed	  by	  the	  country	  and	  demanded	  by	  the	  
	   people…”170	  
	  
PGT	  leader	  José	  Manuel	  Fortuny	  further	  clarified	  the	  PGT’s	  position	  on	  the	  Méndez	  
Montenegro	  administration	  in	  late	  1966,	  contending:	  	  
	   “The	  newly	  installed	  government	  styles	  itself	  the	  ‘third	  revolutionary	  
	   government’…But	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  would	  be	  an	  oversimplification	  to	  qualify,	  
	   as	  some	  people	  do,	  the	  new	  Montenegro	  administration	  as	  the	  ‘fourth	  
	   government	  of	  the	  counter-­‐revolution’	  …The	  government	  has	  little	  room	  to	  
	   maneuver	  and	  the	  prospects	  are	  that	  the	  noose	  in	  which	  it	  is	  caught	  will	  be	  
	   drawn	  tighter	  by	  the	  top	  brass	  …doomed	  to	  inactivity	  both	  by	  reasons	  beyond	  
	   their	  control	  and	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  any	  volition	  of	  their	  own,	  the	  men	  in	  the	  
	   government	  have	  but	  one	  objective	  –	  to	  retain	  their	  grip	  on	  the	  machinery	  of	  the	  
	   state….	  Paradoxically	  	  enough,	  the	  government	  was	  far	  more	  interested	  in	  an	  
	   amnesty	  than	  the	  revolutionaries	  for	  whom	  it	  was	  intended.”	  171	  
	  
In	  Fortuny’s	  view,	  the	  election	  of	  Méndez	  Montenegro	  represented	  the	  political	  will	  of	  
the	  marginalized	  fragments	  of	  the	  Guatemalan	  society.	  If	  such	  fragments	  were	  “class	  
conscious”	  and	  “economically	  stronger,”	  Fortuny	  argued,	  they	  could	  pressure	  the	  
government	  into	  democratic	  reforms.	  However,	  Fortuny	  maintained	  that	  the	  Méndez	  
Montenegro	  administration	  was	  incapable	  of	  doing	  so	  because	  of	  the	  military’s	  grip	  on	  
power,	  which	  represented	  the	  will	  of	  the	  dominant	  classes	  who	  rejected	  reform.172	  
	   The	  FAR	  believed	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  Méndez	  Montenegro	  to	  enact	  any	  tangible	  
reforms	  was	  making	  it	  increasingly	  clear	  that	  he	  was	  a	  “slave	  to	  the	  system,”	  and	  not	  all	  
too	  dissimilar	  to	  the	  authoritative	  dictatorships	  that	  came	  before	  him.173	  Furthermore,	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FAR	  leader	  Turcios	  Lima	  began	  to	  realize	  that	  the	  ‘truce’	  and	  ‘pacification,’	  which	  the	  
Méndez	  Montenegro	  government	  offered	  the	  guerrillas,	  was	  just	  a	  political	  guise,	  a	  ploy	  
to	  conceal	  the	  military’s	  true	  objective:	  the	  eradication	  of	  the	  guerrilla.	  In	  a	  publication	  
of	  the	  Tri-­‐continental	  Bulletin	  in	  late	  1966,	  Turcios	  Lima	  publically	  rejected	  the	  military’s	  
“truce,”	  declaring,	  “We	  do	  not	  accept	  the	  ultimatum.	  Our	  struggle	  will	  continue.	  Our	  
objective	  is	  to	  conquer	  power.”174	  To	  prevent	  an	  all-­‐out	  blitz,	  Turcios	  Lima	  called	  on	  the	  
FAR	  to	  remobilize	  and	  to	  prepare	  for	  war.175	  He	  called	  for	  revolutionary	  unity	  on	  armed	  
tactics,	  increased	  military	  training	  and	  equipment,	  and	  the	  re-­‐establishment	  of	  supply	  
lines.	  Turcios	  Lima	  explained	  his	  understanding	  of	  “present-­‐day	  Guatemala”	  a	  few	  
months	  after	  the	  election	  and	  why	  the	  subjective	  conditions	  required	  the	  primacy	  of	  
armed	  tactics:	  
	   “Even	  though	  the	  election	  took	  place	  in	  relative	  tranquility,	  it	  was	  tinged	  with	  a	  
	   variety	  of	  political	  colors,	  which	  were	  the	  immediate	  outcome	  of	  the	  
	   complicated	  situation	  in	  present-­‐day	  Guatemala.	  One	  must	  not	  forget	  that	  in	  this	  
	   country	  of	  ours,	  which	  has	  long	  been	  under	  dictatorial	  rule,	  it	  is	  unavoidable	  that	  
	   not	  a	  few	  people	  are	  tired	  of	  so	  many	  deaths	  and	  so	  much	  bloodshed.	  Thus,	  
	   these	  citizens	  sought	  and	  expected	  a	  final	  change	  of	  the	  system	  though	  peaceful	  
	   means.	  It	  was	  precisely	  because	  of	  this	  that	  the	  revolutionary	  FAR	  
	   leadership…decided	  to	  vote	  for	  Julio	  César	  Méndez	  Montenegro	  –	  not	  because	  
	   we	  supposed	  this	  distinguished	  lawyer	  would	  be	  able	  to	  modify	  the	  present	  
	   situation…voting	  for	  Julio	  César	  Méndez	  Montenegro	  represents	  a	  form	  of	  
	   struggle	  against	  the	  arbitrary	  behavior	  of	  the	  government	  and	  also	  a	  
	   demonstration	  of	  public	  opinion...Therefore	  the	  victory	  of	  the	  candidate	  of	  the	  
	   Revolutionary	  party	  signifies	  a	  political	  victory	  of	  the	  FAR,	  for	  the	  Guatemalan	  
	   people	  have	  through	  the	  voting	  expressed	  their	  irrepressible	  desire	  for	  changing	  
	   the	  system.	  However,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  repeat	  and	  stress	  the	  point	  that	  the	  
	   guerrillas	  do	  not	  have	  the	  slightest	  doubt	  about	  what	  road	  to	  take,	  for	  there	  is	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   only	  one	  road.	  This	  is	  by	  no	  means	  the	  road	  of	  elections	  but	  the	  road	  of	  armed	  
	   struggle.”176	  
	  
After	  witnessing	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Méndez	  Montenegro	  administration	  to	  achieve	  any	  
real	  reforms,	  even	  PGT	  leader	  Fortuny	  agreed	  with	  Turcios	  Lima	  that	  the	  armed	  struggle	  
would	  have	  to	  continue,	  maintaining	  that:	  
	   “Some	  people	  feel	  that	  the	  present	  political	  situation	  affords	  grounds	  for	  
	   changing	  the	  line	  of	  the	  Party,	  for	  turning	  to	  the	  peaceful	  path	  as	  the	  only	  
	   possible	  alternative	  for	  the	  present	  line.	  Those	  who	  think	  so	  confuse,	  at	  best,	  
	   the	  forms	  of	  struggle	  and	  the	  overall	  course	  of	  the	  revolution…	  PGT	  holds	  that	  
	   in	  the	  present	  situation/conditions	  of	  the	  revolution	  can	  only	  be	  carried	  out	  
	   by	  armed	  struggle.	  Those	  who	  fail	  to	  see	  this	  will	  be	  caught	  in	  a	  vicious	  circle…	  
	   The	  form	  of	  the	  struggle	  is	  another	  matter.”177	  
	  
	   After	  Turcios	  Lima’s	  death,	  César	  Montes	  was	  appointed	  commander	  of	  the	  FAR.	  
César	  Montes	  had	  been	  isolated	  in	  the	  mountains	  at	  the	  time	  and	  some	  believed	  that	  he	  
was	  elected	  FAR	  Commander	  because	  it	  was	  thought	  he	  could	  easily	  be	  manipulated.	  
However,	  this	  notion	  soon	  proved	  misguided	  as	  César	  Montes	  continued	  Turcios	  Lima’s	  
outspoken	  opposition	  to	  electoral	  reformism.	  “Nothing	  has	  changed	  since	  Turcios	  died,”	  
Montes	  said	  to	  foreign	  journalist	  Georgie	  Anne	  Geyer	  in	  late	  1966,	  “We	  gradually	  
indoctrinate	  the	  peasants	  until	  a	  strong	  peasant	  army	  is	  formed…	  a	  long	  war….	  
Montenegro	  is	  not	  a	  guerrilla,	  but	  a	  gorilla.”178	   	  
Post-­‐1966	  reflections	  upon	  Guatemala’s	  electoral	  democracy	  
In	  an	  interview	  in	  1981,	  FAR	  guerrilla	  leader	  Pablo	  Monsanto	  reflected	  that	  the	  
“guerrillas	  made	  a	  huge	  mistake	  by	  endorsing	  Méndez	  during	  armed	  propaganda…in	  the	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early	  months	  of	  1966	  the	  guerrillas	  actually	  carried	  the	  sign	  ‘Vote	  for	  Mendez’…the	  
choice	  to	  endorse	  Méndez	  cost	  the	  guerrilla	  movement	  everything.”179	  On	  March	  7,	  
1967	  the	  FAR	  released	  a	  document	  called	  the	  Documento	  de	  Marzo	  (March	  Document),	  
which	  argued	  that	  the	  PGT’s	  decision	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  elections	  of	  1966	  was	  a	  
tactical	  catastrophe,	  and	  called	  for	  unity	  around	  fully	  embracing	  armed	  tactics.	  In	  the	  
Documento	  de	  Marzo	  the	  FAR	  explained	  that	  the	  
	   “central	  determinant	  that	  led	  PGT	  to	  support	  Julio	  César	  Méndez	  Montenegro	  
	   was	  his	  personality…they	  did	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  social	  
	   classes	  that	  led	  and	  influenced	  his	  politics…the	  fundamental	  objective	  of	  this	  
	   perspective	  was	  to	  constitute	  a	  hegemonic	  power	  of	  the	  oligarchy	  in	  favour	  of	  
	   the	  dominant	  classes	  who	  are	  against	  the	  pueblo…the	  political	  survival	  of	  
	   Méndez	  Montenegro	  depended	  on	  military	  victory	  over	  the	  FAR…If	  they	  beat	  the	  
	   the	  FAR	  in	  the	  countryside…they	  could	  initiate	  minor	  reforms	  that	  gives	  ultimate	  
	   authority	  to	  the	  military	  and	  oligarchy….	  The	  problem	  with	  electoral	  
	   participation	  is	  that	  it	  justifies	  the	  Méndez	  administration	  to	  commit	  acts	  of	  
	   repression	  with	  the	  facade	  of	  the	  people’s	  popular	  will.”180	  
	  
The	  FAR	  maintained	  that	  not	  only	  did	  participating	  in	  the	  election	  of	  1966	  fail	  to	  deliver	  
radical	  changes,	  it	  also	  gave	  the	  military	  the	  ability	  to	  claim	  they	  held	  a	  popular	  mandate	  
to	  continue	  its	  counter-­‐insurgency	  offensive.	  The	  Documento	  de	  Marzo	  emphasized	  the	  
FAR’s	  opposition	  to	  the	  PGT’s	  revolutionary	  strategy	  of	  electoral	  manoeuvring	  and	  
prioritization	  of	  legal	  modes	  of	  resistance,	  declaring:	  	  	  
	   “The	  PGT	  is	  too	  focused	  on	  how	  to	  make	  the	  best	  use	  of	  legality…and	  in	  doing	  so	  
	   lose	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  moment	  and	  of	  the	  process…	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  PGT	  are	  
	   saying	  they	  want	  to	  return	  to	  ‘normality’	  and	  are	  thus	  surrendering…And	  what	  
	   were	  the	  results	  of	  supporting	  this?	  We	  haven’t	  had	  one	  significant	  advance	  to	  
	   the	  syndical	  movement.”181	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The	  FAR	  took	  particular	  exception	  with	  the	  PGT’s	  continued	  hesitance	  to	  fully	  embrace	  
the	  necessity	  of	  an	  armed	  struggle,	  instead	  clinging	  to	  a	  strategy	  of	  strategic	  “self-­‐
defence.”	  The	  FAR	  maintained:	  
	   	  “The	  adoption	  of	  ‘self-­‐defence’	  by	  the	  PGT	  in	  1966	  does	  not	  reflect	  a	  
	   revolutionary	  perspective…it	  only	  lets	  the	  enemy	  go	  on	  the	  offensive…Our	  
	   struggle	  has	  to	  be	  on	  the	  offensive,	  always	  extending	  to	  new	  geographic	  zones	  to	  
	   convert	  the	  war	  into	  a	  national	  war,	  to	  incorporate	  new	  sectors	  of	  society	  into	  
	   the	  struggle.”182	  	  
	  
The	  FAR	  argued	  that	  the	  central	  methodological	  issue	  with	  the	  PGT’s	  strategy	  of	  “self-­‐
defence”	  was	  that	  it	  abandoned	  the	  campesinos	  in	  the	  countryside,	  who	  were	  facing	  the	  
brunt	  of	  the	  military’s	  offensive.	  “We	  reject	  the	  superiority	  of	  the	  working	  class	  over	  
campesinos,”	  the	  FAR	  declared	  in	  1968.183	  The	  PGT	  defended	  their	  strategy	  of	  “self-­‐
defence”	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  extend	  the	  revolutionary	  struggle	  to	  more	  moderate	  
segments	  of	  Guatemalan	  society	  who	  had	  become	  alienated	  with	  the	  FAR’s	  violent	  
tactics.	  However,	  to	  the	  FAR,	  the	  PGT	  were	  sacrificing	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  
campesinos	  in	  the	  countryside	  to	  do	  so.	  This	  methodological	  incongruity	  concerning	  
what	  segment	  of	  Guatemalan	  society	  should	  lead	  the	  revolution	  was	  a	  divisive	  one;	  the	  
FAR	  blamed	  the	  PGT	  for	  abandoning	  the	  campesinos	  in	  favour	  of	  urban	  workers,	  though	  
this	  dialectical	  accusation	  was	  largely	  a	  mechanism	  for	  rallying	  campesino	  support	  for	  
the	  guerrillas	  in	  the	  countryside.	  
	   In	  the	  Documento	  de	  Marzo,	  the	  FAR	  increasingly	  hinted	  that	  a	  split	  with	  the	  PGT	  
was	  imminent,	  proclaiming	  that	  “the	  weaknesses	  and	  absolute	  sense	  of	  a	  military	  line	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and	  the	  predominance	  of	  a	  bureaucratic	  political	  line	  has	  made	  FAR	  and	  PGT	  
incompatible,”	  adding	  that	  the	  PGT	  was	  too	  focused	  on	  the	  urban	  middle	  class	  at	  the	  
expense	  of	  the	  rural	  campesino	  to	  continue	  leading	  the	  revolution:	  “No	  longer	  will	  the	  
fight	  be	  led	  by	  political	  leaders	  who	  don’t	  know	  how	  to	  conduct	  war,	  we	  will	  manage	  
ourselves	  without	  bureaucratic	  apparatuses…the	  organization	  of	  the	  proletariat	  is	  in	  
fighting,	  not	  in	  debate	  club.”184	  The	  FAR	  emphasized	  that	  their	  lack	  of	  political	  
leadership	  on	  the	  PGT	  Central	  Committee	  would	  have	  to	  be	  modified	  if	  the	  PGT	  were	  
interested	  in	  sustaining	  their	  revolutionary	  alliance,	  contending:	  
	   	  “Many	  have	  discussed	  the	  difference	  in	  ‘political	  work’	  and	  ‘military	  
	   work’…’political	  spaces’	  and	  ‘military	  spaces’…creating	  a	  ghost	  of	  militarism	  that	  
	   is	  used	  to	  justify	  indecision,	  opportunism…we	  have	  to	  end	  this	  because	  these	  are	  
	   our	  greatest	  errors	  and	  weaknesses…Our	  struggle	  is	  political	  process	  because	  it’s	  
	   a	  military	  process	  in	  method	  and	  dynamics…this	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  ‘guerrilla	  war	  
	   of	  the	  people’…therefore,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  have	  an	  exclusively	  political	  
	   organization…in	  the	  future	  we	  will	  not	  have	  political	  leaders	  who	  don’t	  know	  
	   how	  to	  conduct	  war,	  nor	  make	  military	  leaders	  part	  of	  political	  
	   commissions…The	  separation	  of	  the	  political	  struggle	  and	  the	  military	  struggle	  is	  
	   artificial	  and	  dangerous…	  the	  PGT	  has	  demonstrated	  it’s	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  the	  
	   present.”185	  	  
	  
	   In	  response	  to	  the	  FAR’s	  Documento	  de	  Marzo,	  Fortuny	  defended	  the	  PGT’s	  
historic	  contributions	  to	  the	  armed	  struggle	  in	  a	  publication	  of	  the	  World	  Marxist	  Review	  
in	  July	  1967:	  
	   “On	  weighing	  the	  national	  realities	  and	  the	  problems	  and	  prospects	  of	  
	   Guatemala’s	  development…our	  Party	  embarked	  on	  armed	  struggle	  aimed	  at	  a	  
	   popular	  anti-­‐imperialist	  revolution	  and	  its	  subsequent	  growth	  into	  a	  socialist	  
	   revolution.	  The	  success	  of	  the	  guerrilla	  movement	  and	  the	  armed	  resistance	  
	   groups	  under	  leadership	  of	  FAR,	  in	  which	  our	  Party	  plays	  a	  prominent	  part,	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   shows	  we	  have	  chosen	  the	  right	  course…We	  know	  that	  revolutionary	  war	  entails	  
	   bloodshed	  and	  sacrifice.”186	  
	  
However,	  the	  PGT	  continued	  to	  defend	  their	  methodological	  position	  that	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  armed	  struggle	  should	  be	  simultaneously	  implemented	  in	  tandem	  
with	  the	  deployment	  of	  electoral	  tactics.	  	  	  
Internal	  implosion	  
The	  PGT’s	  insistence	  on	  “multiple	  forms”	  and	  their	  hesitance	  to	  fully	  embrace	  armed	  
tactics	  finally	  tested	  the	  FAR’s	  patience	  for	  too	  long.	  On	  January	  21,	  1968	  FAR	  leader	  
César	  Montes	  issued	  a	  statement	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  FAR	  explaining	  their	  decision	  to	  split	  
from	  the	  PGT	  as	  a:	  
	   “Necessary	  and	  profoundly	  revolutionary	  measure…	  because	  it	  means	  
	   moving	  out,	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  of	  a	  bogged-­‐down	  phase	  of	  incipient	  guerrilla	  
	   development…a	  phase	  sidetracked	  by	  the	  incorrect,	  opportunist	  line	  of	  
	   general	  orientation	  laid	  down	  by	  a	  small	  group	  of	  old	  PGT	  leaders…who	  
	   managed	  to	  influence	  the	  revolutionary	  ranks	  with	  their	  policy…	  the	  break	  
	   with	  PGT	  is	  culmination	  of	  a	  weeding-­‐out	  process	  that	  is	  perfectly	  natural	  in	  
	   the	  historical	  development	  of	  a	  revolution…On	  one	  side	  is	  a	  revolutionary	  
	   idea,	  which	  sees	  war	  as	  the	  peoples	  instrument	  and	  method	  of	  taking	  power	  
	   …a	  radical	  vision,	  audacious,	  young,	  dynamic…on	  the	  other	  side	  the	  
	   pseudo-­‐revolutionary	  idea,	  no	  confidence	  in	  the	  peoples	  ability	  to	  take	  power,	  
	   confidence	  in	  the	  bourgeoisie	  to	  direct	  a	  democratic	  regime	  of	  state	  capitalism	  
	   progressing	  peacefully,	  evolving	  tranquilly	  toward	  socialism…it	  would	  try	  to	  use	  a	  
	   political	  argument	  to	  make	  the	  bourgeoisie	  recognize	  its	  right	  of	  participation	  in	  
	   the	  government.	  This	  is	  a	  submissive,	  opportunist,	  faint	  hearted,	  outmoded,	  
	   passive	  vision.”187	  	  
	  
César	  Montes	  painted	  a	  polarizing	  picture	  contrasting	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR,	  portraying	  
the	  PGT	  as	  a	  group	  of	  outmoded	  politicians,	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  the	  national	  conditions	  
that	  made	  Guatemala	  yearn	  for	  revolution	  and	  incapable	  of	  directing	  military	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campaigns.	  The	  FAR	  questioned	  the	  PGT’s	  revolutionary	  strategy	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  prolific	  
social	  and	  political	  violence,	  rejecting	  the	  PGT’s	  notion	  that	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  achieve	  a	  
“peaceful”	  transition	  to	  socialism.	  According	  to	  César	  Montes,	  the	  PGT	  were	  incapable	  
of	  enduring	  the	  bloodshed	  that	  accompanied	  war	  while	  the	  FAR,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
were	  enduring	  heavy	  casualties.	  Furthermore,	  the	  FAR	  argued	  that	  the	  PGT	  was	  too	  
comfortable	  making	  alliances	  with	  the	  bourgeoisie	  to	  “direct	  a	  democratic	  regime	  of	  
state	  capitalism,”	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  solidifying	  campesinos,	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  workers,	  
as	  their	  primary	  bases	  of	  support.	  	  
	   César	  Montes	  juxtaposed	  this	  image	  of	  the	  PGT	  with	  a	  radically	  different	  image	  
of	  the	  FAR,	  which	  he	  described	  as	  “audacious”	  and	  “dynamic,”	  willing	  to	  sacrifice	  
everything	  for	  a	  “Nueva	  Guatemala,”	  including	  their	  lives.	  He	  essentially	  offered	  
Guatemala’s	  radical	  left	  a	  choice:	  the	  PGT	  or	  the	  FAR,	  implying	  one	  could	  no	  longer	  
support	  both	  groups	  as	  their	  revolutionary	  strategies	  had	  reached	  a	  point	  of	  
irreconcilable	  divergence.	  	  
	   In	  March	  1968,	  the	  PGT	  released	  a	  statement	  responding	  to	  the	  FAR’s	  departure	  
from	  their	  revolutionary	  coalition	  called	  Situación	  y	  Perspectivas	  de	  la	  Revolución	  
Guatemalteca	  (Circumstances	  and	  Perspectives	  on	  the	  Guatemalan	  Revolution),	  which	  
named	  “ultra-­‐leftism”	  the	  worst	  enemy	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  movement.	  The	  PGT	  urged	  
“all	  forms	  of	  struggle,	  including	  elections”	  to	  be	  pursued.“188	  “After	  four	  years	  of	  armed	  
struggle,	  active	  participation	  of	  the	  masses…have	  yet	  to	  be	  secured,”	  the	  PGT	  declared,	  
arguing	  the	  FAR’s	  insistence	  on	  violent	  tactics	  had	  lost	  the	  revolutionary	  movement	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




support	  from	  less	  radical	  segments	  of	  the	  movement	  including	  workers,	  students,	  and	  
peasants.189	  Situación	  y	  Perspectivas	  de	  la	  Revolución	  Guatemalteca	  embodied	  how	  the	  
debate	  between	  the	  FAR	  and	  the	  PGT	  had	  evolved	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1960s,	  with	  the	  
PGT	  increasingly	  focused	  on	  alleviating	  their	  blame	  for	  the	  strategic	  misstep	  of	  
participating	  in	  the	  election	  of	  1966,	  instead	  laying	  blame	  on	  the	  FAR’s	  violent	  tactics	  
that	  had	  cost	  them	  invaluable	  support	  from	  the	  moderate	  fragments	  of	  the	  movement.	  	  
	   Situación	  y	  Perspectivas	  de	  la	  Revolución	  Guatemalteca	  sarcastically	  responded	  
to	  the	  FAR’s	  assertion	  that	  “they	  give	  the	  dead	  bodies,	  while	  the	  PGT	  gives	  the	  ideas,”	  
by	  publishing	  a	  list	  of	  names	  of	  all	  the	  PGT	  members	  who	  had	  died	  throughout	  the	  
decade.	  Interestingly,	  in	  addition	  to	  listing	  Victor	  Manuel	  Gutiérrez	  and	  Leonardo	  
Castillo	  Flores	  as	  fallen	  PGT	  members,	  they	  also	  list	  FAR	  leader	  Turcios	  Lima,	  implying	  he	  
had	  supported	  and	  died	  representing	  the	  PGT.	  190	  Situación	  y	  Perspectivas	  de	  la	  
Revolución	  Guatemalteca	  continued	  by	  listing	  historical	  cases	  in	  which	  they	  directly	  
supported,	  and/or	  compromised,	  with	  the	  FAR	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  demonstrate	  they	  were	  
not	  culpable	  for	  the	  collapse	  of	  revolutionary	  unity:	  
	   “We	  gave	  FAR	  leadership	  roles	  on	  Central	  Committee	  in	  ’66	  and	  ’67	  –	  what	  
	   more	  could	  we	  do?”	  We	  financed	  FAR	  when	  we	  could;	  we	  have	  endorsed	  the	  
	   armed	  struggle.	  We	  don’t	  have	  to	  follow	  the	  Cuban	  Model;	  there	  is	  a	  role	  for	  
	   the	  Party.	  “Documento	  de	  Marzo”	  is	  simply	  not	  true,	  all	  our	  public	  documents	  
	   and	  private	  documents	  have	  endorsed	  the	  armed	  way…	  Radio	  Havana	  
	   spreads	  lies…	  PGT	  supports	  the	  armed	  struggle	  as	  the	  only	  way	  not	  for	  a	  love	  
	   of	  violence,	  or	  romanticism,	  or	  imitation	  of	  other	  struggles.	  Without	  mass	  
	   support,	  through	  moderate	  strategies	  of	  inclusion,	  our	  struggle	  is	  easily	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   countered	  –	  this	  is	  a	  prolonged	  war,	  in	  FAR’s	  own	  words…the	  armed	  way	  is	  
	   the	  fundamental	  strategy	  but	  combined	  with	  other	  forms.”191	  	  
	  
The	  PGT	  defended	  the	  party’s	  utility	  to	  the	  revolutionary	  struggle;	  suggesting	  Cuba’s	  
influence	  over	  the	  FAR	  had	  skewed	  historical	  facts	  and	  undervalued	  the	  historical	  
contributions	  made	  by	  the	  PGT	  to	  the	  Guatemalan	  revolution.	  In	  the	  PGT’s	  perspective,	  
electoral	  reformism	  was	  just	  one	  form	  of	  revolutionary	  struggle,	  arguing	  electoral	  
participation	  did	  not	  contradict	  the	  FAR’s	  armed	  tactics,	  as	  multiple	  forms	  of	  struggle	  
should	  be	  incorporated	  in	  order	  to	  extend	  the	  struggle	  onto	  multiple	  democratic	  levels	  
and	  popular	  fronts.	  The	  PGT	  proclaimed,	  “the	  FAR	  are	  ultra-­‐leftists,	  militaristic,	  
sectarian,	  immature…the	  PGT’s	  strategy	  is	  not	  just	  to	  include	  the	  most	  radical	  segments	  
of	  the	  population	  but	  also	  more	  moderate	  fragments	  to	  strengthen	  the	  movement.”192	  	  
To	  the	  PGT,	  the	  FAR’s	  “militaristic”	  strategy	  had	  cost	  the	  radical	  left	  support	  from	  the	  
more	  moderate	  segments	  of	  the	  citizenry.	  The	  PGT	  maintained	  that	  the	  Méndez	  
Montenegro	  government	  could	  have	  potentially	  passed	  more	  reforms	  if	  there	  had	  been	  
enough	  pressure	  applied	  by	  a	  more	  united	  citizenry	  to	  realize	  such	  reforms.	  However,	  
according	  to	  the	  PGT,	  the	  FAR	  had	  alienated	  their	  bases	  of	  support	  with	  their	  non-­‐
compromising	  tactics	  of	  violence,	  causing	  the	  moderate	  bases	  of	  support	  to	  quiet	  their	  
calls	  for	  radical	  change.	  	  
	   From	  the	  FAR’s	  perspective,	  compromising	  with	  what	  they	  termed	  the	  
“bourgeoisie”	  was	  merely	  a	  hegemonic	  conception	  of	  reform,	  not	  the	  revolutionary	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change	  they	  envisioned.	  In	  late	  1967,	  the	  FAR	  released	  a	  document	  that	  responded	  to	  
the	  PGT’s	  accusations	  that	  their	  violent	  tactics	  had	  cost	  the	  revolutionary	  movement	  
their	  bases	  of	  support:	  
	   “The	  PGT’s	  1967	  resolution	  talks	  about	  internal	  differences	  but	  they	  just	  
	   maintain	  their	  hegemonic	  direction	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  movement.	  They	  
	   don’t	  offer	  the	  pueblo	  a	  correct	  conception	  of	  the	  strategic	  development	  of	  
	   the	  armed	  fight.	  But,	  we	  aren’t	  going	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  Party	  unless	  the	  topic	  
	   is	  developing	  a	  guerrilla	  and	  popular	  front	  war–	  if	  PGT	  fails	  to	  be	  the	  
	   vanguard	  of	  the	  people,	  other	  revolutionary	  groups	  will	  fill	  the	  void.”193	  	  
	  	  
The	  FAR	  were	  not	  willing	  to	  compromise	  in	  order	  to	  achieve,	  what	  they	  predicted	  would	  
be,	  only	  inconsequential	  reforms.	  The	  FAR	  were	  committed	  to	  their	  strategy	  of	  
conquering	  power	  by	  an	  armed	  struggle,	  and	  any	  suggestion	  that	  they	  should	  soften	  
their	  rhetoric,	  they	  argued,	  was	  a	  distraction	  from	  the	  revolution.	  On	  January	  1,	  1968,	  in	  
coordination	  with	  their	  announcement	  of	  withdrawal	  from	  their	  revolutionary	  alliance	  
with	  the	  PGT,	  the	  FAR	  released	  a	  statement	  criticizing	  the	  PGT’s	  “opportunistic”	  
revolutionary	  line.	  The	  FAR	  proclaimed	  “The	  PGT’s	  policy	  has	  always	  been	  to	  decide	  
which	  is	  the	  main	  enemy,	  not	  in	  order	  to	  concentrate	  against	  this	  main	  enemy,	  but	  with	  
the	  aim	  of	  making	  deals	  with	  the	  ‘lesser	  enemies’…termed	  ‘united-­‐front-­‐work.”194	  	  	  
	   In	  April	  1968,	  the	  FAR	  released	  a	  document	  further	  explaining	  why	  the	  PGT’s	  
links	  with	  the	  bourgeoisie,	  and	  their	  half-­‐hearted	  embrace	  of	  armed	  tactics,	  made	  the	  
two	  movements	  fundamentally	  incompatible:	  
	   “The	  bourgeois	  influence	  over	  the	  PGT	  has	  been	  enormous	  and	  reflects	  their	  
	   conception	  of	  the	  revolution…the	  PGT	  organized	  a	  party	  under	  legality,	  a	  
	   syndical	  movement	  which	  formed	  under	  the	  illusion	  of	  evolutionary	  
	   development	  of	  the	  revolution,	  within	  a	  bourgeois	  constitution…	  To	  the	  PGT,	  the	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   armed	  struggle	  is	  a	  necessary	  tactic,	  an	  instrument	  of	  agitation,	  an	  element	  of	  
	   negotiation	  that	  can	  guarantee	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  power…	  We	  no	  	  longer	  will	  talk	  
	   about	  the	  Party,	  only	  the	  development	  of	  the	  guerrilla	  and	  popular	  army…	  PGT	  
	   only	  talks	  rhetorically	  about	  worker-­‐campesino	  alliance-­‐	  but	  they	  are	  just	  
	   addicted	  to	  hegemonic	  bourgeoisie	  tactics.	  We	  have	  arrived	  at	  the	  hour	  to	  
	   change	  the	  consigna	  from	  ‘everyone	  should	  be	  ready	  to	  fight	  at	  any	  movement’	  
	   to	  “Everyone	  fight	  now!””195	  	  
	  
To	  the	  FAR,	  the	  PGT’s	  historic	  acceptance	  of	  the	  armed	  struggle	  was	  only	  a	  tactic	  to	  
force	  the	  government	  to	  negotiate.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  PGT	  never	  fully	  developed	  or	  
supported	  the	  armed	  struggle,	  undermining	  the	  FAR’s	  strategy	  within	  their	  broader	  
revolutionary	  methodology	  that	  prioritized	  legal	  modes	  of	  resistance	  and	  electoral	  
reformism.	  In	  doing	  so,	  according	  to	  the	  FAR,	  the	  PGT	  distracted	  energy	  from	  the	  armed	  
struggle	  and	  prevented	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Guatemalan	  revolution.	  
	   In	  March	  1968,	  the	  PGT	  responded	  to	  the	  FAR’s	  withdrawal	  from	  their	  coalition	  
of	  revolutionary	  unity,	  declaring:	  	  
	   “After	  more	  than	  four	  years	  of	  the	  armed	  struggle	  we	  have	  not	  achieved	  the	  
	   active	  incorporation	  of	  the	  masses…	  The	  development	  of	  the	  struggle	  is	  not	  just	  
	   constituted	  in	  military	  action…but	  also	  definitely	  in	  the	  result	  of	  a	  political	  work,	  
	   working	  to	  constitute	  the	  masses...the	  revolution	  needed	  work	  on	  all	  sides,	  on	  all	  
	   fronts…not	  just	  in	  the	  mountains…”	  
	  
The	  PGT	  continued	  by	  criticizing	  Cuba’s	  influence	  over	  the	  FAR,	  particularly	  French	  
revolutionary	  theorist	  and	  pro-­‐FAR	  advocate	  Régis	  Debray,	  who:	  
	   “Planted	  the	  unilateral	  idea	  that	  the	  guerrilla	  is	  fundamental,	  that	  the	  party	  
	   needs	  to	  wait,	  	  that	  it’s	  [the	  party]	  not	  necessary	  to	  develop	  the	  armed	  struggle.	  
	   Based	  on	  the	  subjective	  conditions	  of	  the	  country,	  there	  does	  not	  exist	  another	  
	   road	  for	  the	  Guatemalan	  revolution	  than	  the	  way	  of	  the	  armed	  revolution.”	  196	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The	  PGT	  maintained	  their	  methodological	  orientation	  that	  the	  armed	  struggle	  should	  be	  
just	  one	  of	  many	  forms	  of	  resistance,	  arguing	  that	  the	  FAR’s	  radical	  militarism	  has	  failed	  
to	  transition	  from	  a	  guerrilla	  to	  a	  “popular	  war.”	  Thus,	  without	  such	  a	  “popular”	  war,	  the	  
PGT	  argued,	  “political	  work”	  was	  still	  necessary	  to	  expand	  the	  struggle	  to	  other	  
segments	  of	  the	  country.	  	  
	   The	  concept	  of	  “subjective	  conditions”	  began	  to	  show	  up	  in	  both	  the	  PGT	  and	  
the	  FAR	  correspondence	  with	  increased	  frequency	  during	  this	  period,	  forging	  a	  
theoretical	  debate	  on	  Marxist-­‐Leninism,	  which	  sought	  to	  define	  what	  it	  meant	  for	  the	  
“subjective	  conditions”	  of	  Guatemala	  to	  require	  an	  armed	  struggle.	  To	  the	  FAR,	  global	  
Marxism	  could	  not	  be	  blindly	  applied	  to	  the	  “subjective	  conditions”	  of	  Guatemala.197	  
However,	  the	  PGT	  maintained	  the	  FAR	  were	  misinterpreting	  Marxist-­‐Leninism	  and	  what	  
it	  meant	  for	  the	  	  “subjective	  conditions”	  of	  Guatemala	  to	  require	  armed	  tactics.	  To	  the	  
PGT,	  it	  did	  not	  mean	  abandoning	  the	  potential	  for	  electoral	  reformism	  completely,	  but	  
to	  implement	  both	  forms	  simultaneously.	  	  
	   In	  August	  1968,	  the	  PGT	  released	  a	  statement	  admitting	  an	  internal	  schism	  
within	  the	  party	  about	  embracing	  the	  primacy	  of	  armed	  tactics	  over	  electoral	  
reformism.	  However,	  they	  stressed	  it	  was	  only	  tactical	  divergence	  and	  retained	  unity	  
concerning	  the	  need	  to	  continue	  developing	  the	  armed	  struggle,	  contending:	  
	   “There	  is	  a	  difference	  which	  might	  be	  called	  merely	  tactical,	  for	  the	  different	  
	   Guatemalan	  revolutionary	  organizations	  have	  made	  it	  abundantly	  clear	  that	  the	  
	   only	  road	  is	  the	  armed	  road,	  a	  thesis	  always	  upheld	  by	  the	  party.	  What	  has	  
	   happened	  is	  that	  a	  group	  of	  our	  companions,	  some	  of	  them	  members	  of	  the	  
	   Central	  Committee,	  do	  not	  agree	  with	  fomenting	  a	  people’s	  revolutionary	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   war…there	  are	  no	  differences	  of	  opinion	  on	  the	  road	  to	  be	  followed,	  for	  the	  
	   party	  began	  and	  continues	  to	  support	  the	  armed	  road.	  The	  difference	  concerns	  
	   the	  way	  of	  carrying	  on	  this	  armed	  struggle…The	  Revolutionary	  Armed	  Forces	  will	  
	   turn	  our	  already	  blood-­‐soaked	  Guatemala	  into	  another	  Vietnam.”198	  	  
	  
The	  PGT’s	  Fourth	  Congress,	  1969	  
The	  PGT	  held	  their	  Fourth	  Congress	  on	  December	  22,	  1969,	  which	  reflected	  on	  the	  
party’s	  split	  with	  the	  FAR	  and	  re-­‐affirmed	  the	  Party’s	  methodology	  for	  the	  future.	  The	  
congressional	  resolution	  began	  by	  referencing	  the	  party’s	  origins	  in	  1949,	  self-­‐
proclaiming	  the	  PGT	  as	  the	  “Party	  of	  the	  Revolution.”	  The	  PGT	  emphasized	  how	  pivotal	  
the	  party	  was	  in	  the	  passing	  the	  Agrarian	  Reform	  Law	  of	  1952.199	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  PGT	  
wanted	  to	  reiterate	  that	  they	  had	  had	  been	  around	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
revolutionary	  struggle	  and	  remained	  the	  historical	  vanguard	  of	  the	  proletariat.	  	  
	   The	  PGT	  continued	  by	  reiterating	  their	  methodological	  position	  that	  the	  armed	  
path	  was	  their	  principal	  method	  of	  resistance,	  but	  insisted	  the	  Guatemalan	  revolution	  
should	  develop	  “all	  possible	  forms	  of	  political,	  economic,	  social,	  ideological	  struggle.”200	  
This	  demonstrated	  how	  the	  PGT	  still	  believed	  that	  electoral	  inclusion	  and	  political	  
sovereignty	  were	  valid	  objectives	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  struggle,	  contrasting	  themselves	  
further	  with	  the	  FAR	  who	  had	  wholly	  discarded	  electoral	  inclusion	  and	  reform	  from	  their	  
revolutionary	  strategy.	  The	  PGT’s	  congressional	  resolution	  contained	  a	  list	  of	  statutes,	  
with	  the	  first	  reading:	  	  
	   “In	  every	  society	  with	  divided	  classes,	  the	  development	  of	  an	  intense	  class	  
	   struggle	  has	  economic,	  ideological,	  and	  political	  forms.	  The	  decisive	  form	  is	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America, 80.  
199 PGT Comité Central del PGT, Situación y Perspectivas de la Revolución Guatemalteca (Guatemala, 
1968), 4. 




	   political	  struggle,	  which	  strives	  towards	  political	  power…to	  utilize	  power	  to	  
	   progress,	  liberate	  the	  masses	  from	  exploitation.	  To	  develop	  the	  class	  struggle	  
	   with	  success,	  we	  must	  organize…the	  political	  struggle	  is	  the	  most	  important.”201	  	  
	  
Here,	  the	  PGT	  not	  only	  defended	  the	  utility	  of	  a	  political	  struggle,	  but	  they	  also	  
prioritized	  it	  in	  their	  list	  of	  party	  statutes,	  implying	  electoral	  reformism	  would	  remain	  
central	  to	  the	  PGT’s	  political	  and	  revolutionary	  platform.	  The	  PGT	  explained	  their	  
position	  on	  this	  issue:	  
	   “The	  fundamental	  work	  of	  the	  Guatemalan	  pueblo	  is	  to	  struggle	  and	  advance	  the	  
	   revolutionary	  process…that	  will	  permit	  the	  taking	  of	  power	  to	  achieve	  agrarian	  
	   reform...to	  pass	  into	  socialism.	  But,	  at	  the	  same	  time…It	  is	  necessary	  to	  unite	  
	   organize,	  and	  struggle	  through	  all	  mediums,	  to	  achieve	  all	  of	  the	  immediate	  
	   political,	  economic,	  and	  social	  changes…As	  a	  result	  of	  utilizing	  all	  forms	  of	  
	   struggle,	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  political	  struggle	  and	  the	  armed	  struggle…the	  
	   dominant	  classes	  have	  to	  listen	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  people.”202	  	  
	  
	   The	  PGT’s	  Fourth	  Congressional	  Resolution	  took	  aim	  at	  the	  FAR’s	  claims	  that	  
they	  were	  the	  real	  vanguard	  of	  the	  proletariat,	  not	  the	  PGT.	  The	  resolution	  declared:	  
“We	  are	  the	  vanguard	  of	  the	  working	  class…	  FAR/MR-­‐13	  say	  they	  are	  part	  of	  the	  
revolution	  and	  adhere	  to	  a	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  line	  but	  their	  conceptions,	  strategy,	  
methods	  of	  struggle,	  say	  otherwise…	  FAR	  has	  mutilated	  true	  Marxism-­‐Leninism…”203	  
The	  PGT	  resolution	  continued	  by	  responding	  to	  what	  they	  perceived	  to	  be	  incongruities	  
in	  the	  FAR’s	  revolutionary	  theory	  and	  praxis:	  
	  	   “FAR	  thinks	  that	  there	  is	  no	  existence	  of	  a	  legal	  oppositional	  party,	  us,	  but	  by	  
	   ignoring	  the	  role	  of	  PGT	  and	  their	  legal	  alternatives	  they	  make	  the	  word	  
	   ‘opposition’	  synonymous	  to	  ‘reformism’…	  FAR	  always	  says	  we	  are	  part	  of	  the	  
	   bourgeoisie,	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  the	  subjective	  conditions	  of	  the	  country,	  but	  it	  
	   is	  not	  PGT	  who	  are	  constantly	  referencing	  the	  Vietnamese	  experience,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 The PGT. “Proyecto de Estatutos del Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo,” Materiales IV 
Congreso (1969): 1. 
202 The PGT, Programa de la Revolución Popular, aprobado por el IV Congreso del PGT (Guatemala, 
1969), 39. 
203 The PGT, El Camino de la Revolución Guatemalteca (Mexico, 1972), 45.   
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   wanting	  to	  copy	  their	  success…	  How	  they	  distort	  history!	  The	  FAR	  accuses	  
	   us	  of	  being	  part	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie	  –	  hegemonic	  obstacles	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  
	   the	  proletariat	  –	  but	  the	  very	  language	  they	  use	  is	  an	  affirmation	  of	  
	   bourgeoisie	  language	  –	  they	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  are	  unknowingly	  victims	  of	  
	   bourgeoisie	  influence.”204	  	  	  
	  
While	  the	  PGT	  attempted	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  the	  FAR	  in	  its	  Fourth	  Congress,	  
Carlos	  González,	  General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  PGT,	  claimed	  in	  1970	  that	  the	  Fourth	  
Congressional	  Resolution	  of	  1969	  was	  more	  an	  ideological	  defense	  than	  an	  issue	  of	  
revolutionary	  praxis.	  While	  the	  PGT	  continued	  to	  stress	  their	  position	  that	  multiple	  
forms	  of	  struggle	  should	  be	  implemented	  simultaneously,	  the	  PGT	  all	  but	  adopted	  the	  
line	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  guerrilla.	  	  “In	  the	  1960s,	  PGT	  was	  practically	  diluted	  in	  the	  FAR,”	  
González	  reflected,	  “with	  this	  period	  ending	  in	  ’69	  and	  PGT’s	  IV	  congress	  where	  we	  
ratified	  the	  armed	  way”205	  Although	  the	  PGT	  were	  not	  quick	  to	  admit	  it,	  their	  
revolutionary	  strategy	  had	  been	  heavily	  shaped	  by	  the	  FAR’s	  radical	  militarism,	  
essentially	  forcing	  them	  to	  accept	  the	  primacy	  of	  armed	  tactics	  over	  electoral	  
reformism.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade,	  the	  debate	  between	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  had	  
evolved	  from	  a	  debate	  on	  the	  revolutionary	  strategy	  they	  should	  employ	  in	  the	  future	  
(electoral	  versus	  armed	  tactics),	  into	  a	  debate	  defending	  the	  historic	  legacy	  of	  the	  
revolutionary	  strategies	  they	  had	  implemented	  in	  the	  past.	  
Chapter	  conclusion	  
By	  participating	  in	  the	  elections	  of	  1966,	  Guatemala’s	  radical	  left	  had	  conducted	  a	  costly	  
experiment	  in	  electoral	  democracy,	  an	  experiment	  that	  resulted	  in	  an	  irreconcilable	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fracture	  in	  revolutionary	  unity.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  FAR	  guerrillas	  were	  unable	  to	  counter	  the	  
military’s	  anti-­‐guerrilla	  insurgency	  and	  sustained	  debilitating	  losses.	  	  
	   Based	  on	  their	  writings	  during	  this	  time	  period,	  the	  role	  of	  electoral	  democracy	  
as	  a	  revolutionary	  tool	  was	  the	  most	  contentious	  issue	  that	  inhibited	  revolutionary	  unity	  
between	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR.	  To	  the	  FAR,	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  elections	  of	  1966	  to	  deliver	  
radical	  political,	  social,	  and	  economic	  changes	  unequivocally	  proved	  that	  revolution	  and	  
electoral	  democracy	  were	  incompatible.	  To	  the	  PGT,	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Méndez	  
Montenegro	  administration	  to	  deliver	  reforms	  was	  primarily	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  FAR’s	  
alienating	  and	  isolating	  militarism,	  which	  drained	  the	  movements	  of	  their	  bases	  of	  
support	  and	  inhibited	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  popular	  front	  capable	  of	  forcing	  the	  
government	  to	  concede	  their	  demands	  of	  reform.	  	  
	   Through	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1960s,	  the	  FAR	  and	  the	  PGT	  continued	  to	  debate	  their	  
methodological	  differences.	  While	  both	  groups	  were	  quick	  to	  defend	  their	  position	  as	  
the	  true	  vanguard	  of	  the	  revolution	  and	  the	  proletariat,	  the	  failure	  of	  electoral	  
democracy	  to	  deliver	  revolutionary	  change	  in	  Guatemala	  forced	  the	  PGT	  into	  accepting	  
the	  primacy	  of	  armed	  tactics	  by	  their	  Fourth	  Congressional	  Resolution	  in	  1969.	  
However,	  the	  PGT	  continued	  to	  retain	  their	  revolutionary	  position	  that	  advocated	  for	  









Chapter	  3:	  Infinita	  Tristeza	  (Infinite	  Misery)	  
	  
Throughout	  this	  thesis,	  I	  analyzed	  points	  of	  strategic	  divergence	  that	  fragmented	  and	  
polarized	  the	  Guatemalan	  radical	  left	  throughout	  the	  1960s.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  their	  
strategic	  divergence	  was	  a	  methodological	  dispute	  concerning	  the	  function	  of	  electoral	  
reformism	  within	  Guatemala’s	  struggle	  for	  revolutionary	  change.	  The	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  
vehemently	  disagreed	  on	  the	  ability	  for	  electoral	  democracy	  to	  generate	  radical	  socio-­‐
economic	  and	  political	  changes.	  The	  radical	  left’s	  polarizing	  methodological	  debate	  
throughout	  the	  1960s,	  demonstrated	  the	  wide	  heterogeneity	  of	  their	  perspectives	  and	  
the	  dynamic	  and	  non-­‐static	  mosaic	  of	  Guatemala’s	  radical	  left	  throughout	  the	  decade.	  
	   I	  conclude	  by	  examining	  the	  central	  elements	  in	  the	  formation	  and	  development	  
of	  both	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  to	  evaluate	  how	  these	  historical	  circumstances	  influenced	  
their	  methodological	  positions	  throughout	  1960s.	  I	  also	  summarize	  the	  arguments	  made	  
by	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  in	  their	  defense	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  PGT),	  or	  their	  disposal	  (in	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  FAR),	  of	  electoral	  democracy	  as	  a	  revolutionary	  venue	  capable	  of	  generating	  
radical	  changes.	  	  
Divergent	  origins	  mould	  divergent	  revolutionary	  paths	  
To	  conceptualize	  why	  the	  FAR	  and	  the	  PGT	  diverged	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  electoral	  reformism	  
as	  a	  revolutionary	  tool,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  examine	  how	  each	  group	  evolved	  over	  the	  course	  
of	  the	  1960s	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  political-­‐lines	  and	  revolutionary	  strategies.	  The	  PGT	  were	  
an	  oppositional	  political	  party	  that	  had	  experience	  working	  within	  electoral	  democracy	  
during	  the	  Ten	  Years	  of	  Spring.	  The	  PGT	  defended	  their	  historical	  contributions	  to	  the	  
Ten	  Years	  of	  Spring	  and	  rhetorically	  shaped	  the	  revolutionary	  struggle	  of	  the	  1960s	  as	  a	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continuation	  of	  that	  same	  struggle	  they	  had	  helped	  ignite	  a	  decade	  earlier.	  Their	  
position	  on	  electoral	  and	  democratic	  reformism	  was	  largely	  an	  inheritance	  from	  their	  
time	  successfully	  fighting	  for	  reform	  from	  within	  electoral	  democracy.	  The	  revolutionary	  
conditions	  they	  helped	  ferment	  during	  the	  Ten	  Years	  of	  Spring	  guided	  their	  political	  and	  
revolutionary	  lines	  into	  the	  1960s,	  influenced	  by	  both	  their	  electoral	  successes	  and	  the	  
undemocratic	  overthrow	  of	  President	  Jacobo	  Árbenz	  Guzmán.	  
	   By	  the	  early	  1960s,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  diverse	  factions	  of	  PGT	  wished	  to	  
embrace	  armed	  tactics	  was	  a	  divisive	  issue;	  unity	  quickly	  diminished	  along	  generational	  
lines	  as	  an	  ideological	  rift	  began	  to	  fragment	  the	  PGT.	  Generally,	  the	  older	  generation	  of	  
the	  PGT	  tended	  to	  articulate	  moderate	  positions,	  stressing	  diplomacy	  and	  electoral	  
participation	  as	  their	  key	  methods	  for	  inciting	  change.	  Contrastingly,	  the	  younger	  bloc	  of	  
the	  PGT,	  especially	  the	  Patriotic	  Youth	  Worker’s	  Party	  (JPT),	  began	  calling	  for	  the	  
development	  of	  an	  armed	  struggle;	  they	  demanded	  a	  political	  reorientation	  along	  
military	  lines,	  with	  many	  beginning	  to	  question	  if	  petty-­‐bourgeoisie	  intellectuals	  could	  
direct	  military	  operations.	  
	   In	  1962,	  after	  receiving	  pragmatic	  guerrilla	  instruction	  and	  ideological	  inspiration	  
from	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  in	  Havana,	  a	  radical	  faction	  of	  the	  PGT	  joined	  
with	  the	  military	  rebels	  who	  led	  a	  failed	  coup	  on	  November	  13,	  1960,	  forming	  a	  new	  
militaristic	  wing	  of	  the	  party,	  which	  called	  itself	  the	  Rebel	  Armed	  Forces	  (FAR).	  The	  
emergence	  of	  the	  FAR,	  and	  their	  calls	  for	  an	  armed	  struggle,	  challenged	  the	  PGT’s	  
engrained	  revolutionary	  leadership,	  and	  called	  into	  question	  the	  PGT’s	  strategy	  of	  
reformism	  and	  its	  emphasis	  on	  peaceful	  modes	  of	  resistance.	  In	  1966,	  FAR	  leader	  Luis	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Augusto	  Turcios	  Lima	  declared	  that	  “the	  vanguard	  position	  is	  won	  in	  daily	  struggle,	  the	  
[right	  to]	  leadership	  is	  gained	  through	  skillfully	  executing	  it.”	  Turcios	  Lima	  continued	  
that	  if	  “other	  organizations	  of	  revolutionaries	  with	  greater	  political	  vision”	  develop,	  then	  
they	  “will	  assume	  its	  role…	  [and]	  lead	  the	  revolution.”206	  The	  FAR	  argued	  that	  the	  PGT’s	  
insistence	  on	  the	  primacy	  of	  electoral	  and	  legal	  alternatives	  over	  guerrilla	  violence	  was	  a	  
flawed	  strategy	  given	  the	  subjective	  conditions	  of	  Guatemala.	  	  
	   While	  the	  PGT	  was	  guided	  by	  its	  previous	  electoral	  successes	  during	  the	  Ten	  
Years	  of	  Spring,	  the	  FAR	  was	  a	  movement	  of	  youth	  not	  formed	  until	  1962.	  The	  FAR	  
guerrillas	  were	  too	  young	  to	  remember	  the	  electoral	  successes	  of	  the	  Ten	  Years	  of	  
Spring	  in	  a	  meaningful	  way.	  In	  contrast,	  most	  came	  of	  age	  within	  a	  politically	  repressed	  
and	  socially	  oppressed	  Guatemala–-­‐where	  the	  idea	  of	  traversing	  a	  corrupt	  democracy	  to	  
achieve	  radical	  social,	  economic,	  and	  political	  change	  was	  unimaginable.	  The	  FAR	  
defied,	  and	  later	  rejected,	  what	  they	  perceived	  to	  the	  traditional	  opportunism	  of	  an	  “old	  
left,”	  arguing	  the	  PGT	  were	  too	  cozy	  with	  the	  national	  bourgeoisie	  to	  generate	  any	  real	  
radical	  change	  for	  campesinos	  in	  the	  countryside.	  Revolutionary	  change	  would	  be	  won	  
through	  an	  armed	  struggle,	  the	  FAR	  maintained,	  not	  through	  a	  corrupted	  ballot	  box.	  	  	  	  
	   	  Throughout	  the	  1960s,	  Guatemala’s	  radical	  left	  was	  unable	  to	  maintain	  a	  
revolutionary	  partnership	  that	  could	  reconcile	  their	  divergent	  political	  and	  economic	  
origins;	  backgrounds	  that	  helped	  shaped	  each	  of	  the	  movements’	  revolutionary	  
strategies.	  Despite	  an	  obsessive	  attitude	  towards	  securing	  revolutionary	  unity,	  the	  lack	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of	  such	  unity	  inhibited	  their	  ability	  to	  maintain	  a	  revolutionary	  opposition	  capable	  of	  
challenging	  a	  dynamic	  and	  multi-­‐dimensional	  Guatemalan	  state.	  	  
	   The	  fundamental	  source	  of	  divergence	  between	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  resided	  in	  
their	  strategic	  visions	  for	  the	  Guatemalan	  revolution.	  Throughout	  the	  mid	  1960s,	  the	  
FAR	  became	  increasingly	  unsatisfied	  playing	  a	  subordinate	  role	  on	  the	  PGT’s	  Central	  
Committee.	  In	  March	  1971,	  the	  FAR	  released	  a	  reflective	  statement	  on	  this	  issue,	  
contending	  the	  PGT	  lacked	  a	  “a	  dialectic	  understanding	  of	  the	  war,	  interpreting	  the	  
political	  struggle	  and	  the	  armed	  struggle	  as	  one…devaluing	  armed	  action	  as	  a	  mere	  
political	  tool…	  For	  us,	  the	  armed	  struggle	  is	  our	  political	  expression…	  the	  two	  are	  not	  
separated.	  Our	  military	  action	  is	  political.”	  The	  FAR	  went	  on	  to	  explain	  why	  they	  insisted	  
that	  armed	  tactics	  must	  supersede	  any	  electoral	  or	  legal	  struggle:	  “We	  don’t	  believe	  
that	  the	  principal	  way	  to	  rally	  the	  masses	  is	  reformism,	  we	  can’t	  use	  the	  tools	  of	  the	  
bourgeoisie…political	  violence	  is	  the	  stimulus	  that	  develops	  the	  consciousness	  and	  
catalyzes	  revolutionary	  organization.”207	  	  
	   The	  FAR	  proposed	  a	  new-­‐armed	  strategy	  of	  resistance,	  one	  that	  discarded	  the	  
utility	  of	  electoral	  reformism	  and	  its	  compromising	  with	  the	  dominant	  classes.	  In	  1973,	  
the	  FAR	  reflected	  on	  their	  failed	  experiment	  participating	  in	  the	  1966	  election,	  
proclaiming:	  
	   	  “Elections	  are	  a	  bourgeoisie	  game…Supporting	  Méndez	  was	  ‘collaboration’	  with	  
	   the	  system…	  a	  clear	  instrument	  of	  reaction…their	  [PGT]	  programs	  of	  reform	  do	  
	   not	  propose	  in	  any	  way	  to	  destroy	  the	  system	  of	  capitalist	  exploitation…the	  
	   vanguard	  of	  the	  proletariat	  must	  be	  those	  who	  destroy	  capitalism	  and	  construct	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   a	  socialist	  state…Political	  reform	  is	  a	  tool	  to	  sustain	  economic	  power	  so	  that	  
	   capitalist	  economies	  can	  continue	  uninterrupted.”208	  
	  
Furthermore,	  the	  FAR	  perceived	  the	  PGTs	  electoral	  manoeuvring	  and	  popular	  front	  
building	  as	  a	  betrayal	  to	  campesinos,	  who	  the	  FAR	  believed	  should	  lead	  the	  revolution.	  
“The	  campesinos…the	  exploited	  and	  oppressed	  pueblo,”	  FAR	  guerrilla	  leader	  Pablo	  
Monsanto	  declared,	  “do	  not	  believe	  in	  political	  parties,	  nor	  in	  electoral	  processes”209	  
Electoral	  democracy,	  the	  FAR	  maintained,	  was	  inherently	  incompatible	  with	  the	  
revolutionary	  change	  that	  could	  forge	  a	  “Nueva	  Guatemala.”	  
	   By	  the	  mid	  1960s,	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  FAR,	  the	  PGT	  consistently	  argued	  that	  
multiple	  forms	  of	  struggle,	  including	  both	  democratic	  and	  legal	  modes,	  should	  be	  
incorporated	  into	  their	  revolutionary	  strategy	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  extend	  the	  revolution	  
into	  diverse	  segments	  of	  the	  nation.	  In	  October	  1966,	  PGT	  leader	  Bernardo	  Alvarado	  
Monson	  summarized	  the	  PGT’s	  position	  on	  implementing	  multiple	  forms	  of	  struggle:	  
	   “The	  way	  of	  the	  revolution	  is	  closely	  linked	  with	  the	  forms	  of	  struggle,	  but	  the	  
	   two	  are	  not	  identical.	  The	  forms	  of	  struggle	  change	  with	  the	  changing	  political	  
	   situation.	  However,	  change	  in	  tactics	  occurs	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  
	   revolutionary	  process	  determined	  by	  the	  basic,	  long-­‐term	  trends	  of	  national	  
	   development…the	  theoretical	  concept	  of	  the	  peaceful	  way	  of	  the	  revolution	  
	   admits	  the	  use	  of	  armed	  force	  under	  certain	  circumstances….On	  the	  other	  
	   hand,	  peaceful	  and	  legal	  forms	  can	  and	  should	  be	  used,	  whenever	  this	  is	  
	   possible,	  side	  by	  side	  with	  armed	  forms.”210	  
	  
The	  PGT	  argued	  that	  without	  broadening	  their	  bases	  of	  support,	  to	  include	  less	  radical	  
segments	  of	  the	  Guatemalan	  population,	  they	  would	  never	  gain	  enough	  political	  will	  to	  
force	  the	  government	  to	  concede	  their	  demands.	  In	  1973,	  the	  PGT	  reflected	  on	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 “Que significan las elecciones burguesas” FAR Direccion Nacional Ejectutiva (September 1973): 
29-30, 38, 56.	  
209 Marta Harnecker, “Pueblos en Armas,” Serie Luchas Populares Latinoamericanas (1983), 28. 
210 Bernardo Alvarado Monson, “Some Problems of the Guatemalan Revolution,” World Marxist 
Review 9 (1966): 40.	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split	  with	  the	  FAR,	  arguing	  the	  FAR	  “don’t	  understand	  who	  the	  principal	  enemy	  is”	  and	  
that	  “the	  FAR’s	  lack	  of	  political	  experience	  leads	  them	  to	  fall	  into	  dogmatism.”211	  To	  the	  
PGT,	  their	  political	  experience	  during	  the	  Ten	  Years	  of	  Spring	  was	  an	  asset	  to	  the	  
revolution,	  not	  a	  quality	  or	  strategy	  that	  should	  have	  been	  demonized	  or	  devalued	  by	  
the	  FAR.	  
	   By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1960s,	  the	  PGT	  began	  to	  attack	  the	  FAR’s	  interpretation	  of	  
Marxism-­‐Leninism.	  To	  transition	  Guatemala	  from	  a	  capitalist	  to	  a	  socialist	  nation,	  the	  
PGT	  argued,	  certain	  “objective”	  and	  “subjective”	  conditions	  must	  be	  fulfilled.	  Without	  a	  
long-­‐term	  political	  vision,	  the	  PGT	  maintained,	  simply	  overthrowing	  the	  government	  
without	  harnessing	  the	  nation’s	  objective	  conditions	  (land,	  resources,	  modes	  of	  
production)	  and	  developing	  the	  subjective	  conditions	  (raising	  class-­‐consciousness	  and	  
rallying	  popular	  support	  for	  revolutionary	  change)	  via	  democratic	  reformism,	  would	  
send	  Guatemala	  into	  a	  state	  of	  anarchy.	  In	  1973,	  the	  PGT	  declared	  the	  FAR	  had	  a	  	  
“Bad	  digestion	  of	  Marxism-­‐Leninism…They	  don’t	  think	  its	  necessary	  to	  develop	  
legal	  forms	  of	  struggle…They	  think	  communism	  is	  a	  degeneration	  of	  
reformism…The	  FAR	  perceive	  the	  legality	  of	  our	  movement	  as	  isolation	  from	  the	  
masses...They	  ignore	  the	  need	  for	  a	  transitory	  period	  between	  the	  construction	  
of	  socialism…socialism	  requires	  a	  material-­‐base,	  a	  historical	  process	  that	  creates	  
the	  objective	  and	  subjective	  conditions	  for	  the	  development	  [of	  socialism],	  
without	  such	  conditions	  socialism	  can’t	  be	  developed…	  They	  don’t	  understand	  
that	  you	  can’t	  just	  overthrow	  the	  state	  without	  a	  transitory	  vision…	  a	  socialist	  
state	  can’t	  develop	  out	  of	  nothing...	  It’s	  a	  utopian	  vision.”212	  
	  
	  The	  PGT	  believed	  that	  they	  had	  to	  play	  the	  bourgeois	  political	  game	  in	  order	  to	  conquer	  
it.	  According	  to	  the	  PGT,	  the	  transition	  to	  socialism	  in	  Guatemala	  required	  proper	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objective	  conditions–-­‐modes	  of	  production	  had	  to	  be	  harnessed,	  not	  broken.	  Therefore,	  
the	  PGT	  believed	  they	  needed	  to	  take	  control	  of	  the	  state,	  democratically,	  in	  order	  to	  
control	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  apparatuses	  that	  dictated	  the	  nation’s	  material	  
revolutionary	  conditions.	  The	  FAR’s	  non-­‐compromising	  violence,	  and	  its	  unilateral	  goal	  
of	  toppling	  the	  government,	  was	  short-­‐sighted	  in	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  PGT,	  and	  
ultimately	  weakened	  the	  radical	  left’s	  ability	  to	  advance	  the	  struggle	  for	  revolutionary	  
change	  in	  Guatemala.	  	  
Final	  remarks	  
While	  the	  FAR	  and	  the	  PGT	  generally	  opposed	  the	  same	  enemy	  throughout	  the	  1960s;	  
namely,	  U.S.	  interventionism	  and	  imperialism,	  agrarian	  inequity,	  economic	  inequality,	  
and	  social/political	  violence,	  Guatemala’s	  radical	  left	  was	  often	  fanatically	  focused	  on	  
delivering	  internal	  criticism	  at	  one	  another.	  In	  the	  process,	  the	  PGT	  and	  the	  FAR	  
increasingly	  failed	  to	  secure	  revolutionary	  unity,	  enabling	  the	  Guatemalan	  military	  to	  
capitalize	  on	  a	  fragmented	  and	  disorganized	  revolutionary	  movement.	  Reflecting	  on	  the	  
methodological	  schism	  that	  consumed	  the	  radical	  left	  in	  the	  1960s,	  FAR	  guerrilla	  Mario	  
Sánchez	  recalled,“[the	  1960s]	  was	  a	  period	  in	  the	  revolutionary	  process	  where	  there	  
was	  a	  huge	  distrust	  amongst	  one	  organization	  to	  another.”213	  The	  inability	  to	  maintain	  
political	  and	  revolutionary	  unity	  throughout	  the	  1960s	  resulted	  in	  parallel	  movements	  
that	  operated	  largely	  in	  isolation	  from	  one	  another.	  In	  the	  process,	  they	  divided	  their	  
bases	  of	  support	  and	  battled	  for	  limited	  financial	  and	  material	  resources.	  Without	  a	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unified	  revolutionary	  front,	  they	  were	  easily	  defeated	  by	  a	  well-­‐trained	  and	  well-­‐
equipped	  military.	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